




You've Read Where's The Rest of Me?
Now Read

HERE'S THE REST OF HIM

The Story of Ronald Reagan,
Acting Governor, During The
All-Important First Legislative Year

BY KENT STEFFGEN

HERE'S THE REST OF HIM

Kent H. Steffgen

FORSIGHT BOOKS

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
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Good-by GOP

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INTRODUCTION

Several things prompted this report. Among them: deep resentment in California's Republican Party since Ronald Reagan entered office; unprecedented national publicity favoring a conservative candidate; a "Cloud 9" Republican posture going into a presidential year—the most serious of all national events short of war. Republicans are not merely overlooking significant things about Ronald Reagan; this year, they are inclined to reject even the normal run of inquiry. And finally, the United States has no record of Ronald Reagan's performance in office and the demand has been growing since November of 1966.

This expose is intended to serve the function of the minority voice in politics generally when its cause is justified; namely, the restoration of the two-party position; to restore a sense of balance to Republican hopes this year; and to reveal some of the less obvious stakes of the election.

All discussions on Ronald Reagan in California since 1966 were prompted by a genuine and overriding concern for the Republican Party as an instrument for better government. The party is really the point of the whole debate and doubly so for those whose invaluable contributions are included here.

As to Reagan's liberal-left Democratic background—charter member of the Americans for Democratic Action, 13 years with the United World Federalists, three times president of the left-of-center Screen Actors Guild, etc.—it is old news, and every American must be allowed to change his station in life.

Of far greater bearing on the 1968 elections than past affiliations are statements like Harry Ashmore's on a special CBS television coverage of Ronald Reagan on December 14, 1967: "... he (Reagan) came into the election carrying the image of Barry Goldwater. He emerged at the end of that campaign bearing the image of Nelson Rockefeller." And Reagan's own statement to the press on October 16, 1967, during the Virgin Islands Governors' Conference when he

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said he saw no barrier to a platform consisting of Nelson Rockefeller and himself. Far more interesting and with much farther-reaching implications.

Because Reagan entered office (in the eyes of his followers) as a conservative, conservatives in the California state legislature were picked to measure his actions by. Of these, Reagan's chief opponent became Republican state senator John G. Schmitz of Orange County. At the beginning of the 1967 legislative session, Sen. Schmitz shared almost every feature of Reagan's announced platform and he was the only one who still had it at the end of the year.

The rest was gathered from magazine articles, speeches, day-to-day press coverages, and over 70 personal interviews in a ten-week period with Republicans both within and outside the state capitol at Sacramento. With the GOP "party unity" beacon pulling strong for the coming months, anything closer to a Republican minority report on Reagan's first year would probably be difficult to come by.

With almost no experience or longevity in the Republican Party, there is some question as to just what Ronald Reagan is supposed to represent in Republican minds this year, a political godsend or a figment of the Republican imagination. He seems to be riding more on the crest of an intellectual dearth than a determination to face political realities; a bad hangover from 1964; a dream to cling to; a panacea for conservative grievances, some political, but mostly psychological and emotional.

Conservatives close to Reagan made their way into the campaign two years ago by forming a bridge to the Party's liberal wing, a gesture orthodox conservatism had rejected for over 20 years. Consequently, their "reform candidate" wound up having to "gear down" considerably—on bills and appointments—once he got to Sacramento. Now, you hear blunt phrases like "Reagan is turning California over to the liberals," from a onetime high official in the California Federation of Republican Women. But in Sacramento, he is now pursuing what they are pleased to call "Fabian Conservatism"—a little here, a little there. And many an eclectic paraphrase fills the halls of the state capitol nowadays in attempts to explain it away.

Reagan's ability to match words with actions would, in fact, end up as conservative government. Whereas his inability to bring the two into alignment by necessity turns him into a conservative salesman for a socialist cause. This can be the

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formula that will ride the liberals back into power without a break under the Republican label in 1968. And it could be one of the greatest deceptions of all time.

In short, Reagan may *be* a panacea,—but *whose*?

KENT STEFFGEN

is a product of the Nixon, Goldwater, and Reagan campaigns and a lifelong Californian. Interest in world events supplanted a preparation for architecture two years after graduation from the University of California, and he spent the next nine years laboring in Republican and related political causes, moving from there into publishing. In 1964, he wrote a full-length coverage of America's "misnamed civil rights cause" entitled *The Bondage Of The Free* which held strongly to the priority of government by limited powers, and criticized rights leaders as reviving the race agitation of 1865 for nothing more than their own political gain. Growing syndicalism, in the author's view, as a self-consuming disease that must leave American society in a state of anarchy sooner or later—probably by 1970. In Reagan's almost determined about-face, he sees possibly *the* strategic error of the century. For nothing is more obvious than that the main undercurrent of American thought is moving more and more in a conservative direction, regardless of a tighter grip vested minorities now have on American life than ever before.

ENTER OUTWARD

Would you buy a new house on the strength of a television ad? Or a new car? Or a washing machine? What's so different about politicians? The wrong one will cost you money.

That's the general problem with Ronald Reagan. He's brand new in politics; so new they've hardly had time to inscribe his name on his office door. And they're even reconsidering that because he may be just passing through on his way to Washington.

Ten frenzied weeks were spent researching the Reagan first legislative year and you are going to be focused in at close range on the one and only 12-month period Ronald Reagan has ever spent in politics.

And, by the way, even without Ronald Reagan to rev your motor, life in the California state government is anything but dull. Once I thought it was; but I've changed my mind in just ten weeks. It's a place with a million stories; some you wouldn't believe.

Those for whom the per diem allowance supplants a nervous system have a ball; giving speeches to Rotary Clubs and ladies teas, floating off to free lunches, benefits, and steak dinners, making friends and influencing people. Ten years down the line, out they go with contacts they've made to something more lucrative, like a bank partnership, or a thriving law practice, or to manage the local Playboy Club.

Then there are the die-hards; 20 years on one piece of legislation. Win or lose, they become a legend in their own home district. "Here Lies Fred Fillerup; He Fought Our War in Sacramento." Sometimes, they're just not strong enough to surmount the monster they have created, like a crusade against water pollution, smog, or dirty books. It consumes them. Down they go, to the shallow end of San Francisco Bay

to gaze down into the filmy water that no longer reflects their image; or over to Pasadena where the sky becomes just a slab of carbon on really bad days.

Devious types spend years corraling loyalties and picking up leverage on both political sides. Holding nothing but a seat in the assembly, in 10 or 15 years they become the power behind state government and no big moves are made without them.

State government is the proving ground for politicians with a wandering eye on Washington or an important judgeship or a powerful lobby (the third house). The best administrator will never make it in politics without the art of successful cloak-room wheeling and dealing. In fact, if he has that, he can hire the other.

Possibly the craziest sight is the velvet manner in which legislative opponents dissect each other on the floor of the chamber like praying mantises in a duel that would better be served with switch blades. Strictly protocol. And afterwards, the cocktail lounge.

For variety, an off-color prank or two. Like the time a certain senator strapped one king-sized fish to the underside of a buddy's senate desk because the latter had the cheek to run out on a deal. In two days, on came the year's greatest smell; like something out of Nebuchadnezzar's tomb, rising over the senate chamber with a will of its own.

Does this sound like California?

But beyond the commonplace, the California state legislature has special meaning for you if you are trying to draw realistic sights on the 1968 presidential race. For one thing, most everything happening in California in the way of legislation is probably happening in your state, to a greater or lesser degree. And, most important, for a straight look at Ronald Reagan, the 1967 legislative year in Sacramento is all you've got. The rest is made up of prepared speeches, old Hollywood re-runs, hope and imagination.

In a certain Oregon town last summer, reception to a Reagan speech was warm and enthusiastic. Offstage, they were more interested in Reagan's performance in office than his actor's rating. But pass through Texas or California, and you'll find what the psychologists call a "wish fulfillment fantasy" with enough premature optimism to demand a sobriety test for all Reagan supporters on the way into the polling booth. For otherwise "thinking" people, it is the "in" thing to let promises and assumptions substitute for results

which, in a nation as escape-prone as America is today, has disastrous implications.

You can't pin it all on Reagan. Without him, the conservatives, depressed and demoralized after their big 1964 defeat, would have found some other way to make it to Cloud 9. For the time being, Reagan enters not as a victorious field general on the outskirts of a city he is about to occupy, but as a daredevil on a crumbling dike whose frantic labors to plug a bad leak may allow the conservatives to escape to higher ground before the flood inundates them. They are resigned to anarchy; it's all over but the shooting; only a matter of time. This, when America is about to enter her most anti-liberal period.

Demanding nothing more than faith, faith is all they've gotten in return so far. "Why won't you *trust* me!" he roared one day in March of 1967. The occasion was his decision to push a billion dollar tax increase after promising none at all. On the receiving end: one, lone state senator—and a member of Reagan's own party—who would not buy the increases without a two-year moratorium.

Nevertheless, you don't question a Reagan move which doesn't jive with his press-notices; you kneel in heaven-bent prayer and trust him. Faith is the healer; it's all right there in the Scriptures. A furrowed brow signifies you have no faith; that you have blasphemed, you have desecrated the altar. For the conservatives, Reagan is going to win, even if he doesn't run for anything.

Outside the twilight zone, however, are some more reliable absolutes. While without Reagan the Republicans may have no campaign, with him victory is by no means assured, even if George Wallace were not in the running; a Republican loss in 1968 may not mean the end of our civilization; Ronald Reagan is not a Tibetan lama who can bring Nirvana in 1968 and beyond; nor is he the Mikado, Ramakrishna, or St. John the Divine. He is Ronald Reagan, ordinary mortal, who, as a political freshman, is probably more vulnerable than a dope addict without a source of supply. He has no cadre, holds no I. O. U.'s, has an audience-rating which may yet compromise his ideology, is adopting political strategy which may turn out to be his epitaph, and has stepped into a "guts" political ballgame for the first time in his career. With enough stage prescience to charm the hide off a raccoon, Reagan is what the insurance trade would dub a "preferred risk"—for the Republican Party, for conservatism, even for himself, if he

cannot control (or has miscalculated) the orbital path of his one-man space mission.

Less is actually *known* about Ronald Reagan—his political moves, the men around him, his overall strategy—than any American who ever nurtured undeclared plans to enter a U.S. presidential race. No one has had time to put the pieces together. Bad! What else made us so suspicious? (a) unnatural haste surrounding his campaign; (b) raw emotionalism; and (c) the glory-road treatment of a liberal press which just doesn't pass out laurels to conservatives. Very bad! Like a reading of the Big Board, this is the time to sell enthusiasm short and buy reserve. Then there is the *record*.

You ask, wide-eyed: "Why did Reagan double taxes after promising to hold the line?" Stiffening into a quivering ball, your listener braces and fires off this line: "He inherited it from Pat Brown (the previous governor)." Staggered, you rally meekly with: "I heard last week that some hunters had their guns confiscated on the way to the Sierras. Didn't Reagan say he would refuse to allow any changes in the state's gun laws?" Felled as though by gunfire, contorted in pain but trying valiantly to rise, your horrified friend responds: "He's surrounded by bad advice!"

In your innocence, you declare, "What is that nasty rumor I heard that Reagan is being told to send no active conservatives to the Miami Convention because they might hold his promises up to him and become a "divisive element?" Oozing to the sidewalk, face wrenched upward in piteous disbelief, the stricken one mutters as you bend close to hear: "You've swallowed Communist propaganda." "But," you ask with outstretched palms, "at the Virgin Islands Governors' Conference, in October of 1967, Reagan told the press that he saw barrier to a platform consisting of Nelson Rockefeller and himself. What does it *mean*?" As the ambulance bears him away, you barely hear these fading words: "He's all we've got."

Still unable to quell your curiosity, you wonder to yourself: "How come we still have an open housing law in California when the voters marched on Sacramento in 1964 to overthrow it, then hoisted Reagan on their shoulders and carried him into office because he promised to do as they asked?" Instant replay produces the other nostrums: "Give him a chance," "Wallace will split the Republican Party," "You would rather have Johnson?" "What can you expect from one man?" "You're prejudiced, etc., etc." And you are

as likely to hear it in East Cupcake, Texas or Boston's Back Bay as you are in California.

So you stagger off with 1900 other questions coursing through an uncomprehending brain that was only programmed for 12. It must be you; nothing but a heretic could suggest foul play from a man with such a warm, side-screen smile, reassuring speech, and disarming 1946-vintage baggy tweeds. To wear clothes like that, he *has* to be a nice guy.

Nevertheless, these are the premature, emotion-packed, stock answers of good souls too desperate to challenge the Grand Canyon now opening up between the Reagan record and the Reagan personality; stereotyped answers, conditioned reflex answers, while each new jaw-dropping statistic passes before their eyes. You, with your questions, are making waves; you have swallowed prepared, patterned propaganda of the left. Yet, hadn't you always been told stereotyped reaction is usually the first reliable indication that there has even been any?

The "Manchurian Candidate" theory won't do; not because it is not as logical as plant life on Mars. Poor taste and impractical. We can't sober up on bigger doses of James Bond films. More of the same sensationalism which first gave us pause, in fact. But you might go back and see the movie someday. Nor are we trying to run a Drew Pearson rating on him (e.g.: He's lying, lying, lying; Ayeeee!). But don't forget what Reagan was before he entered politics.

I prefer the view expressed by a highly-respected, dignified (former) state assemblyman at a 1966 meeting of the California Republican State Central Committee. When asked by this gentleman if Reagan understood the caliber of the people he was forming around him, or if he even knew who they were, Nancy Reagan looked up and replied tartly: "Are you questioning Ronny's integrity?" "No," said the legislator, "I'm questioning his judgment." A very polite answer and apropos.

Because, regardless of human beings, you must garner some respect for certain institutions whose standing remains inviolate; such as high political office, motherhood, and the bar at Don the Beachcomber's in Hollywood. Said a sage: "We cannot judge (our fellow man) because it is impossible to know why (referring to erratic behavior)." To which one must subscribe. When men dive for reasons and forget the deeds, regardless of the cause they get nailed to the wall either way. Causemongering, in fact, does not prevent the conservative

from getting the shaft every other year with tide-like regularity.

Every new election, the conservative candidate seems to have some clandestine romp with Jack the Ripper. And he just never comes back. But back go the conservatives two years later for another shaft. They forget things. This year, they're forgetting everything they ever learned. They don't really want to get into the action at all; they want to go to Hawaii or Bermuda or the Adriatic.

Not that the man with the baggy tweeds and boyish glow has done this to them already: he who actually *understands* Bill Buckley. But the organization he has allowed to form around him is like you and me buying protection from Al Capone. (We already had *that* problem with LBJ). When all the figures are in (a Reaganism), Reagan himself may become the principal victim.

The conservatives—with their feet planted more firmly in the air than ever—are not going to be allowed any cheap, ersatz victory this year. This year, anything can happen and probably will. The magic word is “instability.” No patchwork of rank emotionalism will pull them through. Why even mention it? Because in stark refutation of the polls, polemics and publicity, here is the Reagan Roster after four months as Governor in California and eight as a roving fund-raiser for the Republican Party. Since entering office, Reagan

- has signed into law a sweeping anti-gun bill (the Mulford Gun Law) which seriously curtails personal self-defense in the face of the nation's greatest upsurge in rioting and street crime;

- on August 6, 1967, saw his conservative following crumble away and himself aligned with hardened liberals and civil rights leaders for trying to retain—with revisions—California's unpopular Rumford open housing law after the voters, by an overwhelming 2 to 1 majority initiative action, demanded outright repeal in 1964;

- may support arch-liberal and civil rights paragon U.S. Senator Thomas H. Kuchel for re-election in the interests of “party unity”; when Kuchel has been the most divisive element in California's Republican Party for the past eight years;

- signed into law the largest single tax increase in the history of any state in the United States—\$1 billion in one step;

- brought moderates and liberals into his campaign, after

- victory awarded them with top jobs in state apparatus and is running an essentially liberal administration now;
- has reversed himself on nearly every piece of major legislation and/or promise that made him the “people’s choice” over Democratic incumbent Governor Edmund “Pat” Brown;
 - has gone directly into the liberal wing of the Republican Party to organize his political foundation;
 - has developed a “party unity” plan around this base which will ultimately involve the elimination of the conservative wing from the party structure *nationally*;
 - has gotten away with more than his Democratic predecessor, Edmund Brown ever could have, precisely *because* he is a Republican;
 - has increased, not decreased, the strength of liberal power in the state capitol at Sacramento;
 - instead of cutting back the Democrats’ program he inherited, has attempted to shift it onto a sound economic base and call *this* conservatism;
 - is sticking with enough of the Democrats’ highly unpopular policies (such as civil rights) to place the Republican Party in serious jeopardy should this become the pattern of the upcoming election;
 - has shifted the ideological struggle within the Republican Party from its pre-1966 basis of right vs left to center vs left.

Perhaps the most prophetic depth-plumb on Ronald Reagan was uttered by “seeress” Jean Dixon in January of 1967, just after Reagan’s installation as Governor. Miss Dixon’s annual look into the future on subjects far and wide makes the news columns at the start of every year due to their odd tendency to come true. Reagan, said she, is a man with a brilliant political future, providing he does not fall under the influence of the big Eastern political and financial powers.

That this may already have happened—or, to be more precise, that it happened halfway through his gubernatorial *primary* battle against Republican liberal George Christopher, is the point at issue.

SAVE BY SPENDING

"Now, with the budget established at its present level, we are told that it. . . must be increased next year to meet the added problems of population growth and inflation. . . the cost of California's government is too high; it adversely affects our business climate.

"We are going to squeeze and cut and trim until we reduce the cost of government. It won't be easy nor will it be pleasant, and it will involve every department of government, starting with the Governor's office."

—Governor Ronald Reagan
Inaugural Address
January 5, 1967

Once in office, Governor Reagan was going to pay off the huge \$500 million debt left to him by the previous governor and get California operating in the black the first year. This meant only one thing: he had to hold the line on new spending. After two months in office, and with speeches and promises of economy and less government stretching back almost two years, Reagan reversed his position on spending, doubled the unpaid debt of his predecessor, and even wound up with an 18% increase in the operating budget of his own Governor's office.

What Happened?

Edmund G. "Pat" Brown was Governor of California for two terms, 1958 through 1966. For eight years, Brown had been playing the Merchant of Venice in reverse. He was what

the polite set would call a "tax and spend Keynesian liberal." More to the point, he was "tap city:" broke, in debt, and heading for more. A Democrat, Brown had been spending \$5 billion a year of California tax money. His spending had begun to exceed his income as far back as 1965. By 1966, California was getting rid of \$1 million per day more than it was taking in. California's population was increasing 3% per year and spending was going up 12%. In Brown's last merry-go-round year, spending jumped to 16% or five times the rate of population growth.

This—1966—was an election year. Brown knew he was going to have to face Ronald Reagan and the voters and he had a \$500 million debt hanging off the end of his nose like an "I am a leper" sign. (Exact figure: \$4,624,634,742.) If he didn't hide it somewhere, he would also have to face the courts, because it says right in the California constitution, the books must balance at the end of each fiscal year (regardless of what kind of Jackson Pollock drip-artistry is employed to make them).

Clearly, Brown had a problem. He could not raise taxes in an election year to pay off this \$500 million bag of sorrow, as this would finish him off with the voters for sure. Like a strange woman in his room and his wife's footsteps pounding up the hall, he would never be able to explain it at the polls. If he lost the election, Reagan would be the one faced with the problem which, for Brown, would be a perfectly legitimate ploy, providing he could pull it off. If he could cover it up with some kind of legal camouflage for a few months and win, he could then step out and have a parade with it and no one could do much about it because he, Brown, could then hang a *new* sign off the end of his nose which read: "Mandate from the people." And Brown knew the angles, and Reagan didn't.

So Pat Brown did the expedient thing. He ran a special legal loophole through the legislature—designed to apply to his own, private predicament—which would allow him to sew his bottomless pocket into Reagan's pants—just in case he lost. And the legislature, dominated as it was by Democrats, was happy to do what it could. They called it the "accrual system." And before you could say "20 years at hard labor," there it was, like the missing buckle on his treads.

Accrual was a last-ditch resort designed to pull a pound-foolish governor out of the hole so he could return to private life without having to take a detour through the honor farm. It

was good for *one time only*. Accrual says that you can add the first three months of next year's income into this year's accounts and thereby count your money before you have it. Through accrual accounting, Brown could credit himself with 15-months' income for a 12-month year. Then it would be up to the next governor to solve the problem.

Strange, but the legislators refrain from calling this marked-card stunt "deficit financing." They avoid it like the mention of Cyrano's protruding nose, even though that is precisely what it is. Why don't they call it by name? Not because it isn't deficit financing; not because it isn't plain old-fashioned book-juggling; but because California law does not *permit* deficit financing. That's right! So you aren't allowed to use the words. If you're going to use accrual, you have to give it another title; like calling a horse a cow.

No matter. Brown made the necessary book entries, "balanced" the books, stepped defiantly into his campaign. . . . and fell into his shoes, losing by a million votes. Exit Edmund.

Enter Ronald. Through tears of joy and unable to believe he could become governor with no previous experience (just like it said on his employment application), Ronald Reagan strode manfully into Sacramento and there, behold, bearing down upon him with dollar signs flying, was a \$500 million Sherman tank, driven by Pat Brown's henchmen on their way out of office. Not to be believed! Brown, guilty of hanky-panky! How could he. . . .

Forget it. What good did it do to howl? After all, there it is, right there in the statutes, that accrual. . . . So Reagan and Nancy and Lieutenant Governor Bob Finch and all the well-wishers picked themselves up and dug into the rest or the old attic trunk to see what other goodies Brown had left behind.

Well, it wasn't exactly a trunk; it was a *truck*; a Mack truck, packed to overflowing with problems Reagan did not understand but would have to find answers to somehow. Brown had actually been concealing his spending every year by changing the method of collecting sales taxes from monthly to quarterly, all of which had basically the same effect as accrual accounting, except that accrual applies to all taxes.

In the months to come, as Reagan discovered the world of politics, pressure, deadlines, and demands, he would continue to proclaim his conservatism and promise economy to the voters, as more and more he pondered to himself the question, "How?" There were things to learn, appointments to be

made, administration bills to be formulated, a hostile Democrat-controlled legislature in front of him, the liberal wing of the Republican Party behind him, 700 lobbies to his left, the voters on his right, and that was only the beginning. When the mist of effortless victory (it really had been a downhill toboggan run against Brown) cleared and the Goliath-like size of the power structure stretched before him in full view, would he still want to play a miniscule "David?"

Reagan could not be expected to cut spending by too much the first year because there were so many growth factors built-into the spending already authorized. *But he could hold the line on any new spending.* This, for Reagan, was the key to it all.

In his budget message to the legislature on January 31, 1967, Reagan's stern warning rang loud and clear, reflecting the resentment he felt at finding his pocket already picked before entering office:

"... while it has taken our population 20 years to double, general fund spending has more than doubled in the last seven years In the past eight years, the state government has been financed by a series of fiscal maneuvers involving acceleration of revenue collections and revisions of accounting procedures which, in the aggregate, total an amazing \$1 billion.

"This administration is not interested in perpetuating such unsound devices for budget-balancing purposes."

Reagan had till March 1—one month—to submit his initial budget proposals to the legislature. His January 31 budget message was the answer to a 20-year-old conservative prayer. Not only was he going to restrict spending the coming year to Brown's previous level, but through a series of special economy measures, he would be able to reduce spending by 5.17%, for a total of \$270,800,000. In the best tradition of Michigan's George Romney during *his* first year as governor, Reagan would pull California into the black before the following Christmas. And in the "my God, we made it" melieu of conservative rejoice, none but the Democrats caught Reagan's added words that "supplementary reports" to the joint legislative sessions would be added later on.

Great day in the mornin'! Change the menu! Add roast liberal; liberal on the halfshell; chicken caccialiberal. Brutal vengeance was one month away. With an initial budget which

included the following hard-line items, Reagan won the spontaneous—almost jubilant—approval of conservatives everywhere, both within and outside Sacramento, turned and strode with jugged chest, but sweated brown, back into Brown's chamber of horrors:

- a freeze on all further state hiring to the state's 169,000 payroll;
- halt all out-of-state travel by all state employees except for emergencies (cost of out-of-state travel had reached \$5 million per year. In one year, the Department of Water Resources alone had spent \$130,000 on out-of-state travel);
- a limitation by government agencies to stop the flood of needless mimeographing;
- halt all state purchases of office equipment;
- eliminate expensive multi-colored printing of state reports, brochures, and pamphlets unless specifically approved by the Governor's office;
- halt all chartering of planes by state officials;
- curb the use of state cars by state employees for personal business (such use of vehicles had been so abused that the new use limitation would cut costs by as much as 20%);
- halt state purchase of new vehicles except in emergency cases;
- request state employees to work on two holidays: Lincoln's and Washington's birthdays, to achieve a possible \$7 million worth of work;
- terminate several of the state's service centers in so-called "racially-disturbed" areas (such as Watts, which had been established by Brown to bribe race agitators and Negro rioters. Closing them down would save the state approximately \$4 million);
- tighten up the state's Medi-Cal program which, by projected figures, could save the state up to \$30 million per year;
- eliminate proposed pay increases for state government employees, and university and state college personnel.

A series of definite cuts in spending was then proposed. Reagan's budget was expected to reflect the figure arrived at by subtracting them out of Brown's previous budget. These were:

- 1) University of California: cut from \$242,800,00 in fiscal 1966 to \$196,800,000, with tuition to make up for \$20,000,000 of the reduction. Savings: \$ 46,000,000
- 2) California state colleges: cut from \$177,800,00 in fiscal 1966 to \$154,300,000, with tuition to make up for \$18,000,000 of the reduction. Savings: 23,500,000
- 3) State Department of Mental Hygiene: cut from \$193,300,000 in fiscal 1966 to \$175,600,000 Savings: 17,700,000
- 4) 10% reduction in the operating budgets of all state departments and agencies. Savings: 178,000,000
- 5) Close down service centers set up for "poverty-reduction" in racially disturbed areas. Savings: 5,600,000

Total Savings: \$270,800,000

With these reductions, California would enter her first year in 20—since World War II—when the cost of government had not outdistanced the population increase. Although the proof was still one month away, the conservatives (in whose name Reagan had campaigned) took this declaration at face value. John Schmitz, state senator from California's "Bavarian Heartland" of conservatism (Andrew Kopkind, *The New Republic*, July 15, 1967,) cheered:

"At long last, we have a Governor of California who tells the people the truth—and keeps his promises. Governor Reagan's budget message reveals the full extent of the state's fiscal crisis and rejects the easy but destructive solution of large tax increases.

"He has done what he said he would do. He has had the courage to put economy first, to *reduce* expenditures by a quarter of a billion dollars from those of the current year.

"As the Governor warned, special interest groups will clamour loud and long against these reductions. Governor Reagan needs the outspoken, active support of

millions of California taxpayers in his fight on their behalf.

"I am confident he will get their support, and I pledge him mine." (Press release, January 31, 1967).

For Schmitz and millions of others, Reagan's budget message was inspiring in its absolute integrity—both personal and fiscal.

The liberal cacaphony had been going for some time; against Reagan's tuition proposals; against his threat to investigate the University of California for ultra-left activities; in opposition to *his* opposition to University President Clark Kerr; over proposed cuts in Medi-Cal; everything. News of the budget merely switched it to hi-fi. Reagan was going to break the bank, under-privileged professors would be without demonstration money, Medi-Cal recipients would have to go back to sleeping under the bridge; the sick and needy would curse Reagan from shallow graves; "No Tuition" signs were everywhere; mobs of students and faculty from UC's nine campuses and the 14 state college campuses filled the streets and led spitball assaults on their admissions offices. The Golden Goose had flown, egg and all, and Saint Reagan now stood over the populace like Godzilla.

Reagan's economy moves had already brought forth a torrent of criticism from the Democrats in control of the legislature who then commenced to do everything in their power to embarrass the administration. Opposition was on the rise: from the nation's liberal journals and foundations; from the civil service and from educational bureaucrats throughout California's vast university system who bellowed like wounded hogs. Personnel in the mental hospitals, welfare agencies, wherever state money was running the operation—all had Reagan hanging in effigy, or dissolving as part of a unique ritual murder, or falling under the wheels of the 11:00 o'clock Southbound.

It was the roar of the dispossessed.

Maybe Reagan's suntanned skin wasn't so tawny after all. Could be he wasn't *that* ready to chuck his audience rating, or suffer a crusader's unpopularity. Perhaps by the time he went back in for that final, close-order budget study, the fog had cleared, and had come the full size and behemoth proportions of the power structure that sits on Sacramento, and Reagan couldn't believe his eyes.

Whatever the cause, in 30 days, out came a changed

Reagan with a new view on the state's financial problems. And with him, the same old tax-and-spend liberalomania on how to solve them. On March 1, he announced that taxes would be raised steeply in fiscal 1967-68. With the papers carrying the disquieting news (which was very good news to the liberals) this could only mean that Reagan was kissing his economy budget goodbye and would come on the scene with a whole slate of new spending. What else would he want higher taxes for but to pay it off?

And so it was. Before the ink on the reform program had dried, a new Reagan bill calling for \$865 million in new taxes was on its way to the legislature under the care of Sen. George Deukmajian, freshman senator from Long Beach. Six days later, in his March 8 budget speech to the joint legislature, Reagan revealed that he would submit a final budget calling for \$488 million in all-new spending, a complete reversal of his earlier position. Since this was \$467 million he would have to add to Pat Brown's \$4.6 billion, Reagan would now have close to a billion-dollar debt to square away. Thus, the \$865 million tax increase, which would actually not be enough. Before the legislature was through, Reagan would sign into law an overall tax increase of \$943,300,000, the largest single tax hike in the history of any state of the Union.

Starting with his own original economy budget, Reagan had gone back into his administrative department to work it down into precise terminology. When he emerged 30 days later, he had restored most of the budget cuts he first recommended, then added new expenditures. Here was the new "dream" budget in its final form:

- | | | |
|---|-------------|------------|
| 1) For the University of California: | Restored \$ | 34,500,000 |
| 2) For the 14 state colleges: | | |
| Tuition was abandoned in both cases | Restored | 23,500,000 |
| | Added | 9,600,000 |
| 3) For state employees, a 5% across-the-board salary increase: | Added | 39,000,000 |
| 4) For university and state college faculty, a 5% across-the-board-salary increase: | Added | 10,500,000 |
| 5) Because average reduction of operating budgets of state agencies came to only 7% | | |

of the original 10% cut requested:	Restored	55,000,000
6) New appropriation for Medi-Cal (which could not be avoided unless the law was changed):	Added \$	99,000,000
7) For local schools (below college level):	Added	85,000,000
8) For local property tax relief (which did not go for this purpose as scheduled):	Added	120,000,000
9) For increased retirement benefits for teachers:	Added	10,000,000
10) For Governor's increased office budget:	Added	1,550,000
	Total:	\$487,650,000

of which:

\$113,000,000 consisted of restorations to original budget cuts, and \$374,650,000 represented all-new spending.

Opponents of Reagan's budget increase withing the legislature insisted he didn't need the all-new spending or the restored cuts. The increases were supported on the grounds of increased costs of living, which could not be denied. Retirement payments for teachers, for example, would have to go up eventually, but not the year when you were trying to pay off Brown's debt. A \$500 million deficit overrode pay increases in order of importance, depending on how determined the administration was to eliminate it. Also, a tax increase would itself serve only to raise the cost of living still more. In the above figures, retirement and the 5% across-the-board salary increases were in the same category. You could blame the cost of living, but the money for increased salaries would have to come from taxes and the year when you had an enormous \$500 million deficit to pay off made it doubly important to *hold the line—just for the first year.*

Of course, immediately, off went the liberal "cry murder" machine. Peace in the valley. Now, it was the conservative's turn to howl. After all, who was Reagan supposed to be trying to satisfy? Forthwith, on came Orange County's tallest tree, a greatly saddened Sen. John Schmitz to let it be known that since four months remained—till June 30, 1967—before

Reagan would have to sign the final budget bill on its way back from the legislature, he still had time to reverse his course and go back to his original economy plan. Said Schmitz with Olympian restraint:

"Three and three-quarter million Californians put their faith in Ronald Reagan to lead them out of the endless spiral of spend and tax. Ten thousand letters to him now pour into the Capitol every week, overwhelmingly in support of his stand for economy and budget cuts.

"But now it appears that there are men in Governor Reagan's administration who have no fundamental sympathy either with the Governor's own announced goals of economy or with the people who so much admire all that he said and did during January and February. It is from these men around the Governor that the proposal for \$865 million in spending and tax increases made March 1 to the Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee evidently came.

"With this proposal, Reagan stands at the crossroads."

And,

"If these taxing and spending increases become law, many of our best citizens will never again be willing to trust the word of a seeker or holder of political office.

"There is still time to make the right decision or to reverse a wrong one I speak for many thousands of my constituents and for millions throughout the state who would urge and plead with Governor Reagan not to break the faith and the hearts of those who have put their trust in him; not to speak of economy, then ask us to accept almost a billion dollars in new taxes.

"Deficits must be met. But spending increases of this magnitude are indefensible . . . Governor Reagan spoke for the taxpayer. For him to fall silent now, to bow to expediency, to take the advice of those who never really believed in budget reductions—this could bring a tragic end to the brightest hope on the American scene today.

"California awaits the Governor's decision."

(Sacramento Report, Mar. 31, 1967)

And come June 30, 1967, Reagan's decision was to forget the taxpayers and sign the budget increase into law, like any

loyal servant of the Democratic platform, of the pressure groups, and of the tradition set by all the U.S. presidents before him stretching back to 1932, and most of the governors.

What probably passed before Governor Reagan during those closed-door sessions from January 31 to March 1 was a series of lantern slides showing the power structure at the base of which he, like Peanut I, was now standing; how big it was and how impenetrable; how much it wanted to be his pen-pal, have him and Nancy over for monopoly and ginger beer, and help Ronald plant his own money tree. Wouldn't it be easier to just stop trying to play Don Quixote and join the others in the big leagues?

You could exchange guesses until your yo-yo arm fell off, but only one would hold water: he wasn't getting it from the conservatives anymore. Voting against the June 30 budget bill, Sen. Schmitz announced:

"I regret the necessity of opposing the budget of Governor Reagan who is not only a member of my Party, but whose public statements express principles so much closer to my own than ever voiced by his predecessor. But the fact remains that I would have voted against this budget if it had been presented by Governor Brown.

"The increase of this year's budget over last year's . . . still exceeds population growth and hence furthers the trend toward the total state which I am pledged to fight with all my strength."

Reagan "blue-pencilled" through \$43 million of items from the \$514 million increase sent back by the legislature for his signature and stopped about \$500 million short. Instead of reducing Brown's spending by 5.17%, the new additions would raise the 1966 level 4.5% from Brown's \$4.865 billion.

The legislature now turned to Reagan's \$865 million tax bill and a new deadline of July 30. July 28 would turn out to be the marathon session of the year.

From this analysis, you can see why critics both within and outside the state legislature reject the supposition that Reagan was forced into higher taxes as an unavoidable consequence of having to pay off Brown's debt. You either challenge the premise or you challenge the figures. "Holding the line" does not mean an automatic increase in terms of population increase but in terms of the previous years' budget. Unless, of

course, you are committed to the liberal or socialist premise that a large population demands a large government to rule over it. The whole idea is to get government *out* of the population-management business.

That Reagan had this in mind was implied in almost all his speeches involving pointed remarks about "government running the lives of individual citizens." If that was his intention, it was contradicted by the logic he employed in arriving at the budget increases. And the inference is that either Reagan was surfeited with such an overwhelming torrent of detail work that he lost sight of his objectives (the budget is a big operation involving some 9,000 separate entries) or he does not know how to form the bridge between constitutional theory and applied constitutionalism; or he was grousing around with electorate from the very beginning; or he had to rely on advisors to take most of the detail work off his hands and they were liberals, not conservatives. This last-named would make infinite good sense but for the fact that it was he who OK'd the selection of organizational talent during his campaign out of which these appointments eventually came. Indeed, he picked the public relations team which handled his campaign and probably more of the problem goes back to this source than anywhere (All of which is covered in subsequent chapters).

Assuming Reagan had surrounded himself with advisors who reflected his philosophy, instead of increasing spending, Reagan could have been much more hardboiled about reductions; for example by:

- cutting out the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) with its 28 employees, for a saving of some \$61.8 million per year, most of which goes directly into anti-White agitation at state expense;
- removing compensatory education and special privileges for Negroes at the expense of majority group children;
- removing state subsidies to junior colleges;
- removing pre-school subsidies;
- removing special education funds;
- in general, blue-pencilling more items from the budget until it was in balance with present income on the basis of the current tax structure.

The greatest reforms had to be instituted in two areas: education and welfare, because upwards of 85% of Califor-

nia's total budget is divided between them. Since most of *that* goes for education, Reagan was on course when he decided to tie into the educational bureaucracy. But it was like lifting the lid on a can of U-235 and he backed off. Nevertheless, the budget cuts for the university and state colleges were entirely feasible. They could have been helped along by increasing the teaching load and simply not filling the vacancies that would have followed. The average teaching load now is nine hours per week. Some instructors have only six hours per week; most feel that twelve hours is not difficult to meet; and some instructors with excess zeal put in 15 hours per week without having to sacrifice cocktail hours or coffee breaks or time-off for demonstrations.

Welfare is the open hydrant that no one seems to know how to turn off. The democrats turned it on, at both the federal and state levels. The Republicans maintain it in office because they represent the minority party and don't want to see their goodwill rating fall off. They need the votes. Out of office, the Democrats hold it over them like a political mortgage. A bill introduced by Senator Bradley of San Jose, if passed, would have eliminated the medically-indigent category of California's Medi-Cal program (a Pat Brown invention) for a saving of \$200 million per year. The Democratic legislature just sat on the bill. Another bill, S485, introduced by Sen. John Schmitz, would have saved the taxpayers some \$60 million which is now blown to the four winds and seven seas for Aid to Dependent Children. The heart of the argument around ADC is subsidized illegitimacy among, primarily, the Negroes. Reagan brushed by S485 due to the 50-50 matching fund arrangement California has with Washington. Once federal officials heard about S485, they threatened to withdraw their 50% share (which comes to \$250 million per year) if any welfare bill were passed which attacked the ADC program on any basis other than pure and simple *need*.

Rumor has it that during a national convention of certified public accountants meeting in Chicago in 1966, Jesse Unruh, Speaker of the California Assembly—and the most powerful man in the legislature—was overhead to say (in effect): "Don't worry about Reagan, we (the Democrats) have a program twice as large as Brown's."

If you hear any of that kind of stuff floating around this year, let us know. Because Reagan is now making prophecies about his 1968-69 budget, scheduled for introduction on January 13 of this year. And his plan is essentially the same

as it was eleven months ago; balance the budget without the need of any more tax increases. We wonder, because this is also the year the Democrats are pushing all-out for a complete overhaul of the tax picture in California and "holding the line" just isn't the Democratic way.

THE LARGEST TAX INCREASE IN THE HISTORY OF ANY STATE OF THE UNION

*"Almost automatically, we are being advised
of all the new and increased taxes which,
if adopted, will solve the problem. Curiously enough,
another one-time windfall is being urged.
If we switch to withholding of personal income tax,
we will collect two years taxes the first year
and postpone our moment of truth. . . .*

*". . . . Californians are already burdened with
combined state and local taxes
\$113 per capita higher than the national average.
Our property tax contributes to a slump
and makes it well-nigh impossible for many
citizens to continue owning their own homes."*

—Governor Ronald Reagan
Inaugural Address
January 5, 1967

*"I am convinced that I can say to you there
will be no new tax increase next year. . . .
There will be some efforts made at economies
in the present running of this state.*

"The total tax burden will not be increased."

—Gubernatorial candidate Ronald Reagan
Republican Rally, Bakersfield, California,
September 17, 1966.

Two months into his administration, Governor Reagan reversed his position on "no new taxes" and produced the

largest single tax hike in state history: \$1 billion in one giant step (exact figure: \$943,300,000). The deficit inherited from the previous governor, Pat Brown, so often used as justification for this amazing increase did not necessitate a tax hike of this size (even with proposed cuts, a \$250 million tax increase would probably have been necessary to meet the Brown deficit.) What made it necessary was Governor Reagan having to find new money to pay for new spending Governor Reagan had included in his 1967-68 budget over and above that inherited from Governor Brown.

What Happened?

In this sequence, there are three things to remember:

1) Reagan's own position on the tax increase was the key factor in its passage;

2) Reagan first rejected a Democrat-sponsored bill which included withholding of state income tax. Good! But having done so, he would have to come up with his own tax bill, then go begging to secure passage from the Democrat-controlled legislature. This meant that (a), his second bill would, in essence, still have to be a Democrat bill to be satisfactory, and (b) the Democrats would want something else to take the place of withholding.

For years, the most powerful man in the legislature has been Jesse Unruh, a Democrat from Inglewood (nicknamed "Big Daddy" because of his once-dirigible proportions.) Unruh's price for dropping withholding was 100% *concurrence in the second bill by all the Republican members of the Senate and Assembly* which Reagan, as head of his Party, would have to provide. Unruh was going to demand that Reagan line up every Republican vote so the Republicans could never again accuse the Democrats of being the party of high taxes.

Reagan could either comply and join the Democrats in support of a liberal tax bill, or he could use his veto power to hold the increase down and bargain with the Democrats for the smallest amount possible, thereby remaining with his Party and his platform. Reagan was forced into this position because he had to have a tax raise to pay for his own budget increases. So he chose to go with the Democrats and at once, the phrase "Reagan-Unruh Axis" was heard all over the legislature. This placed the Republicans in the position of

having to go against Reagan and be accused of dividing the Party (and also risk Reagan retaliating against them later on) or go with him and sell out their platform.

3) Proof of how far Reagan was willing to go to stand with the Democrats: a last-gasp attempt by one ranking Senate Republican to put a two-year moratorium on the tax increase (which would allow the GOP to retain *some* reputation as the economy faction in Sacramento) was flatly rejected by Reagan. This had the appearance of putting Reagan on record as favoring higher taxes as a permanent yoke on the voters and became the second wedge (after new spending) serving to alienate the conservatives.

By July 1, 1967, California picked up a \$173,000,000 deficit. Even with major economic measures, the state would add another \$240,000,000 debt during the 1967-68 fiscal year for a total of \$413,000,000. An "urgency" clause was therefore attached to the bill to secure passage in order to commence tax collection at the new levels before entering the third quarter of the year.

Reagan proposed:

- 1) sales tax increase of 1c on each dollar of sales (from 4% to 5%) to provide an estimated \$380,000,000 in revenue;
- 2) increased taxes under the Bank and Corporation Tax Law from 5.5% to 7%;
- 3) tax increase from 3c to 10c on the standard package of cigarettes to produce some \$85,000,000 new revenue (and bringing the retail price up to 45c per pack);
- 4) increase the liquor tax 50c from \$1.50 to \$2.00 per wine gallon to produce an anticipated \$20,000,000 in revenue;
- 5) increased gift and inheritance taxes;
- 6) double the income tax for persons in the \$10,000-per-year-or-more categories, as follows:

Gross Income	1966 Tax	1967 Tax
\$10,000	\$ 48	\$ 94
15,000	146	294
20,000	294	574
25,000	492	944
35,000	1,038	1,894
40,000	1,386	2,394
45,000	1,736	2,894
60,000	2,086	3,394

Anyone who paid more than \$200 in state income taxes in 1966 (\$100 for a married person filing a separate return) would now have to pay half of his next year's income tax by October 31, 1967, or be penalized 10% plus interest of 6%. For this, the taxpayer would take credit on his 1967 income tax return (due April 15, 1968). Most people still do not know their state income tax has been doubled. For them, the shock will come on April 15, 1968, before California's presidential primaries.

The Two-Year Moratorium

Carrying the tax bill into the Senate was Senator George Deukmejian representing Reagan's administrative branch. Withholding was introduced as an amendment and defeated by the Republicans. A motion was then introduced to amend the tax bill so as to limit the increases to two years. Author of the amendment: Senator John Schmitz, recognized leader of the Senate conservatives. Reagan wanted Schmitz' support for the bill to satisfy Jesse Unruh's "100% concurrence" stipulation. But worse, for Schmitz to hold out when Reagan had caved in would serve to make an example out of Reagan and repudiate Unruh at the same time.

So on July 10, Reagan called Schmitz into his office and asked him what he—Reagan—had to do to acquire Schmitz's support for the bill. Schmitz replied that if Reagan honestly believed the tax raises were necessary, he might vote for the bill if it had a 2-year termination date attached to it. Schmitz knew by that time that he could not stop the bill from going through so he decided to do what he could to prevent the tax increase from being saddled on the people of California forever. Reagan replied that he had intended to cut spending and *would* cut spending eventually. Then he would be able to cut taxes somewhere down the line. For now, Schmitz was just going to have to trust him—*without putting any termination clause in the bill*.

A dozen questions raced through Schmitz's mind at that point: What would Reagan have against terminating a tax increase he himself had allegedly fought from the beginning? How could he give permanent license to a move which ran counter to his entire announced philosophy of "less government?" Weren't the Republicans in the legislature going to be allowed to go back before the people who had voted them into office with *one* fulfilled promise regarding the Party's

goals of economy? How far was Reagan going to go to please the Democrats during the *rest* of the legislative year? Was this a warning sign that Reagan's plea for "party unity" around the Democrats' tax program was going to mean abandonment of the conservative position *per se*?

Having stood firm against Reagan's budget increases, Schmitz did the expected thing: faith wasn't enough any more; with no better guarantee, he would have to oppose the tax bill. Miffed and groined at the sudden implication, Reagan brought his fist down hard on his heavy, oak Governor's desk and shouted across to the upstart form in front of him: "Why won't you *trust* me?"

Schmitz and Reagan did not meet on common ground for the rest of the legislative session. Indeed, the rift was to grow wider with each succeeding bill.

Assemblyman John V. Briggs

Minus withholding tax, with no termination date, plus a special "urgency" clause, the Senate passed its version of the tax bill and it was on its way to the Assembly. Voting against it were 11 Democrats and one Republican, Senator John Schmitz. Every other Republican had followed Reagan to the other side of the room where enough Democrats to pass the bill had been deliberately withheld in order to compromise the Republicans.

It is worth noting that had Reagan taken any other position, the conservatives who caved in might have gone instead with Schmitz. Several of them were new to the Senate and did not know what the consequences would be for opposing their own executive branch. Others probably had their eye on strengthening their position within the Party whichever way it went in the future. Still others joined Reagan rather than face the possibility of the party running primary opponents against them with the blessings of the Governor. And when it came their turn to run through an important bill, they might need Reagan's support as well as some Democrats, being the minority faction in the legislature. While the conservative members might have shown more forbearance in support of their own idealistic goals, they went with the Democrats for political reasons *because they knew that was what the Governor wanted*.

In the Assembly, Jesse Unruh's Republican line-up was swinging into fine, regimented order. Following all the com-

mittee hearings and debates and after all the additions, deletions and changes had been made, out came the tax bill onto the floor for a final vote. This was July 28, 1967. The time: 10:00 A.M. In order to place maximum pressure on the Republicans and allow them the least possible room to hedge and pause, the Democrats had purposely held up discussions on the bill till the last moment. The vote was taken. Of 54 votes needed for passage in the 80-member Assembly, 53 were cast. Looking on complacently were 26 abstaining Democrats—still voting NO, though many favored the bill—in order to force one remaining Republican into position: John V. Briggs. Briggs, a newcomer to the Assembly, a conservative and also from John Schmitz's own district of Orange County, had campaigned specifically against any increase in taxes. Now it was his turn to go on the carpet before Reagan.

Reagan was attending a meeting at a nearby hotel. Assembly Republicans called him away at this point in an attempt to sway Briggs from his position. Once face to face, Reagan told Briggs why his vote was so badly needed, with the same logic he had used with Schmitz three weeks before. Briggs explained that his constituents had voted for him specifically to prevent—or at least work to prevent—any tax increases. To which Reagan replied that these same people voted for him too as governor and therefore Briggs should change his position. "The Governor told me," said Briggs later in a special press release:

"... that if the bill did not pass, it would be a personal defeat for him and a victory for Jesse Unruh. He said the Republicans should stay together and appealed to me as 'head of our party.'"

(Press Release, July 28, 1967)

According to Briggs, Reagan's explanation revealed for the first time the circumstances and conditions surrounding the tax bill. "It was one of the toughest decisions I've ever had to make," he concluded.

The entire Assembly had now been sitting for over half an hour waiting for Briggs' return. At 1:00 P.M., in he walked with head bowed and quietly moved to his chair. With every eye upon him, silence fell over the Assembly as Briggs then rose and asked the Speaker of the Assembly (Unruh) for permission to change his vote to "Abstain."

Roars of dissent filled the chamber—Democrats and Republicans alike—led by intermittent shouts to change his vote

all the way. With head bowed and looking as though he had lost everything, Briggs consented and changed his vote to "Yea."

Songs of rejoicement. It took the Assembly until 1:30 to finish up and the bill now went back to the Senate for final vote on concurrence. There, the same situation prevailed: 26 (of 40) votes "Yea:" 1 short (Schmitz) of the required two-thirds with 11 Democrats voting NO in order to force Reagan to bring all the Republicans into line. Like Briggs, Schmitz fastened his seatbelt and prepared for 12 miles of bad road.

For the next four hours, every tactic known to politics was heaped on Schmitz—by leading and influential Republicans out of both houses of the legislature, advisors and high-test representatives from Reagan's administrative branch, pleading conservative senators who had long since gone over, threatening opposition. Sobs and threats showered down upon him. The Republicans would see that he never got another bill passed; they would see that a strong opponent ran against him during the next primary election with the Governor's personal backing; his career would be destroyed for failure to comply; he would lose all influence with the Governor, and on and on and on, through the Senate chamber, out into the halls, into the executive washroom, around corners, up the elevators, into private offices, with Schmitz thanking them for their arguments, pondering, reflecting seriously, and returning a polite but firm "no." Megalomania! Paranoid symptoms of gross pathological disorder, aging despot, political harbinger! Ratfink!

Out of the wings came two conservative senators, both freshmen and first on Schmitz's list of the unexpected, with trembling hands. "Come outside a minute and talk, John," wailed Arcadia's H. L. Richardson. "I've got to talk to you," not really falling on his knees, not quite tugging on Schmitz's lapel, nor sobbing—just going through the motions. At the back of the chamber, hastily-forming caucuses, breaking up, forming again. Was this the war-room? Who pressed the button? Schmitz received Glendale's Senator John Harmer in worse condition than Richardson, running up to him with frantic pleadings. It was the Paris Bourse, the crash of '29, the Bubonic Plague. All Schmitz could do was search for avenues of escape, gaze on sympathetically and welcome the excitement as a change of pace.

By sundown, Schmitz was holding firm and it was obvious

to all he wasn't going to budge. So Reagan got on the long-wire to Joseph Kennick, a Senate Democrat then in Los Angeles, and asked him to fly back to Sacramento to cast his "yes" vote for the tax bill. Kennick agreed. But when the news came through, one of the abstaining Democrats, Senator Hugh Burns, saw it would do no good to hold out any longer; Reagan was going to get his two-thirds majority with Kennick's vote. Burns offered to vote "yes" in Kennick's place and allow the legislature to adjourn. They were tired of "working" and wanted to go home.

This day, July 28, 1967, was *the* marathon session of the year.

The two hottest public issues before the public mind were going through the legislature concurrently—taxes and open housing, one right behind the other. In the morning, it was the Assembly swarming all over John V. Briggs on the tax bill. In the afternoon, the open housing measure was acted upon by the Assembly Committee on Governmental Efficiency as the tax bill came back to the Senate, its members then pounding away at John Schmitz for four hours and getting nowhere. Both issues would lay the Republican Party on the line, make Reagan's position conspicuous whichever way they went, and cost unprecedented hours of debate and compromise.

As the dust settled on the tax bill, Reagan was on his way to another reverse over open housing where, for over a year, he had promised to work for repeal.

OPEN HOUSING

"In an effort to clarify his previously stated views on California's open housing law, the Republican candidate for governor said he doesn't think any publicly assisted housing should be limited by a non-discriminatory clause.

"Reagan, answering questions on the televised news program "Face the Nation," reemphasized what he has listed as a major plank in his campaign—that the property owner has a constitutional right to dispose of his property any way he sees fit.

"At the only public event on Reagan's campaign schedule Sunday—a rally in Santa Ana Municipal Stadium—the GOP candidate renewed his attack on the Rumford Act California's open-housing legislation."

—Los Angeles Times
October 31, 1966

"I believe that the right to dispose of and control one's own property is a basic human right and as governor I will fight to uphold that right."

—Candidate Ronald Reagan
Riverside, California
October 12, 1966

Ronald Reagan went to Sacramento partly as the "liberation governor" from the state's Rumford Open Housing Law. It was understood as such by the voters, after their successful 2-to-1 majority initiative action (statewide) against open housing in 1964. The polls showed that fully 75% of the population opposed the law. Once in office and with the voice of the public demanding repeal and probably more adamant on this

subject than anywhere else in the country, Reagan hedged for seven months of hearings, then reversed his position and came out for retention of open housing "with revisions," blaming his change on the legislature and still proclaiming support for repeal. The following year (on March 2, 1968), he announced that he would veto any bill aimed at outright repeal.

What Happened?

In 1964, the California Real Estate Association (CREA) launched a statewide initiative action called Proposition 14 to overthrow open housing in California. This was more than mere repeal. Proposition 14 was an amendment to the state constitution to forbid the future enactment of *any* law which sought to abridge in any way the property rights of California citizens. Voters went to the polls in a record turnout which gave Proposition 14 a 2-to-1 majority victory. Coming from the largest state in the Union, Proposition 14 represented the greatest public outcry against open housing the nation had yet experienced. The position of California voters was clear and unequivocal: they wanted repeal; they did not want "reform" or "compromise."

A liberal-packed California State Supreme Court subsequently ruled Proposition 14 unconstitutional on the grounds that it tied the hands of the legislature and imposed fixed political standards on future generations. In the U.S. Supreme Court, the decision was upheld.

Reagan, in the meantime, had become Governor. The Supreme Court ruling left it up to the conservative members of the state legislature to introduce a bill to repeal the Rumford Open Housing Law *only*. So on the very first day of the legislature—Reagan's first day in public office—the Rumford Repeal Bill, SB 9, was introduced. It's author: Senator John Schmitz of Orange County. Throughout his campaign, Reagan promised to uphold the "will of the voters" on succeeding to office. Repeal of open housing was probably the most important single factor in his victory.

Unbeknown to most of the residents of the state, California has *two* open housing laws. One is the Rumford Act; the other is called the Unruh Civil Rights Act, after the name of the formerly-fat ho-daddy Democratic boss of the Assembly, Jesse Unruh. It used to be "Big Daddy" Unruh. Then he lost 80 pounds. Now the word "big" doesn't seem to line up any more, so they just call him Jesse. But "Thin Daddy" would be

more appropriate because wide or narrow, Jesse Unruh still rules over the legislature. In fact, he may actually carry more weight now than he did before his diet-kick began.

Both the Rumford and Unruh Acts, if enforced, would hold property owners subject to prosecution for refusal to sell or rent to Negroes. The principal difference: the Unruh Act preceded the Rumford Act and applies to anyone who rents to another. It exempts the single-family home. Violators under this law are tried in court. The Rumford Act applies to single-family residential homes, but violators are hauled before the FEPC (Fair Employment Practices Commission).

So the matter of repeal really called for two bills, one to cover each law. On the opening day of the legislature, therefore, Senator John Schmitz introduced SB 9 to repeal the Rumford Act, and SB 14 to destroy the Unruh Act's application to housing.

Both bills went directly into the Senate Governmental Efficiency Committee which included eleven members.

SB 14 died in committee due to some fears as to its vulnerability in the courts. SB 9, the Rumford Repeal Bill, was taken over by Senator Hugh Burns, a senior senator from Visalia, because he felt—and Schmitz agreed—that it would have better chance of passage if the legislature was not made continually aware that an arch-conservative was its author. In addition, of course, Burns was a Democrat (and Speaker Pro Tem of the Senate) in a Democrat-majority house and he had both longevity and respect going for him.

Now operating as the Burns Repeal Bill, SB 9 passed the Governmental Efficiency Committee and went onto the floor of the Senate where it *passed immediately by a vote of 25 to 15*. The liberals were stunned. The 23 included all 19 Republicans in the Senate, 3 Democrats who had voted for it in the Governmental Efficiency Committee, plus one more Democrat from Los Angeles. This represented a clear division of strong bi-partisan support against minority opposition.

No one expected either committee or Senate support for this bill. The liberals were all there, including Rumford himself, ready to issue confident statements to the press and congratulations to the members of the Senate on their wise judgment and the upset vote placed a tremendous and unexpected advantage in Reagan's hands. Which is why the above phrase is emphasized.

Reagan had the full force of the public plus a majority of the legislature's upper house on his side. Not only would the

posture Assembly Republicans would take on the bill, but equally as critical was the question of timing. If Reagan entertained any serious designs of moving in strongly behind repeal—by issuing public statements of support or by notifying the Assembly of his position or by any other means—the time to start was now. This would establish his sentiments early and force the Democrats into the position of having to work against the administration in full view of a hostile public. His actions now would mean all the more by helping the voters to identify with their new governor, and Reagan could lose nothing by upholding his promise to them, even if he were later to be overruled by the Democrats or forced to consider a greatly watered-down bill.

Conversely, conspicuous silence from the executive branch at this critical time would act as notice to both houses of the legislature that Reagan was not going to line up with the public but would probably switch over to the Democrat position and declare himself either for a watered-down measure or a bill which would *retain* open housing with some meaningless loopholes. There could be no question but that given no pressure, or leverage, or ultimata from Reagan, the Democrats would simply ignore the repeal bill and substitute a bill of their own.

With the Assembly waiting to see what Reagan was going to do, from the Governor's office came—nothing. No statements to the press. No conferences with key proponents of the bill. No representatives from the administrative branch moving in to argue its case. No handshaking, no parades, no nothing. The Republicans in the legislature were on their own, just as they had been over the tax and budget increases. The rest would be mere formality with the Democrats in possession of a virtual mandate to do what they wanted with the Burns Repeal Bill. They could sit on it, bottle it up in committee, use it for gliders, run it up the flagpole, or pin it on the wall for a healthy dart game. Reagan would not be coming out for repeal. . . .and he never did.

The Assembly would now go through the motions of producing some kind of fruitless measure that would serve to get Reagan off the hook but keep open housing on the books. And this legislative action, Reagan would later refer to in speeches and broadcasts as "the will of the people."

The Burns Repeal Bill went over into the Assembly Governmental Efficiency Committee. Of the nine members in

this group, five were liberals. Still, it was *possible* to get some kind of bill out of there. What made this so, was its ethnic composition: three Negroes and one ultra-liberal White who usually voted as a block, and five others including four Republicans and one Democrat—usually liberal, but sometimes known to vary.

This committee sat on the bill for *five months*—from April 3 (the first Senate vote) to August 2—with the three Negroes and their White comrade always voting as one. The four Republicans were ready to go for repeal but were held in check by number five, the Democrat LeRoy Greene, who therefore became the swing vote. During this time, the repeal bill was altered, transformed, disfigured and probably eaten several times, until by the end of July, its mother wouldn't even recognize it ("mother" Schmitz). It finally crawled out, not as a repeal bill, but as a bill to retain the Rumford Act with several revisions known oddly as "Compromises." But like Moby Dick, the name "Hugh Burns" was still strapped on when it should have been removed out of simple respect for the dearly-departed. Author of the revisions: Assemblyman Bagley. So as the Burns-Bagley Act, the revision bill go-go danced out onto the floor of the Assembly and there received the necessary majority vote.

Then it moved on back to the Senate for final consideration and here, as though on cue, came the long-awaited declaration. From the Governor's office, pressure opened up on the Republican members of the Senate, all of whom had voted for repeal, to pass the Burns-Bagley bill. Acting through his executive aids (at first), such as Philip Battaglia, Executive Secretary; Vernon Sturgeon, Senate Liaison; and others, Reagan was asking them to reverse their position.

The watered-down bill was so bad that Hugh Burns, sponsor of the repeal bill, stood up and requested the Senate not to concur in the revisions. This, the members did, out of courtesy to Burns. Which meant that the bill would now have to be decided in a special joint committee supplied by three members from each house. It also meant that the conservative members would now have to move against it—hence, against Reagan—to prevent the bill from becoming law.

Any reasonable revision might have made it. But the revision bill was no compromise; it was a betrayal. And the sum total would have been to keep open housing on the books and forever prevent the public from removing it.

The compromise bill did nothing for owners of five or more

dwelling units (houses or apartments). They would still be subject to litigation. This represents a small part of all property owners, but a large chunk of those open to harrassment from organized demonstrators. The compromise bill freed roughly 39% of the population from rights harrassment—that segment which owns property in California.

The remaining 61% which rents or leases, would still be subject in varying numbers to assorted legalities, and some to *double* litigation for failure to comply with the state's two anti-discrimination laws. These would either face court action or the state's Fair Employment Practices Commission—or, in some cases, both—as landlords, real estate dealers, occupants, builders, or bankers financing construction for multiple occupancy or holding mortgages.

For these, the compromise bill:

- 1) authorized the state to pay the legal costs for any Negro bringing suit against a White tenant or landlord;
- 2) changed the law to admit for the first time a double-jeopardy clause which established that a violator could be held responsible under both the Rumford and Unruh civil rights bills for the same violation (which, at least, had been prohibited by the Rumford Act);
- 3) changed the Rumford Act so it would no longer apply to single-family homes but introduced a new provision that realtors could not discriminate, even when acting on the specific instructions of their clients. In other words, all people who go through a real estate dealer or any agent in order to buy, sell, or rent in either direction (for a client or from a landlord).

For still other reasons, however, the compromise bill was worse in its overall application than the Rumford Act alone. Once the compromise bill became law, representative agencies like the many real estate organizations and apartment house associations would probably never again be able to move for outright repeal because the compromise bill would take just enough people off the hook to make it impossible to get enough votes for passage of a new measure.

For the special "bi-house" committee which would decide the fate of the bill, Jesse Unruh (as Speaker of the Assembly) sent over three liberal Democrats. For the Senate side, Hugh

Burns selected one conservative Republican, one liberal Democrat and a Republican swing vote, rather than stack the committee with all-conservatives, in order to retain some order of favor with his own Democratic Party.

Passage required a two-thirds vote on each side. The swing vote was William B. Coombs, a Republican and usually a conservative, who joined the committee without making any statement about the bill either way.

Coombs then went against the revisions, which meant that without his vote, the revision bill would never get out of committee. It would die there and eventually be stricken from the record. So after 7½ months, over the hottest issue in the state, Coombs was the key to it all. The day was August 6, 1967, eight days after John Schmitz had been chased all over the Senate corridors to throw his signature on Reagan's mammoth tax bill.

At this point, Reagan himself stepped into the act. He had been convalescing for minor surgery in a Santa Monica hospital and, from his bedside, he picked up the phone, called Coombs long distance, and kept him on the long wire for a solid hour and a half—90 minutes—trying to get Coombs to change his stand and vote for the revision bill.

Coombs told Reagan that he would support the revision bill if amendments were added as he requested, but he didn't tell Reagan what they were. Their effect would be to remove all the powers of compulsion under the Rumford Act and allow for conciliation only—but no coercion. This would leave the Rumford Act as a conference-type of thing and, of course, destroy the entire purpose for which the liberals had labored so long and hard.

End of conversation. Coombs then just disappeared, vanished, evaporated, and went into hiding for eight hours. Nobody could get in touch with him to get his vote, accept his amendments, call him names, buy him a drink—anything. Why disappear? To get away from Reagan, more than anything, who would have kept the pressure up as long as the bill was before the Senate.

At 7:00 P.M., in walked Coombs and calmly took his chair a few minutes later. It was all over. The revision bill was stricken from the record and the protagonists of open housing repeal would have to start all over again next year.

On September 26, 1967, 51 days after the open housing stalemate in the bi-house special committee, Reagan went before the California Real Estate Association (CREA) and

reaffirmed his strong support for repeal of open housing in California. But he chastized those who could hold out for an "all or nothing" approach. This took a lot of nerve. No organization was in a better position to know the details that had just carried the state's most popular issue down to defeat, than the CREA. The CREA in 1964 had raised and spent over a million and a half dollars putting the anti-Rumford Proposition 14 initiative together and the position of the public could not have been clearer. Proposition 14 was one of the most successful initiatives in the history of the state and the size of the 2-to-1 vote took on immediate national proportions. Pollsters and news analysts regarded Proposition 14 as the most significant expression of anti-open housing sentiment in the entire nation. Therefore, Reagan's *only* acceptable position could, and had to be, repeal, regardless of what he thought the Democrats were going to do. Instead, in the capitol, *Reagan did not express himself for repeal once during the seven-month hearings.*

There is even evidence that he might have been able to restore repeal in the Assembly and defeat the revisions there by simply keeping the members of his own party in line. Many Assembly Democrats were known to favor repeal over revision. On August 2, a floor amendment to restore repeal was introduced by a *Democrat*, Joe Gonsalves, of Norwalk, but was defeated by a vote of 42 to 28. Of the 42 voting against it, 11 were Republicans, 31 were Democrats. When the Burns-Bagley Revision Bill came up for a vote, it received passage by 46 to 32. Among the "yeas," 20 were Republicans and 5 of them were considered conservatives.

By persuading all 38 Assembly Republicans to honor their party platform and support him as head of the party, and adding the 5 Democrats who voted for the Gonsalves amendment to restore repeal, Reagan could have had 43 votes for repeal in the Assembly—enough, and with two to spare—to pass the repeal bill and get rid of the Rumford Act. But when he had the chance, Reagan would not support the Gonsalves amendment either. In this action, he alienated Senate and Assembly Republicans, the real estate groups, the Republican volunteer organizations and every property owner who had been following the proceedings closely.

Reagan actually had a divided loyalty over the property rights issue, and liberal pressures around Sacramento didn't help him any. During his campaign, he had stressed the inviolate right of individual property owners to dispose of

their property in any way they saw fit. But he was unsure that five dwelling (or more) units might not be classified as public property or justifiably come under open occupancy housing laws. And he vacillated over the question of whether the government had a right to impose restrictions to protect its investment in publicly assisted housing (such as FHA, or GI Bill or Cal-Vet).

But even this two-sided argument was taken to mean that he favored outright repeal, which was due to his continuous statements in support of basic property rights and loud ovations about constitutionalism. To the real estate groups, the Republican volunteer organizations and the public at large, property rights come *without* restrictions of any kind if their full constitutional meaning is in force. Reagan passed it all off by saying it was up to the members of the legislature to support the "will of the people" and he would comply with their wishes. Which could only mean he was backing off from his original position, a position the entire state assumed from his statements was going to be a personal crusade to destroy open housing in California. And that is what got him the votes.

THE EDUCATIONAL BUREAUCRACY

"It is my belief the people of California have a right to know all the facts about charges of Communism, sexual misbehavior and near anarchy. . . .

"There is only one way all the facts can be brought to light; there is only one way that those accused of dereliction of duty can present their side of the issue. That is by complete, detailed, open legislative hearings.

Those involved must be forced to testify.

"If the charges are true, they should be the basis of a complete housecleaning at the university."

Candidate Ronald Reagan

—Los Angeles Times

May 13, 1966

"The candidate asserted the so-called 'New Left' has used UC as a political propaganda base with no pretense of allowing balanced discussion and divergent points of view."

—Los Angeles Times

September 10, 1966

As economy measures, Reagan proposed an enormous cutback on the annual appropriation for the University of California (9 campuses) and the 14 state colleges; student tuition to provide tax relief where the cost of instruction is now borne 100% by the public; and to hold the line on faculty and employee salaries for the first year. Throughout his campaign, Reagan asserted that, if elected, a definite investigation of the University of California would be forthcoming. The purpose: "Communism, sexual misconduct and near-anarchy."

Six months into his first term as Governor, Reagan restored all university budget cuts he had made, raised faculty and

employee salaries 5% across the board, kept the tuition plan but removed its tax-relief basis, and forgot about investigating the University. For the first time in California history, Communists this year (1967) gained formal authorization to function openly at the University.

What Happened?

Student tuition, reduced budget appropriations for the University, no salary increases for one year, and a legislative investigation; this is what started it all. Since 1960, Berkeley (main campus of UC) was becoming an embarrassment to the state. If you travelled anywhere outside of California and happened to mention that you had graduated from Cal, or lived there once, or had an office there or just happened to pass through, you couldn't get out of the room without giving a speech. To the hometowners in Boston, Kalamazoo or Dead End, Utah, Berkeley had a higher interest-span than Perry Mason or the world series. Taking over the University! Trying to shut down an Army base! Free love! Students in class without shoes! Four-letter words over public address systems paid for by the taxpayer! The whole bit. You blushed when you flew *over* the place.

And in California, no one really liked the breakdown of law enforcement at Cal, the narcotics epidemic among the young, the misuse of tax money or the thought of sending his sons or daughters there with 50-50 odds that they would emerge from their freshman year as militant, Marxist revolutionaries or as moral decadents.

So Reagan had a tailor-made campaign issue to thrive on and he made the most of it and it earned him roses and respect as a moral crusader in the anti-Communist cause. Perfect. Then he won. And, with victory behind him, the student-faculty demonstrations, protest marches and effigies were only a matter of time. This man had to be stopped!

This is not the place for a detailed analysis of conditions at Cal. Suffice to say, if you were going to launch an investigation, where would you start? Berkeley, where students in bare feet carry a copy of Mao Tse Tung's *Red Guard* as a manual of conduct on their way to peace parades to protest police brutality; where marijuana is grown surreptitiously in home window gardens, Mescaline brewed on top of the stove, next to the peas and asparagus, and LSD prepared with front-room chemical sets.

What would you investigate, venereal disease among part-time day students or a student course in urban guerilla warfare? Would you call a leftwing faculty member on the carpet for preaching violent overthrow of the established social order, or his hippie son for trying to foment it while high to the rafters on heroin? You could stop the professor, but how would you close down a Bay-wide narcotics ring?

Would you try the Bill Buckley approach of trying to understand and communicate with the milkshake that makes up the student revolutionary mind, or would you start with something less ephemeral, such as blasting his unwashed backside off the city streets with a 12-gauge load of rocksalt? Which came first, a course on economic determinism or the policy of academic freedom which sustained it? The academic or the psychedelic? Collectivism on the campus taught with the full sanction of the Regents? Or collectivism *off* the campus, *lived* under the approving eye of the City of Berkeley?

Probably 60% of the problem is the town of Berkeley—that is, incredibly lax city management; and only 40% the leftwing university instructor. Before 1960, the student revolutionary and beat-set lived in the backs of cars parked around the university on *city streets*, or 12 to a room originally designed for 2 against *city* ordinances; in conditions which violated *city* hygienic codes. And, curious but true, in this form they had a very off-cast standing at Cal. On campus, the emphasis was still very much on the pursuit of learning, athletics, social life as preparation to fit into professional adult life—rather than overthrow it; the traditional thing. Then, up went a nice, new student union building right on the edge of the campus at the main South entrance, open all hours, and suddenly the student underground had a home, something resembling status and an official standing.

Whereas in 1950 an occasional student passed out the latest edition of the *Daily Worker* on the steps of the men's gymnasium at the risk of being kicked off campus the same day or mobbed and beaten by irate students passing by, in and around the student union today probably 50 to 60 different revolutionary journals are palmed off to students and sightseers going on and off the campus by an army of bearded, shoeless protesting members of the "love" generation.

And, you could stand the sight if you could stand the smell.

Directly across the broad tree-lined walkway: Sproul Hall

—the admissions building—where sits the chancellor of the university under whose eyes and nose and approving glances lives this crawling scene from the St. Petersburg ghettos of 1864.

So there is some question as to where you would start with an investigation of Cal: the charter of the University, the charter of the Regents, the charter of the City of Berkeley, the state money supply, the penal code, or the Army. It seems altogether fitting that an investigation should be oriented first and foremost around three main fields of emphasis (*disciplines!*): body, mind and soul, as all three are down the tubes at Cal. And there is some question as to whether shutting down the Marxist mindbending factory they operate there would ever make straight souls out of the hippies again, anyway. Berkeley has become the garbage disposal unit of the western world, supplanting Juarez, Mexico. Or, as one spectator paraphrased it one day under the Berkeley sun, unable to believe his eyes: "Greenwich Village and Berkeley: Toilet East and Toilet West."

Gov. Pat Brown couldn't—and wouldn't—do anything about UC because Brown was an omelette.

The uproar over student tuition, investigation, budget-cuts and so on, which met Reagan at the gates of Sacramento two months after his inauguration, was not actually a legitimate defense of higher education. It was a protest launched by the militant, leftwing arm of the University system to protect the world's largest youth-indoctrination program.

The bottom really fell out of Berkeley when the residents there lost a campaign to overturn grammar school across-town busing in 1964. They tried to recall the local school board and failed, when they might have won on a court injunction to *forbid* busing, which at least had been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court on numerous occasions.

A coalition of liberal and colored votes beat them down, and over the following year, probably one-third of the white residents moved over the hill into neighboring Contra Costa County. Before that, Berkeley was more or less holding its own.

In early 1965, the "New Left" at Berkeley put together a novel device called the Free Speech Movement. Over 3,000 students, leftwing faculty and non-student agitators converged on Sproul Hall in a giant, coordinated move to—are you ready?—*take over the University*. That's right. Administrative procedures were outmoded and old-fashioned; faculty

members were too restricted to "authorized" curricula; students should be allowed greater freedom to express and propound the ideas and express the mood of a dynamic and rapidly-changing progressive society. In short, they wanted official standing for all "off-color" groups and above-board instruction in the ideologies of the left with student-faculty administration in charge. Nominal leader of the FSM was a corn-curved Italian-American named Mario Savio.

This was no Glee Club protest to install Coca Cola machines. This demonstration brought together every militant and semi-militant leftwing body from the Youth Action Union to the Young Socialist Alliance, the Socialists and Trotskyites, the Progressive Labor Movement, the Progressive Labor Party, the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs and a more recent addition called SLATE. Originally launched as a protest movement on campus, SLATE became communist-dominated. The DuBois clubs were descended from the Young Communist League which was formed in 1919 under direct control of the Soviet Union. Since the FSM created national news, there was an investigation by the State of California Senate Fact-Finding Sub-Committee which charged SLATE as being Communist-dominated and the Progressive Labor Movement as "the most militant Communist organization in this country."

Aimed at University policies, rules and regulations, the FSM employed the *Cogobierno* method of student takeover, a formal Communist pattern attempted at the University of Mexico in 1963 and in many Latin American countries, with the object of taking over administrative control.

The Senate report accused University President Clark Kerr of allowing known Communist organizations to operate directly on the campus, for placing known Communist Party members—instructors—on the University payroll, and of failing to take justified disciplinary action. ". . . . the Berkeley administration was floundering in a bureaucratic tangle," said the report,

"With no clear and definite leadership, no firm insistence on the enforcement of its own rules, and an unwillingness to stand solidly behind the actions of the chancellor.

"There were endless committee hearings, faculty resolutions, disruptions in the chain of command and an area of confusion overlapping between the administration of

the statewide university and the administration of the Berkeley campus."

Substance of the report (although not indicated in so many words): Over the previous ten years or more, Berkeley had become a Communist cell under the leadership of leftwing or Communist-oriented faculty, working under the full protection of the Regents.

Although the FSM failed to accomplish its purpose, it did accomplish the firing of one of its top sympathizers, Dr. Clark Kerr, two years later and won the Communists their first formal recognition by the University to operate openly and legitimately on campus. And, it did set in motion an exodus of some of Cal's top instructors.

In the first year following the FSM, 68 professors abandoned Cal to seek greener—and less exhibitionist—pastures elsewhere, thus contributing somewhat to a decline in teaching standards. It would be harder to develop quality teaching at a campus only a banana-peel away from an uprising.

Then there was the sex orgy in the men's gymnasium.

On March 25, 1966 a campus group called the "Vietnam Day Committee" took over the Berkeley campus' Harmon Gymnasium for hippie fun and games lasting from 6 to 2 in the morning (after requesting and obtaining permission from the chancellor's office).

A report by the California Senate Fact-Finding Sub-Committee described the event from information supplied by local police authorities. Three rock-and-roll bands facing in different directions played sometimes at intervals and then altogether, in an incongruous roar which drowned out all conversation. Random sounds from electronic devices played continuously for "dancing" to the pulsating projection of multi-colored lights, while movies of undulating nude men and women and color sequences spread across two screens and on a huge balloon suspended above the bandstand. The movies provided the only illumination in the immense gym. The event was advertised as "hallucinogenic sounds, projections and lights." Said the report:

"... the sweet, acrid odor of marijuana pervaded the area, many of the dancers were ... intoxicated, and there was evidence of nausea in the lavatories, halls, and other portions of the premises. Young people were ... seen standing against the walls or lying on the floors and steps in a dazed condition, with glazed eyes consistent

with a condition of being under the influence of narcotics. Sexual misconduct was blatant." (Thirteenth Report, Senate Fact Finding Subcommittee on Un-American Activities, Supplement; Sen. Hugh Burns, Chairman; State of California, 1966)

A year later, this same organization would launch a desperation drive to shut down the Oakland Army induction depot, with sporadic attempts to stop troop trains and in other ways try to intervene directly in the war effort. Marches and rallies had proven ineffective. There had to be physical action. So on October 16, 1967, 700 anti-draft demonstrators congregated once again with the Berkeley campus as their starting place, boarded buses down to the Oakland Army induction center and there, tried to stop 400 men from going to Vietnam. They were met by rows of Oakland police and Army bayonets, and after some resistance some 125 were jailed with bails ranging up to \$1,100 on assorted charges. But, oddly, no University officials.

When Reagan talked about investigating the University of California, the idea wasn't to unearth new insights into the University's financial structure or administrative overhead; it was to back up the State Senate Fact-Finding Committee's charges of "Communism, sexual misconduct and neary-anarchy on the campus of the University of California." And, it wasn't a bad idea. Probably 90% of the taxpaying public was looking forward to such an investigation with glee. When Reagan announced, after his victory, that he would name former CIA director, John J. McCone, (under Eisenhower) to conduct the inquiry, therefore, the familiar reactions took place: conservatives jumping up and down in joyous anticipation, liberals pouring into the streets to protest the action.

Then, as an added economy measure, Reagan had the spleen to suggest that students pay part of their own instructor's fees for the first time in California history. Other land grant colleges and many state colleges were doing it, he reasoned, why shouldn't we?

The yearly cost of education averages out to \$2,900 per student, of which the major portion goes for professors' salaries. This all comes out of the state's general fund which, in turn, comes out of the taxpayers' pockets. For the nine university campuses, Reagan proposed a tuition schedule of between \$250 and \$280 per year; for the 14 state college campuses, \$150 to \$160 per year.

First figures set the estimated revenue from these levees at \$39 million per year, which would be \$39 million *less* that the State of California would have to milk from the voters in taxes. That was the purpose of college tuition: *tax relief*. Reagan's Finance Director Gordon Smith also recommended (a) delaying the start of the year-round operations at Berkeley for one year for a net savings of \$5 million, and (b) letting the Regents use their \$21,500,000 "contingence fund" which was not appropriated to anything (which they eventually did).

Since the bureaucrats were demanding a 7% salary increase, when Reagan gave them the "there will be no salary increase this year" rejoinder, it was like pouring hot butter down a wildcat's ear. Then the budget cuts (noted in Chapter 1): \$46,800,000 less for the universities; \$23,500,000 less than the previous year for the state colleges. Mail favoring the Governor's proposals ran 3 to 1 and wires 10 to 1 in support of the reductions.

What could be more logical, thought he, than for college students to pay 10% of their own instruction? They were doing it at Montana, Arizona, Vermont, Penn State, Virginia, New York, Maine, New Jersey (Rutgers), Ohio State, Colorado, Iowa, New Mexico, Oregon, Oregon State, Michigan State and many others. (See the *California Statesman*, January 31, 1967).

But to faculty and administrators, the proposal was likened to that of the Egyptian priests when Ikhnoton announced to the multitude that their pagan gods were not real.

"The worst setback for higher education in the state since the depression," came the cacaphonic bleats of one UC official; "Reagan apparently intends to replace the 'creative society' with the 'illiterate society,'" moaned Professor Jesse Allen, Chairman of the statewide Academic Senate; "either of the proposed actions. . . . would be absolutely disastrous," cried Robert Phelps of the University Faculty Association. And from Franklin Murphy, Chancellor at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA):

" the principle of tuition-free higher education has better served the democratization and the economic growth and development of the United States than perhaps any other factor. This is not the time to jettison this principle." (*Jettison!*)

Reagan replied that there was no such thing as "free"

education; it was very costly and the question was, who paid these costs, and who got the benefits?

A rebellion was under way. Did Reagan know he was going to flush every freeloading propagandist out of the walls and dark corners of the world's largest mindbending institution? Was he aware the streets would fill with hordes of bearded professors joined in phalanx by marching minions of howling, protesting students, or that threats and pressures would come down upon him as though he had just called up all children below the age of five for the Vietnam War? From one Marc Tool (!?), Professor of Economics at Sacramento State College, and President of the California Association of State College Professors:

"We now have no alternative except to organize the faculty and students to seek with every means at our disposal a reversal of these decisions." (The California *Statesman*, January 31, 1967.)

And organize they did. At Fresno State College, Reagan was hung in effigy. Again, at UC's Davis campus (agricultural). Students dug graves for both Reagan and his Finance Director, Gordon Smith. San Fernando Valley State College strung him up again and armed a student mob with placards which read: "Keep Cal State Free," and "Recall Ronnie." While the Regents tried to figure it all out in hastily-called meetings at the Berkeley campus, 2,000 students rallied against the Reagan administration. Again, an effigy, with a sign: "Reduce Reagan 10%." The presidents of the student bodies at all 14 state colleges announced united opposition to the proposed budget cuts.

At UCLA, a Recall Reagan campaign sprang into being with all university campuses called on to participate. Four hundred students and faculty members held a protest rally and carried a coffin bearing a wreath and the inscription, "University of California."

Then, back from a "diplomatic tour" of South Vietnam, came University of California President Clark Kerr. As he stepped off the plane on January 7 (1967) he complained bitterly to a San Francisco Airport news gathering saying that the UC budget should be increased 15%, not decreased, to provide \$38 million more. As for tuition, it was out of the question. Two days later, at a special meeting of the Regents in Berkeley, Kerr bemoaned that Reagan's proposed budget cuts would reduce student enrollment on the nine campuses

by 22,400 the coming year. In plain language, he wasn't having any.

This was bad timing for Kerr. Since 1964 and the Free Speech Movement at UC, he was becoming "excess baggage," an embarrassment to the University. His relations with the Regents, said the *Los Angeles Times* on January 24, were adversely affected by his handling of the Berkeley campus disorders in the Fall of 1964. They deteriorated further as a result of his action the following Spring in announcing his intended resignation to the press without prior consultation or notice.

Kerr was accused of indecisiveness in handling the uprising and of coddling the demonstrators. Although 773 participants were arrested at the sit-in on the Sproul Hall steps, Kerr had not favored bringing in police to make the arrests and had yielded only under pressure from Governor Brown.

Other subsequent events did not improve the relationship. A firing had been in the works, and now Kerr was walking into it as though by his own personal invitation.

Still, nothing as meek as raised eyebrows was going to stop Kerr. With bald noggin glistening in the California sun, but as usual the study of perfect calm, Kerr joined Glenn S. Dumke, Chancellor of the state colleges, and passed down his order to halt student admissions throughout the University's vast nine campuses.

Reagan stood open mouthed but regaining his cool, threatened to cut UC's \$700,000 public relations budget "... since it would seem a good share of it is being spent publicizing me." (*Los Angeles Times*, January 18, 1967).

Then, as the no-tuition, no-budget-reduction movement gained wind, Kerr informed two of the Regents at a private meeting that they could either let him have a free hand in the running of the University or terminate him. (*Los Angeles Times*, January 24, 1967). He would not resign, he told them, and his remarks were interpreted quite logically as an ultimatum. This flip move helped to drive Reagan over into the "anti-Kerr" bleachers of the Board of Regents, which were already against Kerr in a ratio of about 3 to 2.

There were consultations, caucuses, and closed-door discussions. Finally, the Regents took a vote and it came up 14 to 8 for Kerr's dismissal with Reagan going with the "yeas." That was on January 18. Although Reagan thereafter got more credit than he had coming, Kerr admitted in statements to the press that the firing had been in the works for years.

movement new verve. Now they had five: no tuition, no budget cuts, higher salaries, no investigation, and villification of their deposed heirophant. As Reagan prepared his January 31 budget message to the joint legislature, the demonstration expanded into a student strike on all university campuses.

By the time Reagan made his economy program public—the one that had all the conservatives wanting to name their sons or even their daughters “Ronald”—a statewide march on Sacramento was in the works. Joining in the resistance on January 20: the California Teachers Federation made up of 10,000 elementary and high school teachers with no immediate stake in the problem. Arthur Kipp, leader of the statewide Academic Senate, warned darkly that Kerr’s dismissal might produce a loss of UC reputation and an exodus of key faculty personnel (which it did, but only following the earlier national impact of the Free Speech Movement).

From Washington, the 83,000-member American Association of University Professors served notice on Reagan that it would do “all in its power” to prevent any unusual cuts at UC. On January 15, over 250 faculty members at Southern California State, whose admissions had been frozen, marched for two hours outside Chancellor Glenn S. Dumke’s office, called into being by local 1441 of the American Federation of Teachers.

The march on Sacramento came off as scheduled. The date: February 11, 1967. Before the capitol conglomerated one of the mottliest throngs in the history of the beat generation, shouting “Sieg Heil,” and “Tax the Rich.”

A slightly-rattled Governor Reagan moved uneasily to the balcony to face the microphones:

“Ladies and gentlemen. . . . if there are any.” (Shouts and jeers). And later, “If there is anything I can say that would create an open mind in some of you. . . .” (More shouts and jeers). After a few minutes, he left the balcony.

Then the big change. On March 1, news of the budget restorations was made public and several days later, the giant tax increase. For the faculty and non-teaching university personnel: a proposed 5% across-the-board salary increase. There would still be tuition—if the Regents ever got around to adopting it—but instead of a tax-relief proposition, the entire concept was changed on July 4. No tax relief. Instead, tuition revenue, which Reagan now estimated would run to \$54 million per year, would be divided three ways:

- 1) \$27.5 million for state loans and grants to needy students;
- 2) \$13.5 million for new capital construction;
- 3) \$14.0 million for the creation of 500 new "super-salaried" faculty chairs.

Grants to needy students? New capital construction? Five hundred new "super-salaried" chairs? All new spending? Did Reagan need these things *this year*? The year of the *budget*? The year when every possible attempt should be made to "cut" and "trim" and prevent new spending at all costs in order to wipe away last year's debt? The \$27.5 million for loans and grants to "needy students" was not coming out of the state treasury; but neither was any money going to be diverted from existing costs of instruction. The money raised through tuition from those who could afford it would not go for 10% of their *own* instruction, in other words, but into the state treasury to be doled out to "those in need."

From each according to his ability, to each according to his need? Not *Reagan*! He called it an "equal education program." "But rather than make an economy help-the-taxpayer case in his presentation," conceded the *Los Angeles Times* on July 27, 1967, "Reagan emphasized that his basic desire was to help students from poor families get into higher education."

That wasn't the original idea at all; the idea was economy—new ways to save money and reduce taxes. The state was in *debt*, yet Reagan was now beginning to feel altruistic—something he couldn't afford—in the best spirit and tradition of Pat Brown. Our college campuses, said Reagan,

" have become almost closed campuses, available to those who come from upper middle-class white families." (*Los Angeles Times*, July 27, 1967).

More than the old economy drive was going by the boards; Reagan was changing his entire philosophy to class legislation with just a tinge of demagogism. If Whites in the upper middle-income level were the "privileged," did this mean the "underdogs" were mostly Negroes? Was that what Reagan was trying to say? Studies showed that 50% of the state college students and 62% of the students at UC came from families with an income of at least \$10,000 per year; 72% of all 18-year olds in both came from families earning over \$14,000; and 75 % of the university's students came from

families earning \$8,000 or more annually. Only about 12% of the students came from families with a \$6,000-per-year income. This, then, must have been the dividing line between the privileged and underprivileged: a \$6,000 annual income.

Was Reagan prepared to accept the difference between the economically-deprived and the scholastically unqualified in arriving at a definition of "need?" Did he know that a "grant-in-aid" was geared strictly to achievement ability, but that a "subsidy" might end up as a hand-out or a vote-bribe or an incentive for sloth if based on economics alone? Had he discovered the tie-in between theories of need and environment as applied to education enough to know that at the end of *this* particular rainbow was the inevitable lowering of grade and entrance requirements?

Had he consulted statistics and education surveys to ascertain how many young people *are* kept out of college due to insufficient funds? Did he know how many "economically-deprived" students had made it into and through college since the start of the land-grant system? Had he forgotten that his personal income tax schedule was doubling, coincidentally, for those in this same (above) \$10,000-or-more category?

If implemented, Reagan would have to work the "gray areas" out of this tuition plan to prevent it from becoming just more redistribution of wealth.

Even with these built-in goodies—both ideological and monetary—the Regents felt they couldn't adopt the plan. The word "tuition" now had such an ugly ring in people's ears that they didn't think they could ever get away with it; that is, unless they disguised this \$54 million blood offering under the title of additional "fees." (Which they did the following year).

And nothing could be done until the dust had settled. So that's where the subject of tuition stood until February of 1968.

Of course, the tumult evaporated as though pushed off a cliff. Clark Kerr? Oh, he was back on campus within two months at a slightly lower salary: \$30,000, down from the \$45,000 he had been drawing as President of the University. His new job: instructor in industrial relations.

The special investigation? This was the last thing the bureaucrats wanted. The papers attacked the idea bitterly, stood in stark terror that it would degenerate into a probe (which, of course, was the entire purpose of investigation), and pointed to the "Joint Legislative Committee on Higher Education," already established under Jesse Unruh to study

the University's "financial structure." A "Special UC probe is unnecessary," ran a Los Angeles *Times* editorial on November 30, 1966.

So it was called off. Instead, for the first time in University history, a Communist group gained formal recognition to function on campus. On February 11, 1967, the Communist Party Forum headed by Bettina Aptheker, daughter of leading U.S. Marxist theoretician and self-proclaimed Communist, Herbert Aptheker, became an official student organization at Berkeley. Assistant Dean of Students, Donald Hopkins, told reporters he "saw no reason to deny" the Communist Party Forum's application for recognition.

MEDICARE

"You are actually being taxed to provide better medical care for these card holders than you can afford for yourself and your family."

—Governor Ronald Reagan,
Report to the People
December 4, 1967

"I'm frank to say, it is my belief, that unless Medi-Cal—which is our homegrown name for the Medicaid program—that unless it is revised and revamped, it not only can but most assuredly will bankrupt our state in a very few years."

—CBS-TV Special Report
"What About Ronald Reagan,"
December 14, 1967

When Reagan first took issue with Medi-Cal, voters took that to mean he favored supplanting it with something rooted more firmly in private capital insurance. They thought this because (a) Medi-Cal is a burden on the taxpayers with no foreseeable limit, and (b) Reagan campaigned as a conservative which implied a flat rejection of socialized medicine. During 1967, Reagan was prevented, both by the courts and the legislature, from making any alterations in the Democrats' program. But as was later discovered, he was not actually opposed to this method of providing medical care but only to its wasteful aspects. In a public announcement, the position of the Reagan administration was to *retain* Medi-Cal, but place it on an economically-sound footing.

Medi-Cal is California's share of the socialized medical program created by the federal government in 1955 under the title of Medicare. Medicare is paid entirely from the federal treasury and is open only to those 65 or over. The program for the states, sometimes referred to as Medicaid, is a three-way matching grant (federal, state, county) for two classes of people: those who are already on welfare, and the medically indigent (referring to those who make *some* money but who cannot afford doctor bills). In California, these grants divide up as follows (1967 figures):

Federal grants	\$346,348,089
State grants	231,291,258
Local grants	112,712,933
Total	\$790,352,270

These figures represent the proposed budget expenditure for fiscal 1967-68 (at the start of the year) during which the office of health care services (created by Brown in 1959) estimated that 1,575,389 persons would be eligible. California would extend this service to families earning \$3,500 or less per year, and they would be serviced by about 80,000 suppliers (e.g. medically-trained personnel).

Medi-Cal was created during a special legislative session in the Fall of 1965 by the previous Democratic governor, "bottomless pit" Edmund G. "Pat" Brown.

The problem with Medi-Cal for those who like the principle of socialized medicine is, very simply, eligibility. As enacted, the program is nothing but a blank check for anyone who can qualify for anything: a headache, lonesomeness, or fear of in-laws.

If he plays it cool, his dogs, cats and potted plants can get in on the act too.

Within the first year, therefore, Medi-Cal's cup runneth over and administrators in Sacramento were unable to keep it within established budget allotments. Then, come 1967, the Reagan administration failed to pass enough money to fund the program for fiscal 1967-68, missing by \$70 million in state funds and \$210 million overall. And the whole thing is, when the state fails to come up with its share, it loses the others (federal and county). That is the way matching funds operate.

Reagan knew Medi-Cal was a mess, but he did not want to advocate outright repeal—which was the only logical solution there was. Instead, he decided to try and stop those services to indigents which could be classed as *non-essential* by proposing *selective*, as against across-the-board *percentage* cuts.

Regardless of definitions, in just the first two years, Medi-Cal abuse in both classifications was like the Great Train Robbery. For example: over-utilization; doctors treating members of a family who are not patients. One doctor drew \$1,050 from Medi-Cal after examining one family of 8 members and giving 81 tests in 49 office visits. These included electrocardiograms for all of the children. Other examples: performing unnecessary services; doctors seeing patients four and five times a week for minor ailments in order to present the state with a bigger bill; over-prescription; more shots than a patient needed; fraudulent claims made by doctors about the amount of their overhead, the number of their Medi-Cal patients and the nature of their problems; inflating bills; charging the same bill to *both* Medi-Cal and Medi-Care, etc.

Investigations in early 1967 turned up 35 persons and companies later suspended from Medi-Cal participation for discovered abuses. This included 14 doctors, 7 dentists, 3 hearing aid centers, 3 chiropractors, 2 convalescent hospitals, an osteopath, and a nursing home.

Reagan entered office and was hoist on the petard to face a problem created by the Democrats which had no available solution. There was a second problem. Since Medi-Cal had been created through legislation, nothing but legislation could alter the program. Instead, Reagan chose to try and run through a series of reforms by "executive order" which were proscribed to failure even before the ink was dry. He should have known this and those looking for hidden clues to Reagan's "true motives" like to think he did. To wit: that he deliberately undermined his own reform attempts in order to *retain* Medi-Cal unchanged.

Regardless, on came Reagan like Batman with a plan of his own to by-pass the legislature, which looked something like this:

—Medi-Cal patients could stay in a hospital for a maximum of 8 days (the average stay before Medi-Cal was 9 days) because too many bums, tired of sleeping under the bridge, would simply move into a nice, clean hospital ward and get board and room for an indefinite stay;

- All hospital cases not in the emergency category were to be transferred from private to county hospitals unless removal endangered the life of the patient. These transfers would save \$20 million over the following eight months, of which the state would be able to save \$10 million directly;
- Broad cutbacks in dentistry and doctors' fees. From here on, Medi-Cal would cover extractions only if there was pain and/or infection; Medi-Cal would not cover fillings, dentures, fluoride treatments or preventive dentistry. For some dentists, as much as 60% of their patients were on Medi-Cal, which meant that they—the dentists—were surviving two-thirds of the way on the program alone. Among these were 20 to 30 Negro dentists in the Watts area;
- 160,000 eligibles were to be eliminated from the medically-indigent category;
- There would be a roll-back of physicians' fees to the January 1967 levels;
- Nursing homes entries would be reviewed to eliminate all unnecessary entries;
- Surgery was to be restricted to that necessary for treatment of injuries and life-threatening conditions only;
- Other non-essentials would be eliminated, such as foot-care, chiropractic and physical therapy services, transportation, psychotherapy, eyeglasses, hearing aids, and special supplies.

All very good. Throughout the state, 80,000 suppliers were making handsome supplementary incomes out of Medi-Cal, and for the recipient, it was gravy, gravy all the way.

So with news of the cutbacks, up went the familiar howl of the dispossessed. In the Sacramento Superior Court of Judge Irving Perluss, a complaint was filed against Reagan by one Harvey Morris, 45, a Modesto farm worker and welfare recipient who was eligible for Medi-Cal.

Perluss, a Brown appointee, held that (a) any administrative cuts had to be across-the-board percentage cuts, they could not be selective cuts, as Reagan was asking; (b) if percentage cuts were going to be made, they had to start with the "medically indigent" category first and eliminate that entire classification before proceeding into the welfare category; (c) Reagan's administration had an obligation to stay within the

established Medi-Cal budget, which meant he would have to raise the budget back to that projected from the previous year, namely: \$800 million, and put back the 160,000 recipients he had decided to drop; and (d) only new legislation could alter Medi-Cal; it could not be done arbitrarily from the executive branch of government.

Forthwith, Reagan came back on Perluss with some offhand remarks about a "tyranny of the courts" and threatened Medi-Cal doctors with loss of fees if they obeyed Perluss' decision. True, there may *be* a judicial tyranny, but this was not established by Perluss' decision; he was on sound legal ground all the way. Medi-Cal could only be amended by new bills. Reagan then appealed the decision to the State Supreme Court which obediently ruled in Perluss' favor on November 20, 1967. All of Reagan's cuts were therefore restored.

Now it was legislation or nothing. New bills were hastily drawn up in Reagan's office for introduction to Jesse Unruh's Democrat-controlled legislature. This time Reagan recommended across-the-board percentage cuts and a limitation on the state's share to \$305 million; \$41 million less than current levels, and all the other economy devices would still apply.

Unruh simply wound his watch, blew smoke rings in the air and muttered casual nothings to the press about how Reagan was trying to destroy the program. The argument carried in the papers for a few days, then ended on December 7 with a "compromise" (so called) between Reagan and Unruh which put the issue at rest for the balance of the year.

In the minds of Reagan's conservative public, the Governor favored repeal of the program. It is socialized medicine; it occupies no great standing in the ideology which won him popularity. That was their mistake. Reagan's objections to waste did not embody a conservative attempt at a cure. For him, a more efficiently operated socialized program was the answer to Medi-Cal.

"...it is the Republican Administration's position," said Reagan's Health and Welfare Director Spencer Williams on September 18, 1967, "that Medi-Cal, enacted in 1965 under the Democratic Governor Edmund G. Brown, is a worthwhile program aimed at placing the poor in the 'mainstream' of medical care, rather than relegating them to county hospitals without free choice of doctors." (*San Francisco Chronicle*, September 19, 1967).

"We feel our job is to help the needy—not care for the

greedy," said Williams, adding that the Reagan administration merely sought to place the program on an appropriate businesslike basis.

It is possible that in thus endorsing the Democrat's medical plan, Reagan did not even know what a conservative approach to the problem looked like. He *would* require the recipient to chip in something toward his own medical bill. But even Jesse Unruh suggested turning the entire operation over to private carriers to administer (meaning the insurance companies). Even on that basis, however, the problem would remain: a medical fund raised through taxes to subsidize a program which should be financed precisely the other way around: first, from one's relatives; or if they are unable to afford it; second, from his club, organization, or fraternal order; if still more money is needed: third, from the city in which he lives; fourth, from the county; and fifth and last, the state.

By 1959, all major life insurance companies had come forth with programs which, if a public administrator were really looking for economy, would keep the state, as well as the government, completely out of the medical care business.

Unless one is dedicated to socialization at all costs, simple economics will force him to get any such program as Medicare out from under government control, even if government has to raise the money to supply it. The rule is unchallengeable because government subsidizes waste in the most *efficiently managed* programs. Private carriers, on the other hand, either economize and provide service at the same time, or competition will drive their customers over into other companies. The free market supplants all subsidized, politically-controlled endeavors because poor management cannot survive in a free economic environment. Subsidized funds, to the contrary, cannot *eliminate* poor management because politics protects the human error that is eliminated in the free market.

In the final analysis, there was no appreciable difference between Brown's wasteful Medicare program and Reagan's hoped-for efficiently-run Medicare program. Both are socialized and operate, therefore, as welfare, not insurance. Reagan's would become the Democrat's program under the Republican label. Nor could Reagan hope to get by the root of the problem by hiring task forces of private businessmen to work out the kinks. Every businessman knows this, as do most Republicans now giving hands-down endorsement to Reagan in the interest of "party unity." The problem is still

left half-solved by state funding of private insurance programs, as proposed by Jesse Unruh, because the abuse factor still resides in the claims of the insurance companies, rather than the patients, and the state still has a license to extract the amount of the funding through taxes with no other referee than itself.

Assuming that some money must be taken in taxes to fund private insurance for patients who literally have no means of selfsupport, the *very last* public agency to lay hands on it should be the state because it is the farthest removed from the level of collection and, therefore, the most liable to irresponsibility. And this goes quadruple for the U.S. Government.

Whatever Reagan's true aims, he could not remove waste by retaining the Medi-Cal program nor could an economically-run Democratic program masquerade as Republicanism. Any such attempt at a double-play would operate at the expense of the philosophy which won him the state's highest office. Unless Reagan is so committed to politics now that he feels he can no longer allow ideology to influence his actions.

GUN OWNERSHIP

REAGAN WILL FIGHT FOR GUN OWNERSHIP—

"Ronald Reagan, Republican nominee for Governor, promised Tuesday to 'resist any effort that would take from the American citizen his right to own and possess firearms.'

"He also said he would oppose any law requiring registration of firearms."

—Los Angeles Times
August 3, 1966

On July 28, 1967, Governor Ronald Reagan signed into law the Mulford Gun Control Act, the first such move toward firearms control the State of California has ever seen to abridge the rights of citizens under the Second Amendment. The new law makes it impossible for the average citizen to defend himself adequately in high crime areas in the face of the nation's greatest upsurge in street crime.

State Senator John G. Schmitz, a vigorous opponent of the Bill, put it this way: "During the last week of July, one of the worst gun bills in California history was passed and signed into law. This was Assemblyman Mulford's AB 1591 which bans the carrying of loaded guns on any public street or highway by private citizens who cannot prove themselves to be in 'imminent danger' of attack." (*Sacramento Report*, August 17, 1967).

What Happened?

Definition of "gun ownership": The right to employ a loaded firearm in the interest of self-defense. All arguments

on gun legislation relate to gun *usage*, not the collection of souvenirs. Remove the citizens' ability to defend himself and you have made the factor of gun ownership a mockery. More to the point, you have disarmed him. Which is the sum and substance of the Second Amendment, which reads: "... the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

Out of a clear blue sky one day in May (May 3, 1967, to be exact), into the Assembly chamber of the California state capitol walked a band of young Negroes, 26 in all, armed with loaded rifles, pistols and shotguns. They were there to support a bill restricting the carrying of loaded weapons within the city limits of Oakland, California, and they claimed they represented an organization known as the Black Panthers. After stunned capitol police regained the use of their dangling arms, they seized the Negroes' guns, returned them unloaded, and herded them out onto the capitol grounds. From there, the 26 walked away from the capitol onto Sacramento city property and were there arrested by city police and taken into custody.

Either this semi-harmless charade was deliberately staged to throw undue importance on Assemblyman Don Mulford's approaching gun bill or what the papers the next day said was true: the guards and security system around the capitol building were in drastic need of repair. What this particular problem had to do with citizens trying to defend themselves on city streets throughout the state was not completely clear, except that Mulford's gun bill did happen to bear on the public use of firearms, not security around the capitol building. And, perchance, he had high hopes that an atmosphere of emotion and confusion among the legislators—who, being delicate instruments—would construe the difference. Mulford himself was also from Oakland.

Also, the event was almost perfectly-timed with the words of California's Attorney General Thomas Lynch (Democrat) who just a few days before had said:

"... there is no place in this day and age for 'wild west' exhibitions of firearms.

"The time has come when we have to legislate against carrying or exhibiting guns in public places" (Los Angeles *Times*, May 4, 1967).

Earlier, on August 3, 1966, a young kid at the University

of Texas had gone berserk, climbed to the top of the university tower, and proceeded to pick off the speck-like students on the surrounding walkways below. Before brought down by a policeman's bullet, he had taken 16 lives. Then there was the assassination of President John F. Kennedy by Lee Harvey Oswald (allegedly) in 1964 over which great misgivings were immediately raised about the sale of guns through the mail (across state lines).

So the Black Panther incident served to bring the issue to the surface: does the Second Amendment still apply, or has it become invalidated by the conditions rampant in modern-day society? The proponents of unqualified gun ownership maintain that modern conditions have made the Second Amendment more applicable than ever. They point to the side effects of civil rights agitation; increased crime in colored districts which was already 10 times that of White districts (FBI statistics); increased anti-White sentiment among the Negroes; Supreme Court decisions which have tied the hands of local police to deal with the problem. The *Mallory rule* established that police cannot question a suspect who has been taken into custody until after he has been before a magistrate, meaning that confessions given freely by a criminal in this circumstance are declared inadmissible and cannot be used against him. *Fay v. Noia* invaded the right of the state courts to prosecute their own crimes and empowered a criminal to seek *retroactive* pardon because his rights were allegedly violated at the time of conviction, even though there was no such ruling in existence. *Gideon vs. Wainwright* releases convicted felons from prison if it is found they did not have an attorney at their trial. The Supreme Court's *Escobedo* decision established that a confession cannot be used against a defendant unless he has been informed prior to his confession that he is entitled to an attorney and that anything he says may be used against him.

The *Massiah* case releases criminals when evidence obtained to convict them has been given (such as through bugging devices) without their consent or awareness, even though it may contain a full confession. As the result of *Mapp vs. Ohio*, criminals are at liberty to take the question of what is or is not a reasonable search all the way to the Supreme Court, even though a search may have produced proof of guilt.

These rulings by the Warren court have set criminals of all kinds and classifications free to go back and roam the streets,

not because their guilt was not known, but because of technicalities the police did not follow during their apprehension. Convicts doing life terms for murder have been let out of the penitentiary because they were able to apply the retroactive nature of these incredible decisions clear back to the time of their trial, when there were no such rulings.

With local law enforcement prevented from standing between the criminal and the public and with crime gaining everywhere in the nation in unprecedented strides, the predicament of the average citizen is fairly obvious: he either takes greater precautions to protect himself, his family and his property, or he stands defenseless before a crisis which authorities openly admit may go all the way into anarchy and civil war. Then, the individual is either prepared or he and his family are sitting ducks.

With this eventuality standing there like Mount Everest, the Democrats—and many Republicans—want *broader* laws to *reduce* the preparedness factor of the average citizen. And the justification they usually apply is the need to reduce the *criminals'* capacity to molest the public, not the citizens' need to create more effective self-defense against the criminal. Those who favor *no change* in the law argue that criminals operating clandestinely will *never* give up their arms and are prepared to risk legal penalties to keep them—loaded and ready to use at all times. Moreover, they claim, no law can be made stringent enough to keep the criminal from carrying, exchanging, or storing loaded weapons without commencing the general disarmament of the entire population, and not even then, probably. Therefore, restrictive gun laws are falsely oriented to begin with, focused, as they are, not against enforcing existing laws but tying the hands of law abiding citizens.

The upper echelon of the gun argument is arms control in a nuclear age with reference to the modern weapons of war, nuclear stockpiles, etc. Disarmament within this context appears to be tied strictly to reducing the incidence of global conflict and one must admit to the difference between ordinary hand guns and military armament, particularly as to function. But whether national or personal self-defense is the subject under discussion, disarmament as related to either is rejected flatly by the opponents of gun law revision. And the question surrounding most discussions of disarmament these days is: how far do the proponents of nuclear disarmament

intend to go into the *other* area of gun legislation (e.g. firearms) to achieve their goals? What is the overlap between military and personal disarmament in the minds of those whose primary concern appears to be the threat of nuclear war? Does "arms control" cover the disarmament of the average citizen as a necessary prerequisite to "world peace?" (Such as house-to-house searches, confiscation of personal firearms a zone at a time, etc. etc.).

Most supporters of un-amended firearms laws feel that it definitely does, and this has added considerably to the resistance against new or restrictive gun legislation. Not only crime, but the threat of invasion hangs over the average citizen, therefore he has double the reason to resist any attempts to control or deprive him of his firearms.

They point to such things as the First and Second International Arms Control Symposiums held on the University of Michigan campus at Ann Arbor; the first, from December 17 through 20, 1962; the second, January 21 through 24, 1964 with the Bendix Corporation participating.

According to reports, discussions at these conferences ranged all the way from official banning of nuclear armaments as an announced government policy, to zonal inspection, house-to-house search for small arms of any kind, down to the creation of an international peace-keeping police force under the United Nations.

This tie-up obviously paints the advocates of firearms control and nuclear disarmament into the same cubicle.

So there you are. Leaving the answers to posterity, that is the substance of the gun argument from one end to the other, briefly. You can take any part of it you like and chew it to rags. The crime argument is actually enough to justify *no change* in the gun laws of any state except, perhaps, Nevada, where there are no people.

Crime is here; it is growing; you can see it and you cannot dispute its validity. The law-abiding citizen needs *greater* freedom to defend himself, while the police need more, not less, ability to bring proper law enforcement to bear against crime which is rapidly exceeding the bounds of containment. Most gun legislation is in precisely reverse order, says the opposition, and I happen to share this view.

The question at court is, what about Reagan's promise?

Reagan assured Californians over and over again during his campaign that he would resist any effort to take from the

American citizen his right to own and possess firearms. And it must be assumed that he knew the difference between a gun mounted on the mantelpiece to show to friends, and a gun carried on one's person for purposes of self-defense. Moreover, that one of the two had to be *loaded* at all times to serve its peculiar function. All he had to do to test the latter was play the bad guy, stand Don Mulford in front of him and say "draw!" And in the time it would take Mulford to load his gun with blanks from another pocket, Reagan could have emptied his cap gun. That, in short order, proves the pure, unadulterated fallacy of the Mulford Gun Law and why your jaw falls open when you learn that Reagan went ahead and signed it knowing—he *must* have known—that the average citizen will now be placed in exactly the above predicament when face-to-face with an armed assailant.

Yet the Mulford Gun Law provides a penalty of one year's imprisonment or a \$1,000 fine for anyone found with a loaded gun in his possession on any public street or highway *unless he can prove he was in imminent danger of harm*. Which is almost as riotously absurd as Lyndon B. Johnson's \$45 million appropriation for rat control in Harlem—because the Negroes, apparently, refuse to spend their welfare money on rat poison. The unarmed citizen will now say, "Wait there, will you buddy?" run into the nearest gun shop, if he can find one, and come out shooting.

It's right out of Looney Toons. You can hold the bullets in one pocket and the unloaded gun in the other, that's all. Which means automatically that (a) every desperado in Los Angeles now knows that although you may have a gun, it has to be unloaded; therefore, you are helpless. So (b) he will take liberties he never would have before when he could never be sure you wouldn't shoot him, or (c) if you haul out a loaded gun, he will throw up his arms, surrender, let you take him down to the police station. This you will do because you are law-abiding. Then he will bring suit against you for carrying a loaded gun in violation of the Mulford Gun Law. And, under the law as Don Mulford wrote it, the legislators perspired into it, and Reagan signed it, he can *win*.

Not only that, but in the passage of this monstrous fraud, the people of California were actually blamed because the state capitol has only a few sleepy-eyed policemen who were too busy on their four-hour coffee break, playing monopoly, or feeding the pigeons on the capitol grounds to notice that 26 armed Negroes marched by them into the legislature.

The gun bill passed the Assembly and went over into the Senate where the swing vote (which could pass or destroy it) became an arch-conservative and onetime John Birch Society coordinator, freshman Senator H. L. "Bill" Richardson. Richardson, like Reagan, campaigned as a conservative and was elected as a conservative. He was the *last* person anyone thought would have mixed emotions over a bill with a light year separating its liberal and conservative interpretations. But he bought the "unrest among the Negroes" argument and went with the "yeas." (strangely enough, so did the American Rifle Association representative in California). The bill then went to Reagan where he signed it into law.

The Mulford Gun Law disarms the citizen. That is the feature the liberals have been looking for and it took "faith in the words of our conservative Governor" to give it to them. When face-to-face with your next robber, or murderer or rapist, you can (a) plead for mercy, (b) let him drive your GTO around the block, or (c) bribe him with a free pass to Disneyland. But *don't* shoot him, because he'll arrest you.

The first man to be apprehended under the Mulford Gun Law was not a criminal, but a conservative on his way to work. He was driving through a high-crime area on the outskirts of Watts, scene of the mammoth 1964 race riot, at 4:00 AM on the way to work.

On his seat, a loaded .38 revolver. A Los Angeles police man stopped him for speeding, spotted the gun, and wrote him up.

Commenting on the horseplay of the legislators, in his August 17, 1967 *Sacramento Report*, Sen. John Schmitz remarked:

"During discussions and debate on AB 1591, I was told over and over by its supporters that the bill was not aimed at law-abiding individuals wishing only to provide for their own self-defense. But now we find that the first victim of the Mulford Act is not a Black Panther, nor a rioter, nor a criminal. He is a good citizen with an unblemished record who was a Republican candidate for the state legislature in last year's general election.

It was not the intent . . . to penalize this kind of man. But their bill has done so, just as all gun control legislation hurts good citizens. "The law-abiding suffer, either through obeying the law and depriving themselves of protection, or through violating it unaware, while the

criminals, well aware of the law, blithely ignore it because they are already law-breakers.

"This law should be repealed, or at least amended . . ."

In one of the more obvious, yet critical, legislative acts of the 1967 year, Reagan again lined up with the Democrats.

THE PROPERTY TAX GAME

"In the last 10 years, property taxes have increased two-thirds more rapidly than personal incomes . . . In some localities, the disparity between property tax burden and personal income has been even greater.

"I recommend, therefore, that the state appropriate \$120 million for direct property tax relief in 1967-68.

"I further recommend that direct property tax relief be effected by a credit against the tax for school support and that the credit increase as the tax rises, so that those paying the highest rate will receive the greatest relative reduction."

—Governor Ronald Reagan
Tax Message to the Legislature
March 8, 1967

Reagan offered \$120 million to the counties for schools, ostensibly to give them that much *less* than they would have to siphon out of the voters. And "siphon" is the proper word, because property taxes are destroying California's economic base. But to function *as* property tax relief, concurrent restrictions had to be placed on the further taxing power of the counties. Otherwise, they were free to take the extra appropriation and raise taxes too. None occurred.

Instead of \$120 million, the tariff was raised to \$155 million for new spending on schools *only*. A special class of property owners in the over-65, under \$3250 per year income bracket ended up with \$22 million, which is still subject to the pleasure of the county taxing authorities.

The only actual property tax proposed by the Reagan administration was geared to people over the age of 65 whose *total household income* did not exceed \$3,250 per year. That is, when all the income from all the members of the family, plus social security, pensions, bonds, annuities—everything—was totalled up and did not exceed \$3,250 annually, those over 65 could qualify for property tax relief. They then could file and get a percentage refund only after they paid their property tax. This would allow the counties a chance to check for eligibility and if it was found lacking, they would have their money anyway.

Property owners in the "ability to pay" bracket, who really got sledgehammered—\$1,400 per year for an average five-room house, for instance—got nothing. This was strictly a "help the needy" gesture.

But even this burnt offering was dependent on placing definite restrictions on the counties to go on raising taxes as before. In California, local schools (below the college level) are sustained through another matching fund. The state throws in 40% of overall costs, and the other 60% is raised by the counties from property taxes.

To be consistent with his property tax relief goal, Reagan had to change this ratio to 50-50 or some other adjustment, thus forcing the counties to look to the state for a portion which had once been drawn from the property owners. If 50-50, the state would provide 10% more and the property owners 10% less to the county school appropriation, etc. Otherwise, the counties could cite this \$120 million as part of the state's 40% share for 1967-68 and go into the property owners for the other 60%, or \$180 million more.

Without some restriction, Reagan was leaving it up to the *conscience* of local school boards and county tax assessors to give a break to the needy. Which is like asking the desert to reject a summer shower. With nothing more to stop them, the counties would say, "Fine; wonderful; we'll just hire more administrators, build more executive washrooms, and proceed with our intended tax raise this year."

In plain language, to be anything but a pipe dream in Reagan's "hope" arsenal, he could not leave it up to the prerogatives of the county officials. Every year in California, another county tax assessor is exposed and hauled off to jail for fraud. It's that bad here.

There were other "outs." Reagan could change the state-county ratio, or he could pass legislation *forbidding* the counties to extract more from this class of taxpayers. But bills to relieve—even abolish—the property tax are introduced into the legislature every year and just disappear. Or, he could count the property tax as a deduction on state income tax, or give rebates to those on fixed income, etc. And, some of these were posted in his March 8 budget message.

But what actually happened? After enough favorable publicity to sell the Arabs on Kosher food, the \$120 million for property tax relief was allowed to die in committee. Instead, on came \$155 million of new spending as part of Boss Jesse Unruh's personal school bill, with delayed instructions on how to spend it. As of this writing, "Big Daddy" Unruh is still sitting on his \$155 million nest egg, and a paltry \$22 million has gone out to the over-65, under-\$3,250-per-year people.

How miniscule it really is follows from an eye-smarting view of the broader property tax picture. Had even the original \$120 million become property tax relief as planned, next to the total amount extracted from property owners in California every year it was the entrails thrown to starving beggars in Montmatre under Louis the IX to keep them one more day from rebellion.

The total amount paid in property taxes in California every year is—hold on: \$8 *billion*. Of this mountain of money, \$120 million is so miniscule that you hardly have a fraction small enough to write it down. In round numbers, it comes to 1/66 of eight billion dollars, or 1½%. Reagan was offering (if you were a resident of Los Angeles County) a tax break of \$15.00 *on each* \$1,000 *property tax bill* to a select class of hardship cases and the word is not "relief" but "alms." It wasn't even egg money; it was what one taxpayer called "gypsauce."

Gypsauce: It seems there were two young kids in Los Angeles who decided to put up a neighborhood stand and sell hot dogs one day. Along came a customer who just liked kids and decided to humor them. They asked: "What do you want on your hot dog, mister, mustard or our special 'gypsauce'?"

("Gypsauce! How quaint," thought the man). Taken mildly by surprise, but convinced of their wholesome innocence, he beamed: "O.K., I'll have gypsauce."

"That'll be an extra 25 cents," said one of the boys, splashing his hot dog with some Heinz 57. "Twenty-five cents!

Where do you get *that* stuff!" said he, and the wiseacre kid replied, "You asked for gypsauce, didn't ya?"

Gypsauce is the polite facsimile for cynical barbs and epithets heard all over the state—and too unfit to print—since Reagan announced that he was going to give 1½ % off to property owners almost too poor to afford bus fare down to the revenue bureau.

There's more. Historians are beginning to rank California's property tax among the greatest swindles of all time. Outside of Canada, perhaps, there is really nothing to compare it with, not even Al Capone. Next to the "rape of the property owners" here, Al Capone was running a Taco stand in a Tiajuana bar. California has an *impossible* tax base. Today, 70% of all land in California is *tax-exempt*. It is owned by government—federal, state, local—or by tax exempt foundations, or institutions, churches, unions, defense industries, etc. all of which operate tax free. The other 30% is owned by 39% of the people who pay 80% of *all* California taxes. This means that 61% pay no property tax. In all, 5,700 agencies are authorized in California to levy property taxes. There are 3,000 foreclosures each month in Los Angeles County alone, and 5,000 per month throughout the rest of the state.

This 30% tax base is shrinking by approximately 5% per year due to freeway construction, more schools, water systems, defense industries and other public projects. This is land which is taken *out* of the tax base and made exempt from taxation. Bonded indebtedness on this land is also taken out of the taxable base and shifted onto the property owners along with the inevitable increase.

To make up for the loss, taxes on the property that remains is increased every year, but not by anything so proportional as 5%. The *number* of property owners is diminishing and their taxes are increasing—to the point of confiscation, to the point where people cannot afford to own homes, to the point where if allowed to continue, California's economic base will cease to exist. In some counties, a house and lot valued at \$40,000 is assessed 25% of that, or \$10,000. You pay \$10 per \$100 of that assessed valuation, or \$1,000 per year on a \$40,000 piece of property (which is double the national average!).

In some areas, the bite is up to \$1,400. Property taxes went up \$500 in Los Angeles County in 1967, and a whopping 40% in the San Francisco Bay region. After the 40% increase, bumper stickers appeared all over the Bay area which read: "Bring Back Crooked Assessors," because a group of assessors

thrown in the penitentiary several years back for tax fraud were actually less harsh on the taxpayers than this year's bumper crop who were doing it all legally.

A Stanford Research Institute Report predicted last year that California property taxes would double (\$2,800 on a five room house!); Richard Nevins of the State Board of Equalization gives off-the-cuff estimates that they will *triple* by 1978, and the most realistic figure has been hazarded in casual conversations by Los Angeles County Assessor Philip Watson: They will quadruple by 1978. Since 1950, California property taxes have risen 345%. Only Canada has a property tax like ours. Other countries tax the *income* from property only, not the property itself.

Continuation of present trends will eliminate private property in California. A home represents one of the poorest investments you can make. The property tax is a destructive, tyrannical government monopoly with no built-in safeguards. Taxpayers who attempt to appeal are brutalized by a red tape run-around which abolishes due process of law and imposes taxation without representation. The sophisticated black-jack operation worked against legitimate appeals to protect tax abuses in California falls back on 100-year old court cases to choke off claims altogether. Because of its seriousness, an entire organization was formed in 1966 called United Organizations to place a special initiative on the 1968 general election ballot. It aims to destroy the property tax and force the state to look elsewhere for its revenue. There would be no such need for an organization of this kind if anything *realistic* were coming out of the state government. Most of the figures in this section are taken from their files (See United Organizations, 6431 West 5th Street, Los Angeles, California).

In 1967, a federal appellate court in Connecticut threw out that state's one-year residence requirement for welfare seekers. Because this was a federal ruling, it will apply to all the states of the Union. And hardest hit will not be Connecticut, but California, because an appellate court decision back there doubled property taxes out here. How? By the immediate westward migration that would . . . and did . . . occur. Everyone wants to come to California; only a handful wants to go to Florida. Immediately following this decision, California's welfare rolls went up \$5 million per month and it is believed they will increase by \$25 million because the influx of the jobless will quadruple . . . or more . . . now that they

have an added incentive to come here. Before this decision, they could not afford to wait out that year.

Attorney General Thomas Lynch, a Democrat, filed a brief to request this same Connecticut court to reconsider its decision, but even this massive change in the state's tax picture did not come out until the vice president of United Organizations in California, Howard Jarvis, went on television with the happy news.

These are a few of the reasons why Reagan's \$120 million benefaction had to be at best, a well-intentioned, but pathetic, gesture of encouragement extended in the absence of facts; or, at worst, almost cynical demagogism. Reagan is a freshman politician and perhaps too surfeited during his first year to be able to unearth all the details.

But Reagan had to know something about the problem even to consider it worth mentioning. And more evidence is accumulating that he probably knows it all. This year, Reagan signed a bill into law, AB 272, which will abolish the school tax limitation on local school boards entirely. The property tax varies all over the state. In Los Angeles County, it is collected, then distributed, three ways: 50% for schools, 28% for the county, 22% for the city (in which you live). Before AB 272, local school boards were prohibited by state law from raising levies in the first category, and it stood at about \$4.50 per \$100 of assessed valuation. AB 272 will abolish this limitation, thus giving the school boards carte blanche to extract any size school appropriation they can get away with. J. C. Chambers, member of the Los Angeles City School Board, was overheard to say at one meeting that if this bill had gone into effect immediately, the Los Angeles Board of Education would have doubled the property tax for schools without waiting for anything. And in this bill, there is absolutely no redress for the taxpayer.

But AB 272 does not become effective until 1971 . . . *three years down the line*. The legislators did not believe they could get away with it this year. And if Reagan goes to Washington in 1968, he will be out of the state and long gone when the bomb goes off.

REVISION OF STATE CONSTITUTION

"The executive branch of our state government has grown dangerously top heavy, and it seeks more and more to bypass the legislature to give more and more power to bureaus and agencies who are not elected by the people, but are beholden to the man who appointed them." . . .

—Candidate Ronald Reagan
Speech: A Plan for Action
January 4, 1966

"While the spotlight is on the race for governor . . . California voters may be losing sight of possibly the most important issue to face them in nearly a century."

—Los Angeles Times
November 5, 1966

"Government is best when it is closest to the people."

—Candidate Ronald Reagan
—Los Angeles Times
November 5, 1966

Upon entering office, one of Reagan's first moves was the establishment of a special "task force" to accomplish, or at least undertake, the reorganization of state government. While running for governor the year before, he signed a joint statement with then-Democratic Governor Edmund G. Brown urging voter-concurrence on Proposition 1-A, a special amendment to overhaul the state constitution. Proposition 1-A had serious concessions hidden under a legislative pay raise provision, among them: to make the initiative process subject in

greater measure to the discretion of the courts; prevent the public from overriding the governor's veto of a public referendum; permit the governor to veto his own impeachment-server; delegate the taxing power of the state to non-governmental agencies, laying the groundwork for regional government; and others.

What Happened?

You will find constitutional revision plans before most state legislatures today. Which is not surprising. Most of them emanate from the mecca of metropolitan merging: the National Municipal League of Chicago, which puts out "model" state charters for inefficient, floundering and outmoded American governments to rescue themselves by. NML's archetypal wisdom was unveiled in 1948 with the "Missouri Plan" which became the prototype of California's Proposition 1-A. Alterations on the 1948 draft were made by NML in 1963, one year after the California legislature took its first serious (if not sleepy-eyed) look at revision, and the first meaty revisions made their way onto the 1966 general election ballot.

NML is egghead planning with a vengeance. You could call it a political twist on Little Red Riding Hood. "Greater economy through the merging of government facilities." That sounds harmless enough, doesn't it? Who doesn't want to economize, get rid of needless red tape, and maybe send some politicians back to private life to earn an honest living?

But what they're really driving at is a many-leveled super-state with enough red-tape run-around for the average voter to prevent him from ever challenging its authority. You elect one guy to represent you; he delegates authority to another guy whose domain crosses into the next county; he hands the controls to still another guy whose empire includes part of your state and part of the state next door to you, and you end up with autonomous *zones* all across the continent which supplant the authority of duly-elected city, county and state governments.

The guy at the top? Well, he's in there for life and to get to him, you need a chain of keys, combinations, legal stunts, lawyers, bribe money, quick wit and a spare lung—enough to fill Noah's Ark. Then, at the end of a long, long hall sits a judge who tells you whether what you've just done is legal.

And if he doesn't think so, all the way back to the bottom you go.

If you want to know who has a system like this, find an honest description of the Soviet system—and this is on the level—which is set up in much the same way. Local soviets elect district soviets who elect regional soviets, who elect national delegates who elect the party chiefs, so-called. And in the process, four-fifths of the population is disfranchised. And those who get through either join the establishment, or are overruled by the courts as “enemies of the state” and shot at sunrise.

Of course, it's all coming from the top down and the election process is a gag to keep the peasant from ever coming up. And nobody knows this like the peasants.

Equally obvious, the proponents of regional government will deny that this is what they have in mind. Perhaps so. But we can still talk about life in the Soviet Union can't we?

Barry Goldwater was a regional vice president for NML—for economy's sake, of course. The question is, with some of the sketchy things we *know* about proposition 1-A, how did Reagan find his way into *that* ditty bag?

Reagan was free to merge and combine and re-stack Pat Brown's political blocks—that is, his 8 “super-agencies”—all he wanted to without the need of revising the state constitution. He would still be governed by constitutional restrictions which protected the rights of the voters. State government could grow and spawn and become as efficient or inefficient as Reagan could make it, but in the public's hands would still be the authority to dismantle it, and nothing but sweeping changes in the constitution could take that right away. Hence, Proposition 1-A.

Proposition 1-A (or whatever *your* state has decided to call it) involves alterations on the right of initiative, referendum and recall. But the *announced* purpose was, first of all, increased salaries for the legislators, and second, massive revision necessary to “make coordinated broad changes by renovating outdated sections and articles in its (California's) constitution.” The first revisions got passage in 1966, as Reagan was campaigning for governor, because they were locked into a bill to boost legislators' pay from \$6,000 to \$16,000 per year. And for this, they voted “yea” in the manner of a Brazilian soccer stampede. Wouldn't you? Longer sessions also became justification for higher salaries.

To get Proposition 1-A past the people, the lobbyists then

put the arm on the utilities for money to put up pro-Proposition 1-A billboards all over the state.

"One of the few things Gov. Brown and Republican gubernatorial nominee Ronald Reagan agree on," wrote the *Los Angeles Times* on September 22, 1966, "is the need for voter approval of Proposition 1-A on the November 8 general election ballot.

"The Democratic governor and his GOP challenger signed a statement urging all Californians to vote YES on Proposition 1-A in the ballot pamphlet to be mailed soon to voters along with sample ballots."

Also strongly behind the measure were the League of Women Voters and the California Labor Federation (AFL-CIO), both of which lobbied for the measure since its inception and had members sitting on the Constitutional Revision Commission, the body designated to handle the alterations.

Then, on October 26, 1966, the *Los Angeles Times* went on to say:

"While the spotlight is on the race for governor . . . California voters may be losing sight of possibly the most important issue to face them in nearly a century.

"This partial revision, modernizing and shortening about one-third of California's 80,000-word basic law, appears on the Nov. 8 election ballot as Proposition 1-A.

"It is far more . . . than a pay raise for legislators.

"... the commission proposed that the legislature be empowered to fix the compensation of its members by statute subject to a two-thirds vote of each house, the governor's veto, and the initiative and referendum.

"... to discourage further burdening of the Constitution with amendments *that really belong in the statute books* (e.g.: the courts), Proposition 1-A makes it easier to propose *statutory initiative measures* (emphasis mine)."

So the initiative would be made easier to put together, but would then be left to the discretion of the legislature for approval and ballot positioning. The legislature would also be empowered to pass a statute changing the rules by which petitions are circulated, presented and certified. This will increase the power of the legislature, and seriously endanger the ability of the voters to use the initiative as their last resort against an unwilling administration. The initiative process in

California, which was used so effectively against open housing in 1964, was established under onetime Governor Hiram Johnson by a California electorate that was afraid of the legislature.

The proposal to submit constitutional revisions to the California electorate began in 1962 as embodied in a preliminary measure called Proposition 7. This, too, was billed as a plan for *modernizing and shortening the state constitution*.

The first revision reached the unlikely size of 28,000 words, fairly bloated for a little-publicized proposal. Proposition 7 authorized these revisions to be placed on the ballot. In 1963, the Constitution Revision Commission was authorized by the voters to prepare a "package deal" of changes in the constitution. The voters were assured by the commission that nothing in the way of policy changes would be inserted in the lengthy revision text. But examination disclosed that beneath the detailed wording was a series of limitations on the right of the voters, acting through the initiative power, to challenge the veto power of a governor. Also included were clauses which, if adopted, would give cities and towns within the state the option to contract with outside, appointive—or intermediary—agencies for taxation. Delegation of authority to such an agency would establish taxation without representation, and is illegal under present California law.

Proposition 1-A removes separation of powers. The three departments of state government are treated as a single unit and all branches can perform all functions. Thus, the elimination of internal checks and balances.

The Commission's Background Study Supplement complains on page 10 that the California constitution lacks "any affirmative authorization for creation of an integrated metropolitan government structure" which overlaps existing county boundary lines. So Background Study Supplement No. 9 (October, 1967) recommends:

"The legislature may provide that any governmental unit or agency may contract with other governmental units or agencies for the transfer or performance, in whole or in part, of their respective governmental function or powers. (The Westside Journal. Los Angeles, December 6, 1967). (See page 57, section 10-a on Article IX of California Constitution).

Ready to enter into such contracts are extra-governmental bodies such as the Southern California Association of Region-

al Governments (SCAG). Once in place, federal funds would probably become the principal lever for compliance to the new pattern.

The commission's revision plan also allows federal administrators to run for office in California while still holding down a federal job and clears the way for the delivery of broad new powers to the executive branch of government (Reagan's office).

Specific prohibitions would be eliminated which now prevent the legislature from *passing local laws*; safeguards on this point are then made statutory. The revision takes away from the constitution the many protections for *filing* initiatives and makes *them* statutory. It removes a provision which forbids the state militia from serving under a foreign or international flag.

The authority given in 1962 to confront the voters with a complex package of decisions was itself an exception to specific instructions on this very point as set forth in the constitution of the State of California.

And the purpose is obvious: to protect the average voter from the use of detailed and involved wording which he could never understand in order to conceal drastic changes in the law where he would then become the principal victim. The California constitution states that major policy changes shall be considered *one at a time* when up for a vote. And it thus became the part-time purpose of Proposition 1-A to lay the groundwork for amending more than one section of the constitution at a time. Article IV, Section 1-c holds:

"Every constitutional amendment or statute proposed by initiative shall relate to but one subject."

Article XVII, Section 1, states that amendments:

"shall be so prepared and distinguished by numbers or otherwise that each can be voted on separately."

Article IV, Section 24:

"... every act shall embrace but one subject which shall be expressed in its title."

The commission endorsement did nothing to inform the voters about the weakening of the initiative and referendum, although certain pertinent information did make its way into the Los Angeles *Times* and other newspapers. Of close to 50 major points, only a half-dozen were made clear.

When Reagan gave his support to Proposition 1-A, he may not have been aware of the shift of power or perhaps he was caught up short due to its verbose construction. Maybe he was given a "canned" argument along with the rest of the voters. But there is no longer any vaguery about Proposition 1-A and exactly where Reagan stands will largely depend on the position he takes on the second revisions which are due on the 1968 general election ballot.

The second constitutional revisions are drastic. A complete change in Section 11 will place in the hands of the state legislature the power to restructure government *at all levels*, not just in Sacramento. Certain provisions, for example, will allow for the elimination of an entire county or the alteration of county boundaries and for the establishment of regional government without the consent of the voters. The new regional governments will become autonomous bodies with almost unlimited authority.

Federal money is the power behind the implementation of the program. Under the Demonstration Cities Act of 1966, regional governments will approve all federally-funded projects (eventually) and their contracting agencies. As has been the practice, cities, counties, and states were the receptacles of federal money. The government in Washington wants to go to one central agency instead of four or five. Constitutional revision clears the way. In matching-grant programs, Washington applies its control through the power to withdraw funds. Under the new plan, the state will have less and less power to the degree that regional governments simply supplant the state as the principal funding agents.

In fewer words, it is a federal power grab reaching into the states with the state government relinquishing certain of its powers to a higher level and exerting more power over the electorate at the same time. Already-established regional governments—such as the Association of Bay Area Governments in San Francisco (ABAG)—are being set up at this time to coordinate and operate the 1970 U.S. census. On February 8, 1968, Thomas Truax, assistant to ABAG's executive director, ran off with approximately \$500,000 of federal money out of the association treasury and reportedly blew half of it on the tables in Las Vegas. To restore this money, Washington officials laid claim to all of ABAG's member cities and counties. Both the checks Truax allegedly stole arrived in brown envelopes from the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Here, the theft is less significant as news than as an illustration of the line of new federal authority reaching into the states. If corruption can be kept out of the program, regional governments will become the sole administrators of federal funds going to a multitude of outlets now numbering approximately 33. Among these are:

parks	urban mass transportation
waste treatment	public works
water pollution	beach erosion
air pollution (smog control)	water resources
highway development	community shelter
open space	

If the second revisions pass, regional governments will have authority to condemn property under the right of eminent domain and tax the periphery counties for the benefit of the core city. These and other features of metropolitan merging are bound to erupt into public hostility when the consequences of the program become popularly known. Considerable argument is already brewing in California over the matter of loss of representation and a number of cities have withdrawn from their respective regional associations.

Indications that Reagan was not wholly un-aware of the intent of Proposition 1-A were provided in a release to the press on January 3, 1967, as he entered office as Governor.

Addressing the joint legislature the day before, Reagan "pointed out that Proposition 1-A, the constitutional revision measure adopted overwhelmingly by voters at the November 8 election, authorized the legislature to empower the governor to reorganize the executive branch." (*Los Angeles Times*, January 3, 1967.) "It is my earnest hope," Reagan stated,

"... that the Legislature will adopt legislation allowing us to proceed with this vitally-needed work as soon as possible."

Just why Reagan needed a constitutional revision to cut down former Governor Pat Brown's eight "super agencies," or reduce the size of the executive branch of government (his announced aim as he took office), or "To consolidate all state tax-collecting agencies into a single, streamlined Department of Revenue" (*Los Angeles Times*, January 3, 1967) still is not clear unless this involves certain of the provisions in Proposition 1-A which are found to be objectionable and not in the public interest. Reagan's proposal to merge Brown's eight

super agencies into four was reported well on its way on December 20, 1967, as the end of the year was in sight. Commenting on the new Revenue Department into which all tax-collecting functions of the state would be merged, the Los Angeles *Times* article said: "For years the legislature has fought creation of such a controversial department."

Regional government is inseparable from constitutional revision (such as Proposition 1-A) because its objectives are otherwise unobtainable. (e.g. that regional government destroys state sovereignty, supersedes state lines, takes control of government away from the electorate, destroys representative government, pre-empts local elected officials, and imposes taxation without representation).

"Advocates of regional government for the most part seem blandly unconcerned with these charges," said State Sen. John Schmitz on November 22, 1967 (*Sacramento Report*)" and do not care whether the charges are true or not. They are going to proceed with regional government in either case.

At the end of the 1967 general session of the legislature, regional government was established in the Lake Tahoe area through a bill—AB 1362—signed by Governor Reagan. Lake Tahoe sits on the state line between Nevada and California. Both states became involved some years back in discussions on how to halt contamination of the lake by disposable waste following the rise in population around the lakeshore. For solutions, there were both private plans and public plans.

A joint resolution adopted earlier by the legislature laid the groundwork for San Francisco's ABAG (Association of Bay Area Governments), and in Los Angeles, for SCAG (Southern California Association of Governments). Most other states are undergoing a similar transformation.

Throughout his campaign, Ronald Reagan spoke of favoring "citizen politicians" over professionals in government, because they were closer to the people. If minority studies of Proposition 1-A are accurate, Reagan's hopes for "less government" will be frustrated by the vast centralization of state power which seems to come as an extra pair of trousers with the benefits in current plans for constitutional revision.

APPOINTMENTS—PART I

*"There is no crime so mean as
ingratitude in politics."*

—George Washington Plunkitt
Ex-Senator, New York State Legislature

Remember as you plow through the following that Reagan campaigned as a conservative; not as a moderate or a liberal. Crowds of cheering Goldwater supporters flocked to him because his 1964 campaign speech on behalf of the Arizonan was probably the most electrifying conservative challenge they had ever heard.

In California, he was absorbed without qualification like oxygen to a dying man by the same conservative ground swell which had produced a hands-down primary victory for Goldwater against Nelson Rockefeller. And for Goldwater, you never saw people work the precincts harder or dig deeper for loose change to promote a candidate. The term "Creative Society" was handed to him by a conservative minister.

As though nothing has changed, Reagan's speeches continue to fill the air with attacks on big government, the misuse of power and over-taxation, choice metaphors about how government should be closer to the people, and promises of sweeping reform. Otherwise, the foregoing data would have no significance whatsoever.

Instead, it is the key to his actions during the first legislative year and a predictable guide to the future of California under his directorship.

Reagan made no bones about it; he was going to appoint Democrats as well as Republicans. As though sensing that he would eventually be challenged, and in a statement which

seemed to justify both his policy and its advance warning, he told the newspapers on November 12, 1966—7 days after his victory: "Professionalism is the test." "REAGAN WILL APPOINT DEMOCRATS" ran the Los Angeles *Times* headline the next day. Although born in reference to Reagan's cabinet appointments, the statement was felt to have general application to the some 5,000 jobs Reagan would ultimately have to fill.

Either way, the meaning could not be clearer; Reagan was striking a political rather than an occupational pose. In one sense, he was trying to say that his would be a universal approach to the problem of good government. He was going to be neutral, hence unbiased, in the search for administrative talent. This was no time for narrowness. He would not reject qualified members of his opposition on the weak veneer of narrow political sectarianism. In another sense, however, his announcement was received as formal notice that he was not going to be bound by the conservative wing of the Republican Party. The reader is reminded at this point that in California, the Democratic Party is liberal to the bone.

"Cannibalism" seems to have hung like a dark cloud over the Republican Party since its inception. But in California, it is as predictable as planned depreciation on your income tax form. In "Plunkitt of Tammany Hall," (William Riordon, New York, Dutton, 1963, paperback), the first line of Chapter 8 reads: "There is no crime so mean as ingratitude in politics." Which, for the man who said it—ex-Senator George Washington Plunkitt—was the polite way of saying that to the professional politician, your word is your bond, you get paid for services rendered, there are no contracts—just reciprocity—and them what plays fast and loose with the rules deserves nothin' better than the tire-chain.

We're too sophisticated for that in California. Out here we'd feel something was wrong if the shaft didn't come around every other year like the morning milk delivery. More to the point, the shaft comes *with* the candidate? That seems to be the code of the GOP.

Says Plunkitt, on page 36:

"The question has been asked: Is a politician ever justified in goin' back on his district leader? I answer: 'No; as long as the leader hustles around and gets all the jobs possible for his constituents.' When the voters elect a man leader, they make a sort of contract with him.

They say, although it ain't written out: 'We've put you here to look out for our interests. You want to see that this district gets all the jobs that's comin' to it. Be faithful to us, and we'll be faithful to you.' "

Nonchalance toward conservatives to whom he owed his gubernatorial victory in 1954 cost California's Goodwin J. Knight his re-election four years later. They supported William Knowland and *he* went down by a million votes. The conservatives are the balance of power in California's Republican Party. But they never seem to apply it until the water has gone over the dam. Would Barry Goldwater have appointed Chester Bowles or Adlai Stevenson? Reagan could embrace "professionalism" as a partly-valid reason for appointing Democrats providing (a) he had already paid off to qualified conservatives, and (b) that after boasting of its use, he did not then run headlong into the liberal camp for advice on where to find it; unless (c) he really owed his election to Democrats and liberal Republicans. But if this is the case, his speeches and reassurances to the conservatives come as the Opium the British once threw to the Chinese in place of food, and there will be a score to settle. At the same time, if the lie is that big, Reagan cannot be counted upon to alter its case, and it is up to the conservatives to just shift gears.

For administrative liaison with the legislature, Reagan picked two liberals. For the Senate side: Vernon Sturgeon, former state senator and three-time mayor of the California coastal town of Paso Robles. You will find Sturgeon's name on Leonard Finder's leftward Republican Council list below. For the Assembly: Beverly Hills businessman Jack B. Lindsey, vice president of Early California Foods. Lindsey was also asked to coordinate with GOP State Chairman, James Halley, on arrangements for the Republican National Convention in Miami and picking Reagan's favorite son delegation (Los Angeles *Times*, November 9, 1967). Reagan said Sturgeon was of "inestimable help to us during the general election campaign because of his broad knowledge of legislation and state affairs."

In November of 1967, Reagan came forth with his own plan for taking the selection of judges out of politics. A six-member commission would nominate candidates for appellate court judgeships. On this committee: the chief justice of the state (who would act as chairman), one superior court judge appointed by Reagan, two laymen appointed by Rea-

gan, and two lawyers appointed by the California State Bar. For trial judges, five 6-member commissions, one for each appellate court district. The chairman would be a justice of the District Court of Appeals elected by his colleagues. The other members would be selected under the same plan as the appellate court commission: 3 from the governor and 2 from the State Bar.


Each commission would submit three names to the governor for each judicial vacancy. Five names would be submitted for courts in counties with a population exceeding 700,000. (Los Angeles *Times*, November 15, 1967).

One can only speculate on how such an advisory system would work out if, indeed, it was to operate as anything more than a formal acceptance board for background decisions already made. If he was to face the problem objectively, part of Reagan's problem would have to revolve about changing the formula started by his predecessor, Gov. Edmund Brown, for increasing the *number* of judges. In 1965, 35 bills were introduced to give the governor extra judicial appointments, of which 21 were adopted. Forthwith, Brown appointed 34 new judges to the court system at all-new costs to the taxpayer, some for already over-loaded courts.

In addition, Reagan himself would have to develop considerably more balance in his own selections to make such a commission functional even if it could be taken out of politics.

In practice so far, Reagan has had a much simpler system for his bench appointments; most of them derive from essentially the same channels Reagan has been relying on for personnel from the beginning—because until recently, he had no *other* channels. There is but one exception: most of them generally are acknowledged to be cleared in Sacramento by Paul Haerle, Reagan's advisor on judicial appointments. Haerle is a moderate Republican from Marin County.

To work out his new tax program, Reagan lined up a special task force of businessmen (formal name: Citizens' Advisory Tax Structure Task Force). They were to work for free. For months, great mystery surrounded the operation; no one knew who they were and objections were heard that Reagan was trying to bypass functions which normally would be assigned to tax experts in the legislature. Finally, on January 4, 1968, the names of this task force were made public:



Governor Reagan's Closed Car Approaching the State Capitol
for Inaugural Activities, January 5, 1967

Assembly Speaker
Jesse Unruh



Lt. Gov. Robert
Finch






Gov. Reagan and U.S. Senator Thomas Kuchel

**Dr. Max Rafferty,
State Superintendent
of Public In-
struction**



**State Senator John
G. Schmitz**






The University of California, at Berkeley



Caspar Weinberger (left) and Gordon Smith, Incoming and Outgoing State Finance Chairmen, in February, 1968


William Penn Patrick, President of Holiday Magic Cosmetics





Off-Campus at Berkeley

Phillip Battaglia, Gov. Reagan's first Executive Secretary; So. California Chairman of the 1966 Gubernatorial Campaign





Clifton White, National Consultant to the 1968 Reagan-For-President Campaign

Tom Reed, Northern California Chairman of the 1966 Gubernatorial Campaign; Out-of-State Advance Man for Reagan's 1968 Campaign; Gov. Reagan's Choice for Republican National Committeeman from California to Replace Gardiner Johnson



R. Gwin Follis, (chairman) board chairman and chief executive officer of Standard Oil Co. of California;

Alan K. Browne, (vice-chairman) senior vice president of Bank of America, past president of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce and executive officer of B of A's Investment Securities Commission which handles extensive purchases of state and municipal bonds. Bank of America is the largest purchaser of California state bonds;

Dudley E. Browne, group vice president, principal financial officer of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation which deals predominantly in federal aerospace contracts; Browne is also president of the California Taxpayers Association which represents the business community in Sacramento. He was asked to be Reagan's finance director at the start of the new administration but turned it down. The job then went to Gordon Smith, partner in a large Los Angeles management consultant firm;

Leland Kaiser, retired mutual funds executive in San Francisco, chairman for appointments screening for Reagan in the Bay area and a member of Reagan's "Kitchen Cabinet,"

Gordon Paul Smith, Reagan's state finance director and the only member of the businessmen's task force in government;

Dr. Robert Dockson, Dean of the Graduate School of Business Administration at University of Southern California, and professor of business economics;

James A. Papke, task force consultant and a professor at Purdue University.

The next day, on January 5, the task force made its first recommendation: a 5% sales tax on *food*, meaning all purchases; food purchased in markets or in restaurants. The State Board of Equalization immediately echoed that this would produce \$300 million a year in new revenue. Glossing over the 100% inflationary effect such a new tax would have on California economy, the task force pressed on to its second recommendation: the gross margin tax. The cost of materials and supplies would be subtracted from businessmen's gross receipts and a tax levied on the remainder. (Santa Ana Register, January 5, 1968)

Try to imagine the unveiling of a new car with a backlog of a year's high-test publicity almost tearing it out of the showroom. Then, one day, they roll it out before the world and the wheels fall off. More taxes! The recommendations were met with moans and "oh-my-gods" over the state and expectant yawns in the legislature. Paul Beck, Reagan's press

secretary, said, "there is a general feeling this is the least meritorious and least workable proposal (the food tax) in the task force report," which won the coveted Tongue-in-Cheek prize for the first week of the new year.

Following are the men and their affiliations whom Reagan appointed to head 31 departments in the State of California. (Director of Education was elected:)

Name	Party	Position
Gordon Smith	Rep.	Dir. of Finance
Dr. Max Rafferty	Rep.	Dir. of Education
John Erreca	Dem.	Dir. of Public Works
Lester Breslow, M.D.	Dem.	Dir. of Public Health
Dr. James Lowry	Dem.	Dir. of Mental Hygiene
Earl Coke	Rep.	Dir. of Agriculture
Albert C. Beeson	Rep.	Dir. of Industrial Relations
John C. Montgomery	Rep.	Dir. of Social Welfare
James G. Stearn	Rep.	Dir. of Conservation
Dr. Preston Martin	Rep.	Comm. of Savings and Loan
Harry M. Shine	Rep.	Dir. of Prof. and Voc. Standards
James E. Johnson	Rep.	Dir. of Veteran Affairs
Raymond Procunier	non-par.	Dir. of Corrections
Peter Weinberger	Rep.	Dir. of Employment
Herman G. Stark	Dem.	Dir. of Youth Authority
James M. Hall	Rep.	Supt. of Banks
Gen. Andrew Lolli	non-par.	Dir. of General Services
Warren Thompson	no ind.	Dir. of Rehabilitation
Albert E. Hole	Rep.	State Fire Marshall
Walter T. Shannon	Dem.	Dir. of Fish and Game
William R. Gianelli	Dem.	Dir. of Dept. of Water Resources
Burton Smith	Dem.	Comm. of Real Estate
Richard S. Roddis	Rep.	Comm. of Insurance
Edward Kirby	non-par.	Dir. of Alcoholic Beverage Control
Charles Samson	Rep.	Dir. of Disaster Office
Robert H. Volk	Rep.	Comm. of Corporations

Name	Party	Position
Harold Sullivan	Rep.	Comm. of Highway Patrol
Maj. Gen. Glenn Ames	Rep.	Adjutant General
William P. Mott, Jr.	Rep.	Dir. of Dept. of Parks and Recreation
Charles Lemenager	Rep.	Dir. of Dept. of Housing Comm. Dev.

Total: 19 Republicans, 7 Democrats

The only outstanding conservative in the group is Dr. Max Rafferty, followed by James Stearn, Gordon Smith and a moderate conservative Democrat, Burton Smith. The composition was overwhelmingly non-conservative. But represented in force was the liberal wing of *both* parties.

Appointed by the governor to his six-man cabinet were:

Name	Party	Position
William P. Clark		Cabinet Secretary
Gordon Luce	Rep.	Sec. for Business & Transportation
Spencer Williams	Rep.	Sec. for Human Resources
Earl Coke	Rep.	Sec. of Agriculture
Norman Livermore	Rep.	Sec. of Resources & Development
Houston Flournoy	Rep.	Controller

How can a professed conservative come up with a reform approach to government problems with a non-conservative-to-liberal administration? The answer: he can't. And Republicans everywhere were beginning to ask questions.

The six-man cabinet included four moderates and two liberals. These are not automatic posts but are selected by the governor. Houston Flournoy, the elected Controller, has lined up strictly with hardened liberals since he entered politics.

Out in the districts, the thing was really beginning to hit home. A liberal Democrat, Louis Warschaw, was named to Reagan's appointment-steering committee. Mild disbelief was the reaction in Los Angeles. Louis Warschaw is best known for his wife, Mrs. Carmen Warschaw, a member of the Los Angeles City Board of Education and former Southern California Democratic chairman. Her record of agitation for radical causes is known throughout the region.

For Los Angeles Superior Court bench, Reagan named six liberal Democrats, all at \$25,000 per year: Thomas F. McCarry of Long Beach, Marvin Freeman of West Los Angeles, Samuel Kurland of Los Angeles, Charles Woodmansee, Francis X. Mernell, and Burch Donahue. (The last three moved up from municipal court).

Named to the State Board of Public Health was Albert Marino, 41-year-old Democrat of Placer County. Reagan named another liberal Democrat, ex-University of California vice chancellor Alex C. Sherriffs, as his advisor on education at \$20,000 a year. "In 1953," remarked the *Los Angeles Times* on January 8, 1968, "many persons called him 'a pinko' and 'an ultraliberal' when he ran unsuccessfully for the Berkeley School Board and gave 'yes' answers to two overriding campaign questions: (1) Should fraternities and sororities be banned from the high school campus? and (2) Should Paul Robeson, the singer and friend of communism, have appeared in the school auditorium, as he had recently done?"

At \$18,768 per year, Reagan appointed San Francisco attorney Peter R. Johnson, a 1964 Rockefeller supporter, as Chief of the Division of Fair Employment Practices (FEPC); a Democrat, Russell W. Porter of Sacramento, was named as Chief of the Division of Recreation at \$20,000. Another Rockefeller Republican, Peter Weinberger of San Francisco, was named to the post of state Director of Employment by Reagan at \$24,500. San Francisco attorney, Caspar Weinberger (Peter's brother), one of the most far-left liberals in the GOP, had been approached by Reagan to work in his campaign, after victory was given the chairmanship of the GOP task force on governmental reorganization. This was just the thing for a liberal: the reorganization of California government.

On February 3, 1967, Reagan moved Weinberger up to a new post, chairman of the "Little Hoover Commission;" formal name: Commission on California State Government Organization and Economy. One year later he was handed the job of State Finance Director by Reagan on the resignation of Gordon Smith. Commenting on this astounding move, Sen. John Schmitz remarked:

"The most important office in the State of California is that of Finance Director, who prepares the administration's budget and tax programs. Shortly after his election in 1966, Governor Reagan made what I have always

considered one of his better appointments by naming Gordon P. Smith as Finance Director.

Now Gordon Smith has resigned, and Governor Reagan has appointed Caspar Weinberger as Finance Director.

To Republicans all over the state, who worked their hearts out for Barry Goldwater in 1964 and for Ronald Reagan in 1966, Caspar Weinberger has long been a symbol of the old "me too" liberal Republican establishment which never gave us a choice, always an echo.

He is a co-founder of the California Republican League, the only Republican volunteer organization which refused to endorse Reagan in 1966. He is on record in support of regional government which would take away the right of our people to control affairs in their own communities through their local elected officials (*The Commonwealth*, December 19, 1966, p. 425).

As state chairman of the Republican Party in 1964, he did everything possible to sabotage the campaign of the Republican nominee for President of the United States. The mere rumor of his appointment as Finance Director in November 1966 brought vociferous protests from those who had done the most to elect Ronald Reagan.

Albert Rodda, a far-left Democrat, stepped into the 1966 state senate race from Sacramento and was opposed by a conservative Republican, Malcolm Dixon. Dixon, in turn, was opposed by a liberal Republican Negro named James C. Dodd. Dodd even kept a picture of Bertrand Russell on his wall.

Dixon creamed Dodd. But Rodda went on to win the election. So what did Reagan do? To the state board of trustees for the junior colleges, Reagan named not Malcolm Dixon, not the choice of the Republican voters, not the conservative opponent of school busing, but the liberal Negro Dodd.

Former Ukiah City Manager Lyell Cash, a Democrat, one-worlder, opponent of free enterprise and standing champion of governmental control, was appointed to the Commission of Peace Officers Standards and Training. Mrs. Carl Marsden, liberal Republican from San Marino, was appointed to the Board of Governors of California Community Colleges. Mrs. Marsden was a member of the liberal California Republican League, and was anti-Reagan throughout the primary.

And so on through the job scheduling system. Which is not

to say or imply that conservatives did not get jobs. Some of them did, but the ratio was exceedingly narrow compared to liberals and moderates and almost completely absent were politically active conservatives representing the reform program Reagan had campaigned on. The San Jose *News* commented on December 25, 1967, "The party leadership in Santa Clara County is queried in advance about each appointment, and invited to comment, but many of those named are strangers to local GOP officials."

Instead, strong conservatives were for the most part denied access to state jobs. Louis Francis, San Mateo attorney and former conservative member of the legislature for 12 years was passed over. Over 200 letters from noted businessmen and Republican officials went to Reagan recommending Francis' appointment for Superior Court Judge, including letters from 20 of the state's 58 Republican county chairmen. Instead, the post went to a liberal Republican named Conrad Reisch.

Due to Senate opposition and the intervention of San Diego Senator Clair Burgener (a former member of the liberal California Republican Council), Reagan withdrew the appointment of Dr. William McCandless, a conservative, from the California State School Board. He was replaced by W. Howard Day, a moderate from Long Beach. Said McCandless after the firing. "My position has been one of service to the governor and the people of the state and if the governor feels he should withdraw the appointment, that is certainly his privilege." (Los Angeles *Times*, February 23, 1967). But McCandless and San Diego's considerably large conservative community were astonished at the action, particularly since it seemed to emanate from what they recognized as the far-left wing of the GOP.

For district attorney in Los Angeles, a liberal, Evelle Younger, was opposed by a conservative Republican, Manly Bowler. When Bowler stepped into the district attorney's race and lost, he was given a state assignment as chairman of the California Adult Authority. The job lasted exactly one month, when Bowler was replaced by a GOP moderate, Henry W. Kerr.

From county to county throughout the state, conservative indignation was bitter, and still is. And, the conservatives are the numerically stronger segment of the party. They have been fleeced; they know it, and the roar gets louder.

You can come out to California and hear it now, anytime,

because the appointments are still going on. One dejected and demoralized past president of the Los Angeles County Federation of Republican Women (the largest chapter in the state) remarked in somber tones that of the people she sent to Reagan with the highest recommendation, none were accepted. Conversely, those she specifically recommended against all wound up in the state apparatus.

The treatment was hard for these people to reconcile. Reagan just *couldn't* be with the other side and give a prize-winning conservative delivery like the one in 1964.

"REAGAN SUPPLANTING GOLDWATER AS CONSERVATIVES' NATIONAL SYMBOL" ran the headline of an Evans and Novak article in the Los Angeles *Times* for June 17, 1965. It was now the end of 1967 and things just weren't lining up. The conservatives, not the liberals, ushered Reagan into 1965 on the ruins of the Goldwater defeat, and from there into political prominence. And he is still *speaking* their language. In California, they are represented by four large Republican volunteer organizations: California Republican Assembly (CRA), United Republicans of California (UROC), Young Republicans, and the California Federation of Republican Women. All are dominated statewide by the three sprawling counties in the southern part of the state: Los Angeles, Orange and San Diego. Yet as early as November of 1967, just after the polls closed, the Oakland *Tribune* observed in a broad-headlined article: "REAGAN NAMES LIBERALS TO TOP STATE JOBS." (Oakland *Tribune*, November 27, 1967).

One year later, you could spot an occasional conservative, here and there. But the stark absence of people representing the *philosophy* Reagan was still propounding in loud tones from the podium suggested an appointment ratio of roughly 95-to-5% liberal to conservative. To hear Reagan, you would swear it was the other way around. But to the pros, Reagan's pattern of assignments was fairly clear: he was filling jobs in a spectrum ranging all the way from the Republican middle to the Democratic far left. *Why* he was doing it was still up for conjecture. But it would almost *have* to relate to some significant change that had taken place during his campaign.

William Penn Patrick, one of Reagan's gubernatorial primary opponents, let his views be known:

"The Reagan appointments have served to tell Republicans that they haven't got qualified people in their Party

to match those of the Party just defeated. It's like the U.S. losing in a war and building the enemy nation up beyond its wildest dreams. No wonder the Democrats are silent, they are doing very well in the Reagan Party. Doesn't the GOP have any competent attorneys to serve as judges: Do we find our Party short of capable administrators, so much so that the other Party must bail our Governor out of his personnel problems? Who's he trying to impress? Is he trying to passivate this State long enough to get elected President, then will let the chips fall where they may?

So there began a series of hat-in-hand delegations up to the Governor's office in Sacramento. And if you're not sitting down, you had better. Purpose: to confront Reagan with the woeful news—why didn't Dibble Sanderfly get his appointment to the superior court bench? Harriett X, John Y and William Z were "friends of Ronald Reagan" when the thing began clear back in June of 1965. They worked all the way through for two years, delivered precincts, and brought in bags of money for the campaign. Nothing! Had Reagan's position changed with regard to UROC and the CRA?

Fortunately, enough conservatives were spotted here and there—one or two per county—to be able to answer these hat-in-handers. Reagan could say: "Whatdya mean, liberals? Look at Pepper Snarkdog out there; he's got the number three job in the star-gazing division. Or, "We gave the best post in Mono County to Norris Harnoise: Assistant Superintendent of Rocks." (Mono County has a population of 12: 4 muskrats, 2 hootowls, a chicken-hawk, 3 groundhogs, and 1 nearly-dead prospector; plus Harnois, that makes 12). It's a little tough to get in there, boulders and all that, you know; but *scenic!* You take this road. . . . And where old Harnoise was going, his conservative views wouldn't get him very far.

And Reagan could plow into his press clippings of one year ago, spring back triumphantly and point to the one which read: "REAGAN WILL APPOINT DEMOCRATS." Wasn't it smart politics for a chief executive to strike a non-partisan pose in office? To a degree, maybe. Wasn't it just plain old good diplomacy to make peace with the other side in order to get their fullest cooperation for the good of the state? Logical, logical. Wouldn't he be going out of his way to create disharmony when the real goal was unity of all divided factions? Hmmmmm. He was doing his best; he was new; it

was a very big job; he would deliver, you just wait and see; TRUST him.

And away would come the hat-in-handers, warm as toast, completely reassured. *Not totally convinced*, you understand; but—well—well—maybe he's O.K. after all. As though caught off-guard by a double rum toddy—or worse.

Against Reagan's sincere demeanor, few could argue and no one really wanted to. People—particularly good people—want to believe; they don't really want to look for trouble. Still, something was missing in that logic about professionalism being the only goal—as unchallengeable as it might be on its face. If they could subscribe to Goldwater's 1964 campaign slogan, "In your heart, you know he's right," without qualification, why couldn't they do it with Reagan? But did they? There was that inner something.

In other words, they couldn't see the newspaper for the size of the publishing company. Because while scattered, it did, as a matter of fact, all come out in the newspapers for those who had eyes to see. The conservatives were suffering from blurred vision caused by the hope-defeat syndrome of "1964 panacea lost." Reagan's electrifying Goldwater speech spread a bouyant afterglow beneath them, cushioning them in 1965 and later against the inward certainty of socialist world takeover.

Anyone who could look for flaws was challenging their last chance for freedom; venting his spleen; hatemongering. For once, we were able to work with the liberals—around *our* man in Sacramento.

But it was all there—in print.

APPOINTMENTS—PART II

Here is the structural metamorphosis that took place from June 1965 to February of 1967 in Reagan's search for suitable cadre.

Since Reagan entered as a Goldwater conservative, he was swallowed whole by the conservative wing of the GOP in California—automatically. And the same crew that had been the nucleus of Barry Goldwater's sweeping primary victory over Rockefeller in 1964 supplied him with their services starting in June, 1965. It was the logical thing. At that time, Reagan was *minus experience*; he had no man-hours in the precincts, in Republican Party organizational work—anywhere; he had no real leverage with oldline party regulars; he had no cadre and no I.O.U.'s. It was "Ronald Reagan, monad."

Barry Goldwater uttered two highly significant things about that time: (a) he let his opinion be known that if Reagan could win the California governorship, he would definitely become presidential material in 1968, and (b) he recommended the Los Angeles public relations firm of Spencer and Roberts as Reagan's campaign managers. These two items probably out-plused all others as influences in the molding of Reagan's future in California politics. The first advisory group to begin introducing Reagan all over California (in June 1965) was made up of Goldwater holdovers from the 1964 liberal wars (except the last three):

Bob Mardian (chmn)
Cy Rubel
Holmes Tuttle
Henry Salvatori
Edward Mills

Walter Knott
Stan Plog
Dr. Stuart McBirnie
Dr. Nolan Frizzelle
Bruce Reagan

Harold Levering
Dick Darling
Phil Davis

Mrs. Norman Taurog
David Chow
Jack L. Warner

This one was called Friends of Ronald Reagan; function: to set up a series of preliminary meetings all over the state so Reagan and Bill Roberts (of Spencer and Roberts) could find out what they had going for them and against them; to generate perspective on the upcoming campaign; and to ascertain the nature and quantity of the advice the conservatives were offering. Many would not dive back into the action again unless they could be sure Reagan was not going to reverse-field once in office as so many conservatives had before him. Some would want to hear it from Reagan, that his purpose in running was to up-end the socialist embryo fathered by the current Democratic Governor Pat Brown.

They knew the way; they had been over the road before, since the Goldwater and Shell campaigns, statistics showed they could win any major Republican primary in the state—providing the conservatives stood united behind the candidate—and this, in turn, depended on how convinced they were that he was on the level. Some were too tired and demoralized to care.

Some of the meetings were warm and cordial; some were run through with misgivings and ultimata; deliberative close-quarters discussion ran the gamut all the way over to youthful anticipation and near-glee that Reagan had come along at this eventful time in history; some came to meet the man, tell him they liked him, but the Republican Party was through, and they were pulling out to go to work for Wallace. And there, sitting at many of the meetings usually in perfect silence, was Bill Roberts, taking it all down, forming his own conclusions, listening to the suggestions, the demand, the praise, the ultimata, and the advice of the old guard on what to do, who to bring in, and above all, who to leave out.

Allegedly, Friends of Ronald Reagan was first called together by Henry Salvatori, conservative oil explorer from Los Angeles, who would become Reagan's campaign finance chairman. They supplied *themselves* to the Reagan preliminary run. For eight months, they set up closed-door summit meetings, public addresses at which Reagan was almost unanimously well-received (he gives a good speech!) raised money, and fielded a county-by-county campaign force. Everything was in position. On January 4, 1966, Reagan entered his

name for the gubernatorial primary and made formal declaration. Over the next two months, the metamorphosis began. Friends of Ronald Reagan continued to hold meetings, but after March the group was never called into an active strategy session again, and quietly slid out of the picture. Like old generals, it just "faded away."

Following the June primary victory, Friends of Reagan was replaced by the Reagan for Governor Committee, chaired by a virtual unknown named Phillip Battaglia of Los Angeles. This second group was composed overwhelmingly of leading figures from the Christopher camp, people who had opposed Reagan for the previous five months, who were cross-overs.

The Committee had as co-chairmen (1) Leonard Firestone, ultra-liberal president of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of California, chairman of the statewide Rockefeller-for-President primary campaign in 1964, and onetime member of Leonard Finder's leftward California Republican Council, and (2) Henry Salvatori, the conservative Los Angeles oil man, a carryover from the first advisory committee of Friends of Ronald Reagan which he helped to form in 1965.

While not fully apparent for almost a year, this strange liberal-conservative marriage committed the conservatives to liberal care—not vice versa—and formed the start of a pattern which would survive into the 1968 presidential elections.

Listed as vice-chairmen were two more Christopher-Rockefeller people, Charles Ducommun and Arch Monson, the latter Christopher's northern California campaign chairman. The rest of the members were: (with the only conservative left over from Friends of Ronald Reagan shown with an asterisk):

Asa Call	Justin Dart	Cy Rubel*
Bernard Brennan	M. Philip Davis	John R. McCone
George S. Benson	Jaquelin Hume	Taft Schreiber
James Black, Jr.	Marco Hellman	William French Smith
		Philip Watson

Reagan's campaign managers went out of their way to bring Arch Monson into service. As noted earlier, he was Christopher's statewide campaign chairman and before that had worked for Nelson Rockefeller and before that for Thomas N. Kuchel. Once he joined, Monson's name appeared on nearly every benefit, committee and press release clear into the middle of the Reagan first legislative year.

The 17-man executive campaign committee was packed with liberals, Kuchel and Rockefeller supporters, people who, against almost any *other* conservative than Reagan, could not have been *paid* to come into the campaign. Yet here they were, numerically *dominating* the Reagan forward wall, while conservatives who had been with Reagan since the beginning were removed to do minor work in the campaign . . . if they chose to stay.

To those active in politics on both sides and to others who paid any attention to the news columns, the meaning was clear: the Reagan campaign was changing hands.

Indicative of the change were the various volunteer organizations' drives and benefits which followed, always with more of the liberal and moderate wing posted on letterheads and invitations. Once in a while, a conservative. But to an observer, the company was un-natural with conservatives in these surroundings appearing more as hotel guests who didn't know what room they were in, than as, say, diplomatic couriers who had just engineered a masterful treaty with the Sioux Indians.

On September 12, a \$1,000-per-couple fund-raising dinner was held for Ronald Reagan and other candidates (Robert Finch, lieutenant governor; Houston Fluornoy, controller; Ivy Baker Priest, treasurer; and Spencer Williams, Attorney General). Sponsor of the event was the "Northern California Dinner Committee" with 88 of San Francisco's liberal old guard posted down the left side of the letterhead—and once again, a handful of conservatives. Before April of 1966, the Reagan campaign had trouble attracting any really big money from the liberals and moderates in the northern part of the state. And this, no doubt, would have gone right on. Had these candidates been conservatives, a \$1,000-per-plate dinner in San Francisco would have looked more like the third night of a bad play. No liberal would have placed his name on that sponsoring committee. But with longstanding liberals like Fluornoy and Finch in the line-up, the money began to flow. Personally signed by the following six (of which two, Mrs. Marshall Madison and Mr. Jaquelin Hume were regarded as conservatives) the dinner was a smashing success.

Mrs. Marshall Madison
Dan E. London
Josiah Knowles

Jaquelin Hume
Marco F. Hellman
Arch Monson, Jr.

Reagan couldn't believe the favorable reaction in San

Francisco. If he were willing to cross over the line, the liberals were willing to meet him halfway—maybe even farther, depending on the nature of the concession. And judging from the deliverance of liberals that took place from the Christopher ranks (and even the Democrats) the concessions must have been considerable.

The names of Democrats joining the Reagan camp were circulated along with the other literature during the campaign. One release listed the following: Lloyd Lowery, a lifelong Democrat with 22 years in the California state legislature; John A. Bohn, a Democrat who headed the Citizens for Kennedy in 1960 for Contra Costa County; Mitts Nishihara, who had never voted anything but the straight Democratic ticket—a prominent Santa Cruz County strawberry farmer; Emanuel Razeto, member of the Alameda County Board of Supervisors; and Austin M. Healey of Fresno, who had once been county chairman for Los Angeles Democratic mayor Samuel Yorty's unsuccessful bid for governor.

Before the primary, Democrats worked for a Reagan victory—they said—in the belief that he would be the easiest candidate for incumbent Democratic Governor Pat Brown to beat in the general elections. What was their purpose in crossing over the line now that the general elections were on?

Appointed to head up the Reagan for Governor Volunteer Citizens' Committee at about this time was William Bird, a moderate Republican of San Francisco. Bird was chairman of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce and senior vice president of the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company. His job: to organize 35 vocational and avocational groups with 22,000 volunteers to work in the precincts. Assisting Bird would be Walter Dahl, a liberal and former Republican caucus chairman, onetime mayor of Piedmont, California, and a member of the legislature (now retired) for nine years. Dahl would later figure heavily in appointments below the level of the first 35. Shown on the letterhead of the Citizens' Committee were five non-conservatives, two of whom were notorious liberals:

Bernard Brennan	Los Angeles	Chairman
William French Smith	Los Angeles	vice ch.
Arch Monson, Jr.	San Francisco	vice ch.
Don Mulford	Oakland	vice ch.
Charles Conrad	Los Angeles	vice ch.

Noting the considerable change in the Reagan campaign

after the June primary, the San Francisco *Examiner* commented on July 24, 1966: "... it is known that those heretofore associated with moderate and liberal Republicans ... far outnumber those who were identified with the campaign of Senator Barry Goldwater."

And the San Francisco *Chronicle* two months later, on September 11:

"The Ronald Reagan who has come out swinging in his general election campaign appears to be neither what his Democratic foes or some of his conservative-wing Republicans had hoped.

"His platform is clearly more liberal than either would prefer."

Following Reagan's November victory, it would come as small surprise to find the Oakland *Tribune* remarking on November 27, 1966:

"The Republican statewide team elected with Reagan consists entirely of those with moderate political views ..."

and

"In legislative relations, the new administration has become attached to the moderate lawmakers who generally supported George Christopher in the GOP primary campaign."

To fill out top positions on the campaign steering committee, Reagan went out of his way to personally request the services of a lifelong San Francisco liberal against whose organizational exploits the Republican volunteer groups in California had led one purge after another since 1962: Caspar Weinberger. Weinberger was leftward enough to have joined with Leonard Finder in setting up the California Republican Council in 1964 and after that the California Republican League, both formed in direct opposition to the conservative-dominated United Republicans of California and the California Republican Assembly, whose brand of Republicanism Reagan claimed to represent coming into 1965.

A former state assemblyman, Weinberger was given a priority position at the top of the Reagan steering committee and in February of 1968, was boosted to the top job in the state, Director of Finance.

One horrified Republican assemblyman remarked that in

bringing Weinberger into the campaign, Reagan had undone five years of painstaking conservative organizational labor. Others named to the steering committee from the moderate and liberal wing of the Party were:

State Senator John McCarthy	—moderate Republican from San Rafael
Assemblyman Robert T. Monagan	—of Tracy, California, another hardened liberal
U.S. Congressman Glen Lipscomb	—a conservative with a sometime moderate record
Max Moore	—close personal friend of George Christopher, one of Christopher's local campaign chairmen against Reagan in the primary, and a close political associate
Assemblyman George Miliias	—of Santa Clara County, liberal Republican, statewide organizer of George Christopher's campaign
Dr. Francisco Bravo	—a Democrat, liberal, strong backer of Reagan's opponent who was still in office, incumbent governor Pat Brown.
Mrs. Thurmond Clark	—Rockefeller's 1964 Southern California campaign chairman
Mrs. Norman Taurog	—a Rockefeller delegate to the 1964 convention

Where were the conservatives? Standing around with their teeth in their mouth, cooling their heels; thousands of them, in a state that has probably more conservatives than any other. They could follow this new leadership into the campaign, but only a handful would find their way onto any boards or committees. And these would either be non-political, there to raise funds and help to put a conservative face on a campaign that was becoming more liberal by the moment, or who had a history of supporting both ideological sides.

Oddly enough—and perhaps the most curious feature of the entire year: rather than sizing this transformation up as the victory of the liberals in having taken over the Reagan campaign, those who stayed on saw it as the victory feat for conservatism to have finally brought the liberals in behind a conservative candidate. What's more, thousands of them still do.

To top off the whole operation after his November victory, Reagan named his third advisory board (our numbering)—a group originally formed to set up a statewide screening committee of 66 to screen applicants for appointments. Ultimately replaced by a different screening set-up this committee was retained and given broad publicity as Reagan's "Kitchen Cabinet" to notify the rest of the state of the identity of the Reagan Administration.

Formed on November 14, 1966, it was dominated by several liberals with four carry-over conservatives from the first Friends of Ronald Reagan Committee of a year before. They were:

Liberals

Caspar Weinberger
 Josiah Knowles
 Marco Hellman
 Leonard Firestone
 Justin Dart
 Asa Call
 Taft Schreiber

Conservatives

Henry Salvatori
 Holmes Tuttle
 Cy Rubel
 Ed Mills

Going into 1967, slight changes were made in this "Kitchen Cabinet" to more or less balance the ideological scales. They were given a full pictorial announcement in the April 23, 1967 issue of the Los Angeles *Times* Sunday supplement, *West Magazine*:

Liberals

Leonard Firestone*
 Arch Monson, Jr.*
 Taft Schreiber*
 William French Smith*

Conservatives

Henry Salvatori
 Holmes Tuttle
 Cy Rubel
 Ed Mills
 Leland Kaiser*
 Jaquelin Hume*

*new additions

William French Smith is heading the Reagan Favorite Son Delegation this year. Smith leaned to the conservative side from a semi-moderate—or elastic—position toward center-field, and was known to usually support the party ticket where arch-conservatism would draw the line. (Which was the primary reason politically-active conservatives from the Goldwater campaign did not make it onto the Reagan campaign proper.) Hence, he would probably deny he was a liberal. It didn't make any difference at this stage. The show was

over. But for the record, following is *West Magazine's* run-down on the six (asterisked) who have not been discussed previously:

Leonard Firestone—president of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of California. Statewide chairman for the Rockefeller-for-President primary campaign in 1964, worked for Thomas Kuchel and George Murphy for the U.S. Senate, and became Southern California finance chairman for the Christopher primary battle against Reagan.

Mr. Jaquelin Hume—president of Basic Vegetable Products in San Francisco and a 1964 Goldwater delegate to the national convention.

Leland Kaiser—onetime Republican state central committee treasurer, member of the GOP national finance committee, and a conservative; former board chairman of Insurance Securities, Inc., one of the nation's largest mutual fund brokerages.

Arch Monson, Jr.—San Francisco Western Manager of Autocall Company, manufacturers of signal devices. He was George Christopher's state coordinator during the primary against Reagan, assistant treasurer of the Republican state central committee.

Taft Schreiber—Los Angeles, vice president of MCA, Inc., parent company of Universal Pictures, Universal Studios and Decca Records and Reagan's agent beginning in 1953. He supported Christopher in the primaries.

William French Smith—partner in the Los Angeles law firm of Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher, onetime chairman of the GOP state central committee speakers' bureau, Secretary of Republican Associates in Los Angeles. He supported Christopher in the primary battle.

Leonard Finder

In the early 1960's, Leonard Finder, onetime director and secretary of the New York headquarters of the Anti-Defamation League, came to California and raised funds to buy out the Sacramento *Union* newspaper. Although still predominantly moderate-to-liberal, the *Union* then became Sacramento's more moderate voice against the much larger and howlingly-liberal McClatchey paper, the Sacramento *Bee*. The *Union* supported both Democrat and Republican candidates.

The struggle for ideological supremacy in California's Re-

publican volunteer organizations from 1960 to 1964 ended in strong conservative control going into the Goldwater campaign. The Republican liberals had no home, so to speak, even though they still dominated the Republican state central committee. They needed a new parallel organization to take the place of their former control of the California Republican Assembly. In November of 1964, *Newsweek* Magazine broke the word that the "moderate" Republicans were contemplating several new organizations "in some states to counter the rightwingers." (*Newsweek*, November 9, 1964).

One of these was Finder's left-of-center Republican Council of California. Among the co-founders were:

Leonard Firestone	President, Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.
Caspar Weinberger	Reagan's head of governmental reorganization
Houston Fluornoy	Reagan's state controller (elected)
Sen. Vernon Sturgeon	Reagan's senate liaison on administration bills
Assembl. William Bagley	Marin County
Sen. Milton Marks	San Francisco (not in the state senate at that time by supported for his senate election by Reagan in 1967)
Assembl. John Venneman	Stanislaus County
Sen. John McCarthy	Marin County
Justin Dart	Los Angeles, President of Rexall Drug Co.
Marco Hellman	San Francisco banker
George Miliias	Santa Clara County
Carl A. Britschgi	San Mateo County
Stewart Hinckley	San Bernardino County
Laughlin Waters	former GOP Assemblyman
A. Ronald Button	former state treasurer
Walter Kane	Bakersfield newspaper publisher
Robert Rowan	Los Angeles County
H. Harold Leavy	Sacramento attorney
Frank Richardson	Sacramento attorney
Philip C. Wilkins	Sacramento attorney

(Source: The California States-
man, March 1965)

In addition to working for Christopher in 1965, there was

something even more outstanding about the members of this organization: they were supporters of Rockefeller in 1964. In 1967, most of them branched off into still another liberal Republican invention, the California Republican League.

So by November, 1966, Reagan had on his "Kitchen Cabinet" seven liberal Republicans from the Christopher campaign of whom six had worked for Rockefeller in 1964, of whom two—Firestone and Weinberger—came into Finders new group specifically to work conservatives *out* of the state apparatus.

After victory, four more members of the California Republican Council came in close to Reagan either through appointments or important legislation. Houston Flournoy, controller-elect, was named by Reagan to his regular six-man cabinet. Senator Vernon Sturgeon was appointed by Reagan as Senate Liaison on important administration bills. Assemblyman William Bagley was the author of the open housing revision bill (see Chapter IV) which Reagan supported after refusing to work for repeal. It was partly over the objections of Senator Clair Burgener of San Diego that Reagan unseated one of the most conservative and best-qualified appointments he made all year, San Diego's Dr. William McCandless.

For the 5,000-odd field appointments, the original plan was to have the second 10-man advisory board put together a 66-man field force to make recommendations and funnel letters into Sacramento. This plan went by the boards.

In its place rose the third advisory body, a statewide screening committee under four men, each with a 20-to-30 man team to funnel in letters of recommendation for appointments. The state was divided into four sections with chairmen and field squads as follows:

Los Angeles District—Chairman: William French Smith

Cy Fluor	Assembl. Frank Lanterman
Dennis Carpenter	Dr. Willard Libby
Dr. George S. Benson	John Y. Maeno
Dr. Francisco Bravo	Harold Quinton
Bernard Brennan	Edward Mills*
Dudley E. Browne	Michael Raftery
Asa Call	Phil Regan
William P. Clark	Henry Salvatori*
Robert L. Collins	Taft Schreiber
Assembl. Charles Conrad	George Smith

Charles E. Cook	Holmes Tuttle*
John L. Dales	Louis Vincenti, Sr.
Charles Ducommun	Louis Warschaw
Earl P. Kinsinger	Leonard Firestone

San Diego District—Chairman: Gordon Luce

C. Arnholt Smith	Victor R. Luncy
Henry Boney	Frank Nicol
Walter DeBrunner	William Quirk
Burt F. Raynes	Charles K. Fletcher, Jr.
Tom Hoy	Mrs. N. C. Roberts
Dr. Roy Ledford	Mike Schultz
Thomas Sefton	Joseph Sinnott

San Francisco District—Chairman: Leland Kaiser*

Caspar Weinberger	Assembl. Don Mulford
Marco Hellman	Jaquelin Hume*
Arch Monson	N. J. Knowles
James Halley	Lloyd Lowrey
Theron Bell	Dr. J. L. Price
John Bohn	Thomas Reed
George Fitch	Trevor Roberts*
Roger Chandler	N. Conner Templeton
Vernon Christina	Mrs. Mark Valory
Dr. John DeHeras	Mrs. Wayne Wentner
Lloyd Stolich	

San Joaquin Valley—Chairman: William Mazzie

Ed Bowe	Dave Vaughn
William E. Forbes	D. W. Holmes
Carter Dunlap	Dwight M. Ewing
Ole Bane	Randall Fawcett
Lloyd Harnish	Terry Metcalf
Dr. R. DeCampos	Gordon Monford

(Source: Los Angeles *Times*, Nov. 24, 1967, except San Francisco, which was independently obtained)

These names were supplied by Tom Reed, Reagan's appointments secretary in Sacramento. The list is far from complete. Before the statewide screening committee was completed, Reed, who had been Reagan's northern California campaign chairman, left the state for Texas to begin breaking ground on Reagan's 1968 presidential campaign.

But there was enough here to size up the patronage

structure. You will say, "What do these names—of Californians—mean to me here in Vermont?" As little as those in the San Joaquin Valley mean to us here in Los Angeles, but for these facts: the record is there; each of these screening committees was dominated overwhelmingly by the liberal wing of the Republican Party; (known conservatives are asterisked) and they are clearly identifiable to the Republican volunteer organizations in their respective districts which have been competing with these same personalities for over 10 years for control of the Republican Party in California.

If Reagan was a political reformer in the conservative cause, what was he doing standing nose-deep in the middle of the liberal wing of the party for advice on appointments? Moreover, how did he get there?

For minority leadership in the Assembly, Reagan cast his support for a moderate Republican, incumbent Robert Monagan, over Robert Badham, a conservative. "With Reagan's support," reported the *Oakland Tribune*, "Badham probably would win." The article added,

"Badham supporters are steaming because Reagan appears to have forged a strong alliance with Monagan and GOP assemblymen who formed an anti-Reagan 'truth squad' during the primary campaign on behalf of Christopher.

"Some conservatives are also upset about some of Reagan's early appointments." (*Oakland Tribune*, November 27, 1966)

In the selection of the Senate and Assembly task force to advise Reagan on all bills coming to him from the legislature, the top six conservatives in both houses were ignored. These would have been:

Senate

John Schmitz
Clark Bradley
Bill Richardson
Jack Schrade
James E. Whetmore
John Harmer

Assembly

Robert H. Burke
John V. Briggs
Floyd Wakefield
John Stull
Bud Collier
Carlos J. Moorhead

Instead, Reagan chose four liberals from each house, plus Lieutenant Governor Robert Finch, a moderate, as an ex-officio member of the panel:

Senate

George Deukmajian, Long Beach
John F. McCarthy, San Rafael
Robert J. Lagomarsino, Ojai
Donald Grunsky, Watsonville

Assembly

Robert Monagan, Tracy
Frank Lanterman, La Canada
(varies ideologically)
Charles Conrad, Sherman Oaks
Victory Veysey, Brawley
Robert Finch

(Source: Los Angeles Times, November 17, 1966)

In the above arrangement liberals as well as conservatives found themselves on the outside. The state senate, for instance, works on seniority. So over the years, a small clique has formed which is run by Senator Hugh Burns, a conservative-leaning Democrat from Visalia. One of Burns' closest friends in the Senate was Eugene McAteer (now deceased) a mostly-liberal from San Francisco and a member of the Rules Committee, most powerful body in the Senate.

When McAteer sent a special letter to Reagan's office requesting the Governor's support for his compulsory education bills in 1967, he got a *form letter* back from Philip Battaglia, Reagan's special assistant, telling McAteer that his request would be referred to George Deukmajian. Deukmajian is a liberal senator from Long Beach whom Reagan appointed over the heads of a dozen or more senior senators to carry administration bills through the legislature. A *form letter*—from a subordinate—referring him to another senator who was so new in the Senate that he wasn't even a *freshman* yet! (The legislative session had just opened.) McAteer could hardly control himself. Several months later he died of a heart attack.

Deukmajian is far enough to the left to be found in Leonard Finder's company (see above). In 1964, when Deukmajian was an assemblyman, six Republican legislators cooperated with Leonard Finder in co-authoring a series of articles attacking so-called "right-wing extremist activities" in the Republican Party. This was about the time when the conservatives were busy purging California's top Republican volunteer organizations of the last vestiges of liberal influence—or so they thought. Others participating in the series were:

assemblymen Clair Burgener, George Miliias, William Bagley, and Robert Stevens. While some of their information was not wholly inappropriate, its usefulness was destroyed by the presence of Finder.

Throughout most of 1967, appointments below the level of about 35 (the top jobs) followed from the 4-man statewide screening committee shown above. Ostensibly, letters were funnelled in from each respective district to Kaiser, Mazzie, Smith and Luce who cleared or discarded them, and forwarded their selections on to Tom Reed in Sacramento. And if the liberal character of these dozens upon dozens of field appointments seemed inexplicable to the thousands of conservatives around the state who had been with Reagan since the beginning, there was a logical reason (as there usually is); the unofficial word out of Sacramento was that no active conservative members of any of the Republican volunteer organizations had priority—regardless of qualifications. They were, in a word, excluded from patronage. And this too had a logical reason. The volunteer groups had to be phased out to conform to Dr. Gaylord Parkinson's so-called Eleventh Commandment and the "party unity" Reagan would try to forge going into the 1968 National Convention. (See next chapter.)

Eventually, the four statewide screening committees passed into the background. Reagan had found other channels and relied increasingly on his new appointments secretary, Paul Haerle, to utilize them. Tom Reed had gone off to Texas to test the ground for Reagan's entry into the national picture.

Six months before, Reagan had begun to get his bearings, enough to realize that his chief competition was Finch, not Jesse Unruh. With Reagan touring the country during 1967, "not-running" for president, Finch actually was governor more of the time. Finch had more to do with Reagan's sweeping victory than anyone, and it is he, not Reagan, who is the titular head of the Republican Party in California.

Reagan made the added mistake of delivering himself deeper into Finch's care through his offhand treatment of the conservatives over the previous year and a half. But as of (approximately) July 1967, Reagan took steps to "contain" Finch here and there, and to ferret out new sources of political and advisory strength, possibly in the belief that he could take what he had and step into the presidential race with still another all-new organization. This would fit the time at which he also began to look to his own sources for more appointments. But the somewhat tense air between Reagan

and Finch after July did not signify a Reagan move back toward the conservatives; it merely caused a drop in his poll ratings, as though news organs like the powerful Los Angeles *Times* took the dim view of any makeshift attempt by Reagan toward political independence.

Aside from the formal patronage structure, you could expect background screening to take place all through the system. Allegedly handling dozens of appointments was former Oakland assemblyman Walter Dahl, whom most Republicans only dimly remembered. In Los Angeles, the man consensus seems to favor had the dominant influence on letters pouring into William French Smith's downtown office was Bob Finch. And there is no way to tell how far into the state Finch's influence extended. Working right along with Richard Nixon for almost 15 years, Finch went out of his way to serve the party and maintained harmonious relations with nearly all ideological factions which are as strong now as ever.

The job of commissioner of banks was an especially coveted prize to the state's banking community. Story has it that one day after the election, bankers from all over the state held a special meeting in Monterey to "decide" who was going to be the next banking commissioner.

Presently, in walked Gordon Luce, Senior Vice President of San Diego's Home Federal Savings and Loan and told them it was going to be James H. Hall. And true or not Hall it turned out to be. Luce was said to be in Monterey on behalf of Charles Fletcher, whose Home Federal Savings and other investments have made him a strong figure in San Diego's Republican party representing the moderate conservative outlook. Like no other city in California, San Diego is sharply divided between its conservative and liberal wings. The plums usually go to another banker, C. Arnholt Smith, a more mercenary Republican who is probably the most powerful individual in the downtown—or liberal—sector of San Diego.

Phillip Battaglia went to Sacramento as Reagan's executive secretary with Sandy Quinn tagging along to assist him. No one in the conservative camp had ever heard of them before. Another rumor heard frequently over coffee and budget lunches in Los Angeles after the victory held that they had gotten their jobs on the recommendation of Arch Tuthill, a downtown Los Angeles attorney. Tuthill is considered to be one of arch-liberal Sen. Thomas H. Kuchel's best friends.

The sight of liberals from both parties picking up the plums

in the appointment schedule was only the fourth factor to alienate the conservatives (after the campaign changes, advisors and legislative reverses). From the start of the primary campaign. Reagan's personnel changes did not line up with his conservative goals, in spite of advance notice that he was not going to be bound by politics. He was and is, because politics is the name of the game. A housecleaning had taken place with his willing consent that was bound to affect the running of his administration and restrict his ability to deliver on conservative promises. In fact, it would probably determine his role as a "favorite son" at the 1968 convention. Key figures in the transition were Bob Finch, Phillip Battaglia, William French Smith, Tom Reed, Gordon Luce, Dennis Carpenter and about 54 other county campaign chairmen superimposed on the 1964 Goldwater legions by May of 1966. From then on, the latter had to switch over even to contribute money to the campaign or receive instructions. And they never occupied leadership positions again.

Who were these "new" faces; how did they work their way past an entire field organization to become Reagan's key aids; who stood behind them and in front of Reagan's campaign managers, Spencer and Roberts?

There was nothing new about them. They were the dominant force within the Republican Party in California; officers, background men, members of county state central committees, the big funders; those who always went out for the boring jobs *within* the party structure whether or not they had a powerful volunteer organization like the California Republican Assembly on hand from one year to the next to reflect their ideology. And since they were *running* the Republican Party, while the conservatives were usually making the bigger sounds, it was they who could look askance at Reagan's Goldwater army and ask: "Who are the hosts and who are the guests in *our* organization?"

And if the conservatives were mindful, they could recall the last time a reasonable attempt got up steam to take over the party structure in California. That was in 1964; it reached its peak during the August Republican State Convention for Barry Goldwater . . . and it failed.

A handful of these "new faces" had worked for Barry in 1964. But most of them went for George Murphy and Nelson Rockefeller, and before that Tom Kuchel; then finally for George Christopher's losing skirmish with Reagan in 1966.

They were the moderate-to-liberal wing of the party (which is all one until a conservative jumps into the act); the politicians; members of an organization molded, babied, weaned, strengthened and fathered for over 20 years by (among others) Richard Milhaus Nixon.

THE RAID

"Let none but Americans stand guard tonight."

—George Washington

You like Perry Mason? HMMMMMMMMM? Then, prepare yourself.

If you, in your own private crime lab, set out to reconstruct what took place from the Goldwater loss to the Reagan victory, having not actually been there, but talked to people who were, and read and thought and analyzed, you might come up with a rough theory approximately as follows:

First of all, remember what we all know: it was the Republicans who defeated Goldwater, not the Democrats; the liberal-left flank of the GOP. After losing Scranton and Rockefeller in the nominating convention at the San Francisco Cow Palace, they poured into the Goldwater campaign and there, proceeded to dismantle it from within. This they could do, because they had control of the party structure. They were reportedly joined—indirectly—by thousands of "Syndicate" conservatives from Clifton White's National Draft Goldwater Committee who were irate at being deprived of control over the campaign, and just lost interest. Goldwater did not trust White. After winning the nomination for Goldwater, White was denied any further direct influence on the campaign and something resembling a MacDonald's Hamburger Stand crew came in under Dennison Kitchel to manage Goldwater's downfall. Goldwater workers didn't get their mail; A-grade television productions on the Arizona senator were withdrawn for mediocre films which were then beamed out to voters everywhere; that kind of thing.

The point is, in California Spencer and Roberts (Reagan's campaign managers) had roughly the same problem to look

forward to. Spencer and Roberts were retained by Reagan in June of 1965, seven months after Goldwater's fall from grace. On June 7, Bill Roberts told *Newsweek* Magazine: "Reagan is very new in politics, but he's a hot product. He's hot now because he's kind of supplanted Goldwater in people's minds. But we're going to shift that image. In fact, we've got to if we're going to win."

Reagan is popular *because* he sounds like Goldwater, so we have to *destroy* what makes him popular? Not quite. But perhaps Roberts didn't mean *precisely* that. He was looking for some way to bring the liberal wing of the Republican Party into the Reagan campaign *after* the primary and keep it from splitting the Party down the middle against Reagan, as it had done against Goldwater. That was the problem Bill Roberts had to solve.

In California, the conservatives (when united) can win any major Republican primary election and Reagan could have *won his* hands down without any image-changing. Statistics showed this, from the Goldwater primary of 1964 and, before that, during Joseph C. Shell's 1962 gubernatorial run. Why? Because during a primary, the liberals are out preening and parading their own candidates. But after the primaries, liberal and conservative come together for the general election. And your state can't be too different from ours, the liberals won't play ball unless they have *their* man. They would rather have a Democrat. Since the conservatives are too moral to play this kind of dirty pool (it's called "politics") they always end up joining in happy camaraderie ("party unity") around a liberal candidate, never around a conservative.

So in Bill Roberts' mind, goes the theory, "victory" became commensurate with giving the liberals enough leverage within the Reagan campaign to make unity worth *their* while. (But Roberts would call them the "broad middleground"). This would have to involve a pretty big sacrifice; something like selling your soul for another day at the races. If the deal could be consummated *without* changing Reagan's image, all the better because this image had a 27-million vote potential behind it in a national election (the total Goldwater vote), and the idea was to *expand*, not contract, its influence.

So by accident, perhaps, Roberts was putting *Newsweek* on; the image would stay; Roberts was going to shift Reagan *as he was* onto a liberal campaign organization. And time-wise, he had to make his move before the June 1966 primaries because the liberals work on the basis of firm commit-

ments only. Without that, he could kiss his candidate goodbye.

Something about Spencer and Roberts: forty-eight campaigns from a modest beginning in 1960; 4 were victories, 7 losses. They run a public relations firm for Republicans, no Democrats. To win is to live, to lose is to die; a simple formula—purely mercenary. And Spencer and Roberts have been over the road with the liberals—from the primary through the generals—enough times to know what they have to do to survive. Altruism doesn't pay off.

Since losing makes for lean, hard times, plus professional suicide, and the liberals produce better odds, Spencer and Roberts have gradually worked the conservatives out of their economic bloodstream. They had one: California's John H. Rousselot, whom they sent to Congress in 1960. Since then, U.S. Senator Tom Kuchel, Nelson Rockefeller, George Murphy, (a party-first conservative with a good voting record), Del Clawson—*still winning some, losing others, mind you*. (They lost Rockefeller to Goldwater in the 1964 presidential primary). But on S and R's Ouija Board, moderates and liberals bring the stuff of which Fort Knox is made. Or, so it would seem.

Then, along came Reagan. But hear this about Stu Spencer in the Los Angeles *Times* Sunday supplement, December 11, 1966: "When George Wallace of Alabama made an acceptance speech for his wife, Lurleen, Spencer chuckled and said, 'That little son of a gun is great. He insults the press, he insults everybody, and he still gets away with it.'" Strictly mercenary.

Anyhow, continuing with the theory: Roberts had to change organizations without changing the image. This way, he could have his cake and eat it too—conservatives following Reagan's words, liberals following his actions. And, of course, actions speak louder than words. In fact, they are the *only* standard of value. And to take Reagan on as their candidate, the liberals had to be running his campaign because the payoff was not Reagan but his administration. For this, they would give Roberts "unity" in 1966. To accomplish this transition, S & R started out the same month they were hired—June 1965.

The second priority to Spencer and Roberts weighed heavily on one of Goldwater's prophetic utterances in June of 1965: if Reagan won the governorship in California, he would most assuredly become presidential material in 1968. Reagan heard it too.

The other part of S and R's twofold problem: how to field

the *kind* of organization that could bag the governor's chair and ease Reagan into the national picture at the same time. And what kind of an organization would that be? People with national influence, Democrats and Republicans, big Eastern money. To the extent that S and R saw the gubernatorial race as a "chickee run" presidential primary for 1968—which it was—you have a partial clue to the standard to be used in the selection of Reagan's appointments. But the double-standard idea is really excess baggage at this stage; we're just trying to get those juices flowing.

Throughout 1965, "Friends of Ronald Reagan" was Goldwater to the bone, except for a few impurities—people who really *were* friends of Ronald Reagan—joining in from the movie industry. And around the state went Reagan for the duration of the year holding private meetings and winning tumultuous acclaim through his auditorium addresses, which were superlative.

To show Californians how well-received he was nationally, a speaking tour was arranged which took him into several key eastern states—always a good move. There, Republican leaders cold-shouldered Reagan. But his audiences cheered him as he tore into controls and federal handouts; the anti-poverty program, job training, urban renewal, farm subsidies, tax cuts, scientific research, aid to education and conservation and recreation programs.

Back in California, the closed-door sessions had special significance. There, Reagan rubbed noses with the oldest conservative veterans in the State of California, but he never got close to them. There were old voices out of the legislature, legal giants, experts on water and taxation, powers in the GOP's national volunteer organizations. And a lot of sound advice went his way on financial matters, liaison, the political structure of the state, who was running the legislature, the value-difference between mere victory and conservative reform, etc. From the "fed-ups"—those tired of sell-outs and unfulfilled promises—he got ultimata. "There is not one person sitting in this room," he was told tersely in San Diego,

"... who has one iota of influence in the governor's office in Sacramento. And there isn't any reason why we should go out and work and contribute money and fight and bleed for you if, when you get elected, we *still* have no influence in the governor's office; because we have that for nothing now; why should we pay for it?"

Yet the man in the room for whom that remark was intended, Bill Roberts, just sat there like a maiden aunt stoically, contemplatively, unruffled with nothing but his one big right ear stretching and vibrating to catch the full meaning of the words. And the meaning was: How big a loss factor am I going to suffer when these wiser ones find out who is running this campaign?

Oldtimers like Harold Levering and Phil Davis and Cy Rubel knew what was coming, but you couldn't tell it to the conservatives for the stars in their eyes. Harold Levering and Joseph Shell had been in the legislature 10 years apiece. Levering had been a Republican floor leader and had spent long years on the Revenue and taxation committee. An expert on the state's financial problems, he knew what a genuine tax reform program would have to look like to bail California out from bankruptcy or tyranny—one or the other—four or six years down the line. Shell had been Barry Goldwater's state finance chairman in 1964 in one of the rare campaigns that came through in the black after the polls closed. He was good enough on money problems to rate the post of Director of Finance if ever asked. Toward the end of the year (1965), these and dozens more knew why they were being glossed over in serious discussions over the state's fiscal crisis. Shell understood the State of California. But Roberts knew the liberals would never understand Joe Shell.

The year 1965 passed into history. On January 4, 1966, Reagan declared his candidacy.

Stepping into the governor's race against Ronald Reagan were two independently wealthy Republicans. One was George Christopher, former mayor of San Francisco, Marin County milk baron, and a wall-pounding liberal.

The other: William Penn Patrick, 36-year-old chairman of the board of Holiday Magic Cosmetics, a millionaire the first year his product was on the market, and a conservative. Patrick's entry would give him minority-voice platform leverage against later deviations by Reagan.

During the primary, he represented at least a partial rallying point for Republicans who could not bring themselves to believe in panaceas. In Republican circles as far back as 1965, you were walking into an emotional beehive if you wore anything but a Saint Reagan sign tattooed on your forehead.

Mrs. Jane Alexander, a onetime board member of the California Republican Assembly, and later Patrick employee, earned expulsion from the CRA for what, in a normal year,

would probably have come as harmless introspection. Why, she asked, did we have to promote a lifelong liberal Democrat to carry a Republican conservative cause when Reagan was not even a declared candidate yet? And she dropped another tidbit about a John Birch Society representative who volunteered to throw his support to Reagan or withdraw it, either way, whichever Reagan thought would help him most. Although the rumor later turned out to be true, in the face of the Reagan groundswell, it was like an attack on motherhood. And, too, Mrs. Alexander had been over the coals with the Republicans many times before.

Like Senator John Schmitz, Patrick shared Reagan's platform and would later support him after the general elections with words like: "Governor Reagan's spoken words are, for the most part, music to the ears of all of those, like myself, who seek a redirection in the mood and emphasis of present-day state and federal government policies." But by the end of 1967, he would join Schmitz and thousands of others in holding firm to that commitment as Reagan pulled steadily away. Patrick also was outspoken. For the first year of the Reagan administration, his was almost the only opposition voice among the Republican business community, and his remarks grated on the Republican volunteer organizations whose members were suddenly given to flying blind. As 1968 came into view, the whole picture began to change.

Up to May 17, 1965, Joseph Shell had claimed Reagan's support for his own shot at the governor's chair. When Reagan was serving as state co-chairman for Goldwater's campaign and Shell was Goldwater's state finance chairman, Reagan apparently gave approving nod to suggestions that he support Shell for governor the coming year. Without Reagan in the race, Shell *would* have been the leading primary contender. But with praise and respect for Shell, Reagan politely clarified his position to the press on May 18: "... I never at any time did anything that could be construed as an outright commitment."

Along with dozens of others, Shell's experience and advice on budget and tax problems were available to Reagan throughout 1965 and 1966. But at no time was it ever sought. And like all the other conservatives in California, he ended up in Mono County. One year later, Shell came back to Sacramento as representative for California's independent oil interests.

Only one other Republican entry figured in the GOP slate

that year (at the top). But he was by far the most powerful of the four and his decision to run had enough significance to reveal the pattern of the whole election. Robert Finch, a 40-year-old Los Angelean, had declared his candidacy for Lieutenant Governor on July 6, 1965, one month after Reagan hired Spencer and Roberts to run his campaign. Finch had never held public office. But his 25 years at hard labor in the GOP, both nationally and statewide, more than compensated. *Seventeen* of these years were spent on the Republican State Central Committee of California.

As a student at Los Angeles Occidental College, Finch organized 13 Young Republican Clubs on southland campuses before entering World War II as a Marine. Before his military service he was editor of the National Young Republican Federation newspaper. After returning to take his law degree at the University of Southern California, he was then recalled for service in the Korean War. Two times an unsuccessful candidate for Congress in 1952 and 1954, he entered the employ of Richard M. Nixon as manager of Nixon's Vice-Presidential office in Los Angeles, a post he held from 1953 to 1960.

In a 1960 presidential race that came within $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1% of defeating John F. Kennedy, Finch was Richard Nixon's national campaign manager. But he played only a minor role in Nixon's bid for the California governorship two years later, and also avoided the Goldwater-Rockefeller friction in 1964. Instead, he ran George Murphy's successful 1964 campaign for the U.S. Senate. Finch became Executive Director of Republican Associates in Los Angeles, his last job before entering the Lt. governor's race in 1966 against incumbent Democrat Glenn Anderson (who dropped the ball during the Watts riot), but retains a position today on its board of directors.

Finch had what is called longevity in the GOP; earned following; the thing Reagan lacked. Avoiding cliches, Finch had worked toward what he called the "broad GOP middle-ground" since the beginning, and had a more or less familiar-sounding creed: "I will never attack my fellow Republicans." (Los Angeles *Times*, July 6, 1965)

Although he entered the lieutenant governor's race entirely independent of Reagan and had no particular interest in the "far out" features of Reagan's Goldwater podium delivery, Finch had organization, cadre, IOU's, seniority, and national connections in the Republican Party. Reagan had none, and

needed it all, if the point is clear. So none of Finch's opponents were particularly amazed at finding themselves unable to raise money or workers against him for lieutenant governor. Riverside County Supervisor Norman Davis, a liberal Republican, declared his candidacy because, in his words, Finch was ". . . seeking the office only to serve as a power base for Dick Nixon. National political leaders should not be involved in this primary." (Los Angeles *Times*, March 23, 1966).

Finch made sure he was the *on'y* acceptable Republican candidate for the job. By election time, he had given over 500 speeches and received the endorsement of all the Republican volunteer organizations in the state. If the Republican candidate for governor won in 1966, regardless of who he might be, Finch was sure to win. And he would go down if the candidate lost. In a close gubernatorial race, he might win anyway with his united Republican support and the ticket-splitting by anti-Anderson Democrats. In which case, he would be in position as his party's choice for governor in 1970.

Oh, yes, and one other point: Spencer, Roberts and Finch grew up in the Los Angeles Republican Party together—in the shadow of Richard Nixon.

When Finch was chairman of the Republican Central Committee, Roberts was president of the Los Angeles County Young Republicans. That was in 1957. On September 16 of that year, Roberts and Finch issued a joint plea to all Republicans to avoid splitting the party over the gubernatorial primary contest between Goodwin Knight and William F. Knowland which was forthcoming. Both held to a tight policy of refusing to make primary endorsement. In 1959, Stu Spencer resigned as Recreation Director in Alhambra to take a job as Field Director for the Los Angeles County Republican Central Committee. Then, in 1960, Spencer and Roberts formed their public relations firm. And you might say Finch became something of an *ex officio* member of that firm, because whenever S and R wanted to manage a candidate, they would invariably go back into the same ball of wax—the moderate-liberal wing of the GOP—to field an organization. Where else? Finch and Nixon were sitting on top of it all.

Up to February of 1966, Reagan still had Goldwater's campaign squad in the districts. The original conservative advisory board was very much intact also. After February the advisory board of friends of Reagan was never called into a

strategy session again. All its members did after that was sit around and dream up ways to get rid of Spencer and Roberts.

On February 10, Spencer and Roberts announced the appointment of Phillip Battaglia as chairman over all of Southern California's five population-dense counties. No conservative had ever *heard* of Phillip Battaglia. One source mentioned that even GOP Assemblyman Frank Lanterman, who lived right in Battaglia's district, claimed that he didn't know who he was. His name was a complete mystery.

But the liberals knew him well. He was another background man out of the downtown Nixon-Finch ensemble with years of steadfast GOP service. Battaglia was a Pasadena-born graduate of Loyola High School, University of Southern California and USC Law School, who worked in the 1962 campaigns of Senator Thomas Kuchel and Vice President Richard Nixon. Active in the Los Angeles Junior Chamber of Commerce, he became its vice president in 1965. While in law school, Battaglia worked as a clerk in the Los Angeles law firm of Flint and McKay, later joining the firm as its youngest partner. He had two years in the Air Force and had known Reagan only a year and a half.

In one jump, he now had charge of the state's most conservative and politically-powerful section and eventually would be named state campaign chairman.

For the other 53 counties to to the north of the Tehachapi Mountains, Reagan installed a 32-year-old Marin County businessman, Tom Reed. Reagan had apparently grown a close association with Reed's father, Connecticut industrialist Gordon Reed, on an eastern tour years before.

Tom Reed was secretary of the Republican State Central Committee in California. He had once designed nuclear devices for the University of California's Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, then became active in investments and land development in the San Francisco Bay area and elsewhere, retaining a consultant job at the Radiation Laboratory. Reed had been an advance man for Barry Goldwater's campaign. He was later called up by Reagan to go to work after volunteering his services by mail.

Spencer and Roberts then left it up to Reed and Battaglia to fill in county campaign chairmen in their respective areas of the state. Forthwith, in came a new campaign team for the entire state: Gordon Luce for San Diego County (vice president of C. Arnholt Smith's Home Federal Savings and Loan). California's "hotbed of conservatism"—Orange County—

went to Dennis Carpenter, a moderate active for years on the state and county central committees. William Mazzie, another moderate and retired rancher from Bakersfield, got Kern County. For Los Angeles County, downtown attorney William French Smith, etc. With a sprinkling of onetime Goldwater delegates from 1964, the lot was composed of moderates all the way over to determined liberals.

Spencer and Roberts had found their cue and they were moving into high gear—with an all-new, basically non-conservative field organization. And behind most of it stood Robert Finch.

In Samuel Kipkind's view (*New Republic*, July 15, 1967), Reagan and Spencer and Roberts were in a frenzied search to tap the traditional, liberal sources of money and power and get them into the campaign as the large expenses and dimensions of the campaign became more apparent. But in the early days of the primary, "that same business bloc, and its political allies," avoided Reagan like poison. Meaning the big corporate managers, who

"... wanted expansion, government manipulation of the economy, labor peace, satisfied minorities and international tranquility, or at least low-cost hostility. In California, as elsewhere, most of the nationally-oriented economic forces had fallen in with the Johnson campaign." (*The New Republic*, July 15, 1965)

But Spencer and Roberts kept an open invitation to the moderate wing of the Party which laid the groundwork for at least a workable accommodation. The door was open. In addition, Reagan's stock was soaring while it was becoming clear Christopher would cancel out at an all-time low. As a number of Christopher's arch-liberal supporters (and early opponents of Reagan) put it later, "We all campaigned for Ronnie. Hell, the guy was going to win."

Hardly good enough.

In California, the liberals had poured into the general elections for "winning" conservatives before and split the party wide open to keep them out of office. What made them move toward unity beginning in March of 1966 had to be some other kind of indication or guarantee or bargain offer from the Reagan-Spencer-Roberts camp that Reagan was going to cave in. Either that, or the Reagan camp was so vulnerable that "Those with money and influence knew that if they joined Reagan early enough, they could ultimately direct

the course of his administration." (The *New Republic*, July 15, 1965)

Next to Reagan, Christopher was the gangly, knob-kneed kid whose baggies sailed to the sod halfway through the mile run, but here it was three-quarter time and he still hadn't discovered the problem. Then some boy genius from Los Angeles happened on a police mug shot of the milk man taken years back before he became mayor of San Francisco. The picture was lithographed and shipped all over California. Exit Christopher. Now better known than ever, he retired from the campaign, and probably from politics itself.

Going into early March, 1966, the whole picture in the districts began to shift. New faces appeared from everywhere, throwing parties and receptions, happily hoisting banners and handling campaign funds; people the conservatives in these same districts had never seen or heard of—except perhaps in some offbeat connection. With all of Los Angeles' six campaign districts under duly-authorized Republican conservative chairmen standing there, in right next to them came new chairmen and troops with official recognition from the downtown headquarters. The conservatives were stunned. Where did this place Reagan? Under full authority from Reagan, the liberals were raiding the conservative camp; a ploy as old as silent films.

Nothing so polite as a "drop dead" notice went out to the conservative district chairmen from Spencer and Roberts; no one was told in so many words to step aside. A raid doesn't work that way. Like the first Reagan advisory board, they were just quietly pre-empted. After all, the less noise the better; the conservatives are good precinct workers—the best, in fact. Spencer and Roberts needed them for the general election drive that was to follow.

Of course, some of these "displaced persons" didn't like it; they didn't like it at all. So, on the horn to Reagan to complain: "Who *are* these guys?" Or, "Do you *know* who Spencer and Roberts are sending out here to represent you?" and, "Is *this* what you're after?" and "These are Rockefeller people, avid Kuchel supporters, the hardcore liberal-left flank of the Republican Party, and you're *supposed* to be a conservative!"

From Reagan would come reassuring words: everything was O.K. He knew it was O.K. Spencer and Roberts had put a marvelous thing together and they came highly recommended from none other than Barry Goldwater. The cam-

paign couldn't be in better hands. Look how well we were doing, etc. etc. And Reagan would finish by referring them out to Phillip Battaglia or Tom Reed, and Reed and Battaglia would refer them out to the new county and district chairmen.

It was all over.

This was about the time Nancy Reagan was politely asked at the San Diego County Central Committee meeting if Ronald knew the caliber of people he was allowing to form around him. And she, in stark innocence, turned a patronizing gaze upward like an insulted bride and said: "Are you questioning Ronny's integrity?"

The wiser few just faded to the rear in March of 1966, knowing Reagan could not take favors from the liberals without paying off. Big liberal money and manpower and political influence were on their way in, and the liberals were there in the districts to safeguard the investment. They would finish up with the best appointments—and they did, for that was their price—as it always is—for services rendered. It's called patronage. The "hat-in-hand" delegations? They were at least six months overdue. Possibly even a year.

Reliable sources in the Republican Party sized Tom Reed up as a good conservative. Not only did this opinion reflect oddly on the campaign shakeup after March of 1966, but even more so on the appointments, which were Reed's responsibility for the first four months of the Reagan administration later on.

As a Reagan campaign chairman, Reed followed the Spencer-Roberts formula of closing the door to active conservatives in order to attract more of the party's liberal wing, a policy which became boldly evident in both campaigning and job selection.

At the same time, however, he claimed he ignored the traditional GOP lines which radiate from San Francisco outward in fielding his campaign troops. Instead, he told reporters for the *San Jose Mercury* (April 21, 1967), he started in the other Bay Area counties plus the San Joaquin Valley and worked inward, using what he called the "Mao Tse Tung approach" of capturing first the countryside, then the cities. But from the personalities who eventually appeared at the center of the Reagan campaign, it seemed to end up the same way.

As appointments secretary starting in December 1966, Reed emphasized ability, integrity, and philosophic harmony

with the governor as the basic criteria by which the 25 department heads were selected. For the next 100 top jobs below this level, he conceded that "We had lots of political payoffs," where "political realism" intruded on Reagan's philosophy.

With an average age of 40, nearly one-fifth of the first 100 were from minority ethnic groups, among them 9 Mexican-Americans, 7 Negroes (which after Reed's departure reached 17), 2 Chinese and 1 Japanese. Named as Director of Veterans Affairs, for example, was James Johnson, whom Reed claimed was the first Negro to head a California department. Most appointments were taken from the big cities.

In April of 1967, Tom Reed stepped into the national picture to begin laying the groundwork in other states for Reagan's entry into the 1968 presidential drive. There, he would apply much the same technique in the selection of delegates to the Miami convention as he had toward his appointments in California. Taking his place was a 35-year old San Francisco lawyer named Paul Haerle, who had worked closely with Reed during the gubernatorial campaign.

With Reed as advance-man, the whole scene shifted. Reagan soon followed Reed out of state on a nationwide speaking tour and began to pull farther away from Lt. Gov. Robert Finch. Observers in California took this to mean that he was stepping into thin air by abandoning the only power base (Nixon's) he had left (the first to go were the conservatives).

Instead, subsequent events indicate that both he and Reed started to work that early to align themselves with Clifton White's national public relations force—the successful part of Barry Goldwater's campaign; the team Goldwater dumped in August of 1964. The suggestion is strengthened by Reagan's appointment of three men to his Sacramento staff early in 1967, whom reports indicate are his links to the Syndicate (See Appendix): Rus Walton, Lyn Nofziger, and Ned Hutchinson. By the end of the year, these three would number among the few with any really close association with the governor. Speculation varies as to how far back the Syndicate had its arm in the Reagan campaign. Some maintain that Reagan was the handpicked—by proxy—candidate of Clifton White from the very beginning. But there is nothing concrete to support it.

With his foot already in the 1968 campaign, however, Reagan had to field a campaign force somewhere. He made no motions toward Nixon, and his separation from Finch indicated that none would be forthcoming. That left Clifton

White, who had the only other formidable nationwide structure in the GOP. Tom Reed's bee-line dive into Texas—a strong Syndicate state—also suggested that Reagan was tapping White's organization. When Texas Senator John Tower, himself regarded as pro-Syndicate, turned down a job with Richard Nixon to line up with the Reagan campaign, heads nodded in agreement: it was going to be a Syndicate operation. All doubts vanished in mid-February, 1968, with the retention of Clifton White as national consultant to the Reagan-for-President campaign.

Calling themselves "responsible Republicans," ("Syndicate" is a term coined by their conservative opposition), Clifton White and Associates have a philosophy and a system, all of which is covered in the Appendix. If the proof were there, this system would explain almost all of Reagan's reverses since entering office, his ovations to the liberals, his backdown on key bills, his liberal-to-left appointments, and his phase-out of ideologically-motivated conservatives.

Short of that, the appearance of the Syndicate at the forefront of the Reagan campaign offers a near-blueprint of the future. And the organization is well worth the healthy examination of all Republicans for whom the GOP once served as a potential vehicle for idealistic progress of any kind.

Reagan won over Brown by a cool million votes. Patrick raked in only a small percentage, but made his point later on, for whatever it would be worth. He had seen the change coming a year in advance while roaming the country gathering the makings of his own campaign, hearing things others weren't hearing, and facing the wall of anti-conservative maneuvers working their way down through official Republican channels such as the state central committee.

Usually taken as a healthy impulse in politics—and particularly within conservatism—Patrick's minority voice won him no additional laurels just when the moderates were starting to chant for "party unity." But the best was yet to come. Four months later—as if setting an example for all abstainers—Reagan's Democratic attorney general, Tom Lynch, would place Patrick's expanding business up for tribute. And Patrick would discover city hall the hard way.

Now, the proper "out" for the conservatives at this point was to break out in wild laughter, throw their arms around each other merrily, and shout, "Look, men, we've been HAD! Yipppeeee!" And pour the beer (Near Beer) and serve the pizza and dance like it was New Year's Eve. Then rush out to

congratulate the liberals and either join up with the new Reagan groundswell knowing what it was, or retreat sportsmanlike and re-group for another campaign.

But no. They're still talking about *their* man in Sacramento. This is not the place to debate whether Reagan the individual is or is not a conservative. He has been painted into a corner—a liberal GOP army in front of him and a liberal Democrat army in back of him—and *he cannot deliver in that position*. The conservatives? They talk about how well they are suddenly able to get along with the liberals, and “Will ya just not muddy the waters, fella?” The same liberals they spent four grueling years trying to purge from the GOP. One whole new organization: United Republicans of California (UROC) came into being in 1963 at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars *precisely* to break free of the very elements its members are now holding hands with and calling it “fine.” Because they think they've sold the liberals on *their* man?

So I'll say it for them: Dick Nixon, *congratulations!*

The liberals, in the meantime, are more than willing to let the conservatives bask in Reagan's superlative speeches as long as his administration makes no change in the forward march of Big Government. And, next to this, you can't conceive of a worse predicament. Unless it is the duplication of this pattern on a more expanded scale during the upcoming 1968 elections.

Spencer and Roberts did not win the campaign by changing Ronald Reagan's image; his conservative image is the best weapon he has. They did it by changing—or allowing to be changed—his political organization. And in that single act, they may have changed the course of his entire political career.

End of theory.

RONALD REAGAN

"It is to deny what the history of the world tells us is true, to suppose that men of ambition and talents will not continue to spring up among us. And when they do, they will as naturally seek the gratification of their ruling passion as others have done before them.

"The question then is: can that gratification be found in supporting and maintaining an edifice that has been erected by others?

"Most certainly it cannot."

—Abraham Lincoln
1837

The Consiberal Republicrat

From the beginning, Reagan's tender years in the GOP made him extremely vulnerable to control by those who could command organized loyalty. When it came to the liberals, his answer would be: "They're buying my philosophy, I'm not buying theirs." A good answer, but really a bit naive. Once in the saddle, the liberals would do everything in their power to play down the very weaknesses in Reagan's strategy which gave them command of his movements. Hence Leland Kaiser's remark in the Los Angeles *Times* Sunday supplement, *West Magazine*, on April 23, 1967, "There's one boss—and that's Reagan. Nobody is controlling *him*."

If Kaiser's statement held a grain of truth, then Reagan's position on the legislation, the conservatives, and all his reversals must be considered strictly his own doing, those of a *conscious* liberal with a pattern of deliberate lying.

It is far more likely that Reagan's frantic search for a national power base of known strength—the expected course for an intelligent politician—compromised his ideology one month after entering office.

Up to Sacramento he rode on his white horse, like D'Artagnan, with grand visions of pulling the state government into his bosom and inaugurating sweeping reform. Who wouldn't imagine he possessed quasi-ephemeral powers after salting away a cool million-vote margin against Pat Brown? Thought he: "Man, this is going to be a *breeze*."

The flaw: Reagan didn't know how to ride. The horse went one way, he another. His first glimpse of the power structure in California—such as the lobbies—reversed all his theories and turned his starched underwear burnt umber. Organized labor builds the new campus or freeway or state facility; private contractors supply the materials—steel, concrete, paving, paint, fleets of trucks and machinery; electronics firms produce the computer systems, plumbing fixtures, school supplies; pharmaceutical companies provide medical stores; insurance companies, banks, and labor organizations finance the projects through bonds; power and light companies supply the electrical equipment. Reagan's economy drive brought him up foursquare against a wall of private industry actively promoting government expansion in the interest of private profit. Since 1932, government has become industry's largest customer.

Either Reagan did not understand the power structure, or, with the voters behind him, he thought he could mount it alongside his other butterflies by pulling levers. Not so. With a Democratic-controlled legislature in front of him and a liberal-dominated GOP administration behind him, he just caved in.

Lost in the middle of the Atlantic without a life preserver, the liberals were generous and threw him one and they can take it away anytime. That is why, in intermittent press interviews, and without the aid of prepared script, he sounds like porky pig, fights for appropriate answers, and looks down at his Florsheims as though he had it all there in code right on the toe. Reagan has aged terribly since he entered office, and the unnatural pose he is trying to strike between words and actions may have a lot to do with it.

In the first Reagan year, the right-left struggle within the Republican Party has retreated back to middle vs left with the conservatives more isolated than they were before. Reagan adopted a straight Democratic program which involved *more*

than Pat Brown could ever have gotten away with, precisely because he was a Republican. None but a Republican could have lined up the Republican side of the legislature for those bills.

Consequently, liberal power has increased under a Reagan administration, not decreased, and if allowed to expand, Reagan may become the best salesman the socialist movement ever had. Around a liberal base, he is lining up millions of conservative votes for the 1968 race right now. Or, in Samuel Kopkind's words, "... his main function is to disarm his troops by adopting their words but never giving them the goods." (*New Republic*, July 15, 1967).

So the conservatives like him for his words, the liberals like him for his actions. Quite a combination. Except that in politics, performance is all there is. Reagan's conservatism—measured in actions—consists not of repealing or amending the Democrats' program, but of consolidating and merging what the Democrats created, then making it "economically workable." Serious cutbacks occur only in order to *save* a Democratic program headed for certain destruction. *When* they occur. Should this become a national pattern in 1968 and beyond, America will go the last mile into socialism under the Republican label. And, it will be sold *as conservatism*; and the most disconsolate thought of all: *by the conservatives*, brought in by one of their own to support a liberal running mate—such as Nelson Rockefeller. If this is the shape of 1968, they will go for broke in the support of principles they have spent half their lives—some of them—trying to destroy and will compromise their own political morality in the process.

Before declaring for the governor's race, Ronald Reagan had been a Republican just over four years. And a great furor arose from certain Republicans at the sight of the conservatives throwing all caution to the winds to endorse without at least some introspection a lifelong Democrat with many qualified Republicans on hand whose position was known. Even the timing and circumstances centering about his change of registration would have aroused some speculation among rational people, but it never did. Reagan became a Republican to work in the U.S. Senate campaign of Los Angeles attorney Lloyd Wright (a conservative) the same day Wright stepped into the 1962 primary race against another conservative from Los Angeles—and the leading Republican contender—Howard Jarvis. Jarvis was on his way

to a victory over incumbent Senator Thomas N. Kuchel, an out-and-out radical, whom the dominant conservative faction in California was anxious to replace. Wright's candidacy did nothing more than split the conservative vote behind Jarvis and allow Kuchel to walk through the middle with a united liberal vote and back to Washington.

This year, an almost identical set of circumstances prevails with Kuchel again up for re-election against a conservative, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Dr. Max Rafferty. Reagan looked like he would throw early support to Kuchel, then decided to declare his neutrality in February of 1968 due to mounting conservative objections. But theoretically, Reagan could still support another conservative against Rafferty, split the conservative vote against Kuchel as in 1962, and still go on record as supporting the conservative, rather than the liberal, candidate. Or he can make life uncomfortable enough for Rafferty within the state government, cut off the money ("It is difficult to raise money this year," announced Rafferty, "because most of the Republican Party's big campaign donors are holding their cash for a Reagan-for-President drive") (San Francisco *Examiner*, June 16, 1967), support a conservative against him when Dr. Rafferty is up for re-election, or simply *not* throw support his way, to give Rafferty cause to reconsider his candidacy. For months, the daily news columns reported mutual accord and great friendship on the rise between Reagan and Kuchel.

Conservatives around the state were waiting for this to happen. Then, it came. On February 19, after resigning his post as Reagan's state finance director several days before, Gordon P. Smith was tapped to enter the U.S. Senate race against Tom Kuchel. The pretense: Rafferty couldn't win against the Senate incumbent. To the contrary, Rafferty happened to be the overwhelming popular choice of the Republican Party in California against the almost mutually-despised Kuchel. That is, providing another candidate were not deliberately thrown into the action to divide the conservatives. Smith is running against Rafferty, not Kuchel. Should he stay in the race, he is Gov. Reagan's stalking horse this year.

Earlier, Reagan admonished the Republican volunteer organizations in California not to become involved in a primary battle when "party unity" was so badly needed this year. Which was his way of telling them to swallow their hatred of

Kuchel and not force him—Reagan—into some form of punitive action against them.

Kuchel's re-election, in the meantime, would repudiate the GOP volunteer organizations in California, dominated, as they are, by conservatives. Until Reagan's neutrality decision they were placed in the position of having to go along with Reagan and compromise their ideology, or put a conservative into the race against Kuchel and become the "divisive element" in the Republican Party. When by his actions, Reagan himself has become the Party's single, most divisive element.

Reagan's tacit strength seems to lie in his ability not to deliver liberals to conservative causes, but to neutralize conservative strength for the final victory of key liberals and still end up on the conservative side. He gets away with this because a number of lesser liberals always seem to be sacrificed along the way to achieve an overall goal. When Reagan threw State Senate seniority overboard and with it San Francisco's liberal Sen. Eugene McAteer (a Democrat), both Democrats and conservative members of his own Republican Party were the victims. Senate and Assembly liaison went to Republican liberals. Moves like this cost Reagan dearly in legislation. They would test his ability to hold the members of his own party together in the legislature, and even question his leadership of the Republican Party in California.

On the opening day of the 1968 legislative session, Reagan threw his support to Donald Grunsky for speaker pro-tem of the Senate over McCarthy, who had seniority, then couldn't seem to come up with the votes to produce a victory. The Senate count was 20 Republicans to 20 Democrats. It wasn't even a contest; 40% of the Republicans pulled out on Reagan—including two conservatives—and cast their votes for the Democratic speaker, Sen. Hugh Burns.

It took 21 votes to produce a victory. In case of a 20-20 tie, the Lieutenant Governor, Republican Robert Finch, could cast the deciding vote. But he couldn't vote *without* a tie. Unless the Democrats got some reasonable deal out of Reagan, they would hold one Democratic vote out of the count and prevent a tie from occurring. At the same time, Republicans with something to lose would go over to the Democratic side in the absence of firm guarantees from Reagan knowing they would probably get better protection from the other party under conservative Democrat Hugh Burns.

McCarthy was one of these. Not only did he have seniority over Grunsky for the speaker's job, but he was a member of

the powerful Rules Committee and had the Republicans won, Grunsky would have had his Rules Committee position as well. San Diego's Senator Jack Schrade, a conservative, also sat on the Rules Committee. In a Republican victory, Schrade also risked his Committee post as implied by Reagan's support for the moderate Grunsky. So to protect himself, he too voted for Burns. The meaning was clear: The Democrats had party discipline, Reagan none.

The deal between Reagan and Grunsky had actually been set months before. At the witching hour, Reagan did not stand a chance of capturing the Senate on the first day of the session without a whole new plan. He was merely going through idle motions. But then, the coup de grace. As though Republican unity had been within his grasp—which it wasn't—Reagan called five of the dissenting Republicans to a special meeting (minus Schrade and McCarthy). The purpose: To show the rest of the legislature that he had Republican unity in spite of everything. Beyond its questionable value as a sob-session, the meeting was without value other than to isolate McCarthy for fading out early and merely pointed an accusing finger at Reagan's astounding lack of diplomatic verve. Two showed up—Schrade and Cusanovitch. Leader of the Senate conservatives, John Schmitz, would not even consider it, nor would San Francisco's liberal freshman Senator Milton Marks. And for these two, Reagan had separate names a dimension or two beyond S. O. B. and definitely unprintable. Which made him look even more childish in the eyes of the legislature.

McCarthy and the other seven Republicans had told Reagan that they might conceivably go with him if it weren't obvious that the Democrats were going to hold one man out of the voting and produce a stalemate. They could either get one Democrat to come over—which was impossible, or submit to a deadlock, or let the Democrats organize the Senate. They chose the last, after agreeing that a deadlock would produce nothing. So although party unity was not really the issue, Reagan hung the yoke of disunity around them.

One of the first things they teach new men in Sacramento is how to count. Both Schrade and Cusanovitch had told Reagan to stay out of the Senate race because it would destroy his bi-partisanship—which it did.

Before that, his backing of Monagan (a liberal) over Badham (a conservative) for Assembly minority leader, plus the liberal four-man Senate and Assembly liaison committees

helped to alienate the conservatives. Whether Reagan was spoiling for major setbacks since entering office, whether he acted out of bravado or to tell the world of the great yawning chasm which divides his lack of political savvy from the charismatic quality of his speeches is not immediately clear. But contrary to national news which continues to groom him for the 1968 presidential race, a succession of such events had merely added a long string of lead bobs to his poll ratings in California.

In his first-year maypole dance with Assembly boss Jesse Unruh, Reagan told his Republicans to gang up in areas where they had no chance of victory, instead of using what leverage he did have to produce realizable gains. His principal weapons were the veto and threat of veto. A special five-day session in September, held to test the legislators' power to override the governor's blue pencil privilege, failed. They couldn't do it. Reagan had the votes in the legislature to sustain him. But the blue pencil was never used against the Democrats on any of the really big issues of the 1967 legislature.

The Democrats would tell you openly after July of 1967 that they could not have gotten either a budget or tax increase in 1967 with a Democrat, Pat Brown, at the helm. They had to have a Republican because the Republicans in the legislature would not otherwise have gone along. They got Reagan. And Reagan lined up the votes, with the kind of "do-or-die" pressure you would have expected to see him apply in precisely the other direction. And the question is, if he would go to such lengths to whip the Republicans into line for a \$1 billion tax increase in Sacramento, why won't he do it in Washington? Why won't he work just as hard to throw the conservatives who trust him behind *any* major liberal program?

In those early "meet-the-candidate" sessions with the conservatives in 1965, Reagan was apprised by knowledgeable men to appoint his finance chairman immediately after his gubernatorial victory in order to have four whole months to study the state's fiscal problems and come up with a realistic budget and tax program in line with his platform goals.

Ronald Reagan cannot plead bad advice, nor can his apologists plead it for him on legitimate grounds. He has had the best advice from the very beginning on everything from budget problems to how to deal with the legislature, on

specific moves and counter-moves. Good advice came at him like a windfall throughout 1966 and 1967. With plenty of time to evaluate its merit, he made his own decisions and went on. He continues to get expert advice everyday; from both sides. He knows it is there and where to find more. He cannot help but understand the basic argument or conflict of interest involved. In California, there is no longer any doubt over the matter: he is taking the counsel he wants entirely on his own volition. And California government sinks deeper than ever into the total state.

The argument that Reagan hasn't had time is another weak reed bending in the gentle breeze of contradictory evidence. In 1967, he used over half of that time touring the country on speaking and fund-raising events while "not running" for president. For a new man, these were the months of apprenticeship he should have spent in California learning the mechanics of his trade—if time, rather than desire, were his real interest. Even at that, he had time not to let the second year become a repetition of the first. But it is.

Nor are any of Reagan's critics necessarily prejudiced by merely taking stock of the first year. The more objective of them are Republicans seeking clear statistics in the interest of their party. All of them want a good governor in California who reflects true majority interests. Most of them both understand and appreciate the value of party unity. But not at the expense of turning the GOP into a Siamese twin of the Democratic Party. That kind of victory is a defeat by any other name. The compromise of principle for party reaches a point of diminishing returns beyond which the whole purpose for which the party was originally sought as a vehicle for better government ceases to exist. For both ideological camps, their departure at this point is not radical, but logical. Party unity is only commensurate with the realization of a *minimum political dividend*. Beyond that, they must withdraw or change their method of operation.

Is it any different in the day-to-day business world? When an investment ceases to draw interest, it is no longer an investment, but a liability.

On the biggest single issue of the year—open housing—Reagan had a 2-to-1 majority mandate from the people of California behind him to work for repeal, left over from the statewide Proposition 13 drive of 1964. Part, if not most, of his popularity *stemmed* from his promise to throw out the

Rumford open housing law and million of voters assumed that he meant what he said. He had liberals, tens of thousands of Negroes, almost anyone who owned property or dealt in real estate or rental property, and he had the votes in the legislature, both Democrats and Republicans.

Instead, when it got down to the test, he would *not* work for repeal. Republicans in both houses were mad at him, he alienated the conservatives and real estate groups, stunned the Republican volunteer organizations, and left the voters with the task of finding another candidate who would reflect their interests. A legislative aid to Reagan indicated to conservatives in the legislature that Reagan was going to come up with his own repeal bill. So everyone relaxed. Reagan later denied any knowledge of it. So Sen. John Schmitz went ahead with the repeal bill he had already prepared. Then on April 2, 1968, Reagan announced to the state that he would veto *any* repeal bill. This left the voters no alternative but to launch another statewide initiative. A ballot issue, of course, would signify nothing less than a direct public move against the governor, from which Reagan would probably never regain his popularity.

But the generally-held assumption that Reagan ever really favored full open housing repeal or was with the public in spirit on this issue may have been in error from the beginning. You gain quite another impression from his actions and statements. On the subject of discrimination, Ronald Reagan is a highly emotional man—almost as emotional as when he said in his book, “. . . I was a near-hopeless hemophilic liberal. I bled for ‘causes’ . . .” Too emotional, perhaps, to be able to give Americans back their property rights, unless a prospective loss of votes requires a concession.

You will find that Reagan suffers what is known as a conflict of interest over the civil rights issue—a fairly common ailment among those with either little knowledge of the civil rights granted under the Constitution—or little concern, one or the other. Talk of free choice, property rights and all-white districts—things that have been with America for over 400 years—since 1954 bring hostility from Negroes in government departments, pressure from Washington, and bad publicity from civil rights leaders and other minorities.

A political leader who stands with the majority risks verbal assault from the organized pressure groups. They will brand him a “racist” and hurl the hackneyed “bigotry” argument at

him; a meaningless psychological puff-bomb especially designed to make meek and tender politicians cave in on the property rights section of the U.S. Constitution.

Taking for granted Reagan understands the inseparability of property and individual rights to begin with, he would answer these worthless barbs as he did at the University of California in 1964:

"I believe it (the 1964 Civil Rights Bill) was not as well written as it could have been. But I've been heart and soul all my life, active in promoting the goals of that Act.

"I have repeatedly said that where the constitutional rights of citizens are violated for any reason, it is the responsibility of government, at bayonet point if necessary, to enforce those rights." (Los Angeles *Times*, March 12, 1966.)

Little Rock? Oxford? Birmingham? In the same talk at Boalt Law School, Reagan added that he would not patronize a businessman who practiced discrimination. Similarly, his father once refused to sleep in a hotel one night because the clerk informed him they didn't permit Jews. Mr. Reagan, of course, spent the night in his car, in the cold and snow, and ended up with pneumonia.

"REAGAN WOULD PROTECT RIGHTS WITH BAYONETS," ran the headline of the Sacramento *Bee* on October 21, 1965, following Reagan's address the night before to the San Francisco Bay Area Republican Alliance. He said it again on March 3, 1968, this time on national television. The event: William F. Buckley's very own interview program, *Firing Line*. During the gubernatorial campaign, Reagan appeared with his primary opponents, George Christopher and William Penn Patrick, before a Santa Monica convention of California Negro Republicans. After quietly waiting his turn to speak, he jumped out of his chair full of indignance when a suggestion of "racist leanings" came his way, and said hotly:

"I've suffered in silence through this campaign. I have said in public—when someone's constitutional rights are imposed upon, the government should defend them at the point of a bayonet if necessary." (Oakland *Tribune*, March 6, 1966)

And out of the auditorium he stormed, his voice cracking with emotion. Said the Los Angeles *Times* the next day:

"As Reagan left the room, newsmen standing nearby said they heard Reagan mutter as he slapped a clenched fist into his palm, 'I'll get that S. O. B.'"

"But they said they did not know to whom Reagan was referring."

The story in the *Oakland Tribune* the following morning carried this headline: "BIGOT HINT STIRS TEARS BY REAGAN" as Reagan attributed his outburst to "demagogic inference by two other Republican candidates 'that I was a racist or a bigot.'"

"There is no single thing I detest more than bigotry and to have this charge directed at me was more than I felt I had to take."

This places Reagan in a considerably changed position; to say the least, a tight one. He takes the minority view—the 15% minority—at a time when the American majority is mad enough about civil rights pressures to bring on a second U.S. Civil War. There are moral arguments on *both* sides of the spectrum. But barring morality, Reagan's approach is as unstrategic as it can be for a political figure with high ambitions. And, right or wrong, the Republican Party goes with him. Romney, Rockefeller, Percy and the others are all in there, sharing a "moral conscience" that is about to become a suicide pact for the Republican Party. This, with the example of a dis-united Democratic Party standing right before their eyes.

Moreover, the question of "constitutional rights" rests largely on who was sitting on the U.S. Supreme Court before and after 1954. If federal bayonets figure in any way in Reagan's political future, he should be made to answer in no uncertain terms on behalf of whose law he plans to use them *before* America goes to the polls.

Taken at face value, he will call out the troops to support the principles of the 1964 Civil Rights Law, as Eisenhower did at Little Rock and Jack Kennedy at Oxford. And if his convictions are this strong on the matter, there is serious question whether his emotionalism does not compromise his promise to give Americans back their property rights or even administer the law in the public interest.

In California, Reagan knows the will of the voters. And California will not tolerate the use of troops to back up the principles of the 1964 Civil Rights Law.

The conservative-dominated GOP volunteer groups in California represent minority opposition to any unforeseen attempt to mold "party unity" around a liberal campaign drive or running partner. Steps are therefore under way at this time to subdue their power. For president of the National Federation of Republican Women (Washington, D. C. 1967), Reagan's moral support reportedly went with the liberal, Mrs. Gladys O'Donnell, who went on to win a contested election over Mrs. Phyllis Schlafly, conservative from Alton, Illinois. This was a Syndicate operation all the way. Back in the California chapter of the NFRW, a conservative named Angela Lombardy then took the chair away from a liberal to give Reagan one more hurdle to cross. Mrs. Lombardy and 9 other conservatives (among them this year's *outgoing* presidents of the volunteer groups) were automatically named as delegates to the 1968 Republican convention (along with 28 liberals). But for the privilege of going to Miami, they are under *written oath* to vote the way Reagan tells them to unless released. And at this stage, it is anybody's guess what his decision will be.

Party Unity

"Thou shalt not speak ill of any Republican," said a bard one day and his flock doth kneel, and although rocks did tear their woolies and his damp earth doth wetten their loins, they did respond in unison upon him: 'Amen, Father Parkinson, we're with you, baby.' "

Dr. Gaylord Parkinson, former chairman of the Republican State Central Committee in 1967, did actually have the gall to graft biblical paraphrase onto his attack on the minority GOP opposition last year, as though free thought was now a Midas' revenge against the good queen Lollipop. And, behold! the Eleventh Commandment was born. On a stack of comic books, *that* is the child's name! The phrase is so gross and bad all by its lonesome that it, alone, is enough to ruin Republican chances this year.

In simpler words, what Parky was trying to say was, "Now that we've got your man, you heathen have no *right* to attack him." Imagine a worse calamity for the party of integrity and protest against Democratic collectivism. Doubly insulting, actually, because the thing was headed straight for the conservatives now that the Sacramento crown jewels had been taken

away from *their* candidate and plopped in the lap of the liberals. And the conservatives *aren't* the ones who split the party down the middle over a member of the opposition.

"Party unity this year, please you guys," would have been enough. No mystic rites; no incantations or blood oaths. Just a nice, honest plea, to wit: Look, we sandbagged your man; he's ours. Now why not take it like good sports and help us win an election?

As it stands, the Eleventh Commandment comes as something of a holy writ for thieves. It is the moderate's appeal for party unity around a "broad middleground," a rehash of the Eisenhower years with a new face, an old formula, and the same consequences. Spencer, Roberts and Finch applied a modified Eleventh Commandment in their "center-left" shift for Ronald Reagan in 1966. The GOP has an identical problem coming up in '68: how to give the liberals enough control to keep them from splitting the party during the general elections. Therefore, you *could* say "party unity" was tribute paid to the most disruptive elements in the GOP. But that is beside the point. Party unity is everybody's legitimate dream, providing your platform has not been vampirized during the first legislative year.

William Penn Patrick, the cosmetics manufacturer from San Rafael, bowed out of the 1966 gubernatorial primaries with the smallest number of votes. But he was far from through. Come 1967, Patrick was back again, this time as a 1968 primary contender against U.S. Senator Tom Kuchel and Dr. Max Rafferty. If Reagan were going to throw his weight to Kuchel, this suited him (Reagan) fine. Because Patrick would merely split off more of the conservative vote that would go for Rafferty, however small. Patrick was through with Reagan. His frequent speeches and TV appearances were becoming an embarrassment, with statements like:

"I felt that Reagan could be the chief executive of the largest corporation in the West, that he could handle this complex organization, appoint equally dedicated and sincere people to responsible positions, and steer California back to the sunny land of fiscal sanity and solvency.

"Instead, Ronald Reagan started his administration with appointments of many of the same political hacks that occupied the previous line of thinking held in tow by the Brown line. He made claims he couldn't back, then backed down on having made the claims at all."

But then Patrick announced his withdrawal from the Senate campaign. He was going in behind Max Rafferty and forthwith offered his pledge of \$300,000 to Rafferty's campaign. This put Reagan on the spot and blew his "party unity" plan sky high (for the time being). All he could do was sit on his hands when every conservative in the state expected him to throw his support to Rafferty. His failure to do so made the case for a Reagan-Kuchel alliance all the more plausible. Now, it was up to Reagan to either get Rafferty out of the way or come up with another conservative to jump into the primary race and divide the conservatives all over again. Reagan had strong words for Patrick. And Patrick toured the state with words for Reagan:

"... in the true American fashion of punishing friends and rewarding enemies, Reagan, as Governor of California, has seen fit to support Senator Kuchel's re-election, against the efforts of Dr. Max Rafferty. Where's the party loyalty? Those that step out for Dr. Max are now called the 'disruptors' by the Party leaders, the more liberal of the Reagan cliff hangers."

Although Patrick may have made the right move, his timing was less opportune, for it made him vulnerable at a time when there were no campaign laurels to be won and set him up for retaliatory measures that were certain to come—and did.

Two months before, Patrick entered into a recall movement against Idaho Senator Frank Church which brought on the AFL-CIO in Church's defense in a boycott against Patrick's Holiday Magic Cosmetics line. Patrick sued the AFL-CIO for \$50 million alleging secondary boycott, which is a federal offense.

The next day, Patrick offered \$5000 to Dr. Max Rafferty and \$300,000 in pledges which he said he would ask his contributors to transfer to the Rafferty campaign. Shortly thereafter, Attorney General Thomas Lynch, a Democrat, slapped a judgment on Patrick's company. Lynch's action concerned the sale of wholesale supplies by Holiday Magic's general distributors in the field. He offered Patrick the choice of going to court, which would probably involve a cease-and-desist order on all of Patrick's production during the term of trial, or paying up \$30,000 to the State of California. In order to keep producing, Patrick chose the latter.

Although the two incidents were divorced as to nature, they involved curious timing between the Senate primary issue and the ease with which the AFL-CIO seemed to be able to use the State government as a free thoroughfare against individuals who dared to cross Reagan's path. This, at least, was the implication even though Lynch had no special love for Reagan. Doubly so, considering that Patrick was a Republican and a conservative, as Reagan also professed to be. But more to the point, if there was a tie-in, its partisan flavor could hardly be overlooked when measured against the "party unity" Reagan was going to such great lengths to emphasize.

Even on its face, "party unity" is a highly deceptive phrase. It is bound to have a political sequel which must be analyzed in terms of this year's candidates and those behind them; and second, it is an attempt to confuse a behavioral trait—fair play—with a political objective. Compromise, brotherhood, fair play: all moderate, hence desirable, characteristics. And the moderate becomes the only one capable of uniting all the divided sides of the party. He will bid for the middleground (majority) which cannot be formed without eliminating the extremes. And the extremes are those who will not buy the Democrats' program under the Republican label.

Don't confuse behavioral traits with radical objectives in government. The two won't balance out. Would you let Bing Crosby—one of the nicest guys on Earth—take 90% of your paycheck for the government while singing "Hold My Hand?" If you would, you have a disease for which there may be no cure. Ronald Reagan's eloquent, patriotic speeches, stay-pressed suits, and a verve and dash *can't put an acceptable face on socialism*. And it might even be stretching the point prematurely to suggest that this is what they're going to try and spring on the American people this year.

I don't really think it started out this way in Reagan's mind, and if he knew where it had to end, he'd grow wings and fly back to Pacific Palisades.

People mistakenly accept the moderate's appeal for "party unity" as a change of pace—in other words, *reform*—from the current administration, handled by men of sane temperament. But when you get through waiting for it, you would take political reform from a herd of buffalo just to get delivery.

Moderates are already in the liberal flank, politically; an affirmation of a position arrived at by the Democrats the

previous four years, otherwise they would never be allowed a victory by the side that splits the ticket. And in the liberal-left end, you have: (1) leftwing ideologues, (2) big money backers, industrial trusts, syndicates, and (3) organized minorities. Neither moderates nor liberals can put in reforms against this combination and they never have. The word "middleground," is a standing lie intended to deceive: well-dressed, well-behaved Republican moderates running the same political extortion racket in out-of-season years.

America is offered the choice between government of limited powers and the corporate state. One is a nation, the other an empire. And to create an empire, the liberal-left flank would destroy a nation. Between them, there is no fixed "middleground," just a state of fluidity moving in either direction.

Conservatives remain the minority political voice, even though theirs is the voice of the social and economic majority, first, by having failed to discover how to make nationalism pay, and second, because they really aren't in politics at all. Yet, if the one-party enthusiasts could eliminate conservatism altogether as an idealistic factor, we would *be* in socialism.

Reagan is popular because he is *talking* reform, not moderation. Moderation is not popular across the nation anymore. Hence, neither is the "middleground." Lower taxes, budget curbs, debt ceilings, less foreign aid giveaways, immigration control, property rights (e.g. an end to open housing), tariffs to protect American labor and investors, the free market, less government controls everywhere, fewer green-eared civil servants sticking their noses into American private lives, more individual freedom, the patriotism of our Founding Fathers, etc., etc.) This is not the far right, but the government of limited powers which the pressure groups are *calling* the far right because it stands in the way of empire. Even at that, Reagan gains in popularity because people *think* he is going to restore precisely these political attributes. The rest is the personality cult that makes up the Republican Party.

There can never be "reform," in the sense of a wholesale departure from present welfare policies, without a *change of concept*. Whether Reagan ever really embraced the political principles normally associated with the conservative platform is up for debate. It is merely implied in his speeches on economy and individualism, and when he strikes out at Democratic controls. Instead, the most Reagan or any of his

close aids seem genuinely interested in achieving is *fiscal reform*, which is then allowed to *suffice* as a change of concept.

Once subsidization has been accepted as a legitimate function of government, the elimination of waste from programs like Medi-Cal becomes impossible. Moreover, without a change of concept, even fiscal reform is impossible. In Reagan's case, the problem was compounded by his failure to surround himself with the kind of men who would stand their ground for genuine reform against the roar of the liberals. And after committing his administration to reform, he refused to stand behind the few he had.

Words are *words*, nothing more. The liberals have Reagan locked in (at least for the time being) and "reform" will finish up as Democratic expansionism, just as under the Eisenhower years. Even FDR began as a conservative in 1932. Just go back and read his speeches.

That is the full meaning of "party unity" this year. As for Gaylord Parkinson, after winning partial fame as author of the "Eleventh Commandment," he followed a somewhat devious route out of circulation. Parky first tried to go to work for Governor George Romney as chairman of the Romney for President campaign for 13 western states. But he wanted too much money—\$36,000 per year for 23 months. While Romney's astonished political aids thought the matter through and got set for a counter-offer, Parkinson changed fields and wound up two months later in New York as chairman of the Nixon-for-President National Committee. (*Evans and Novak*, May 4, 1967).

Earlier, the San Diego *Union* had leaked a nasty rumor that while serving as chairman of the California Republican State Central Committee, Parkinson took money from the Reagan campaign for which implied endorsement went to Reagan during the primary struggle against Christopher. The charge was made by C. M. Gillis, former Governor Goodwin Knight's state public works director. Gillis said Parkinson had received over \$30,000 from a slush fund set up by Reagan supporters. (San Diego *Union*, September 26, 1966) Parkinson admitted the slush fund, but denied it was a payoff to use his office to back Reagan. Instead, he said the money was simply reimbursement for earlier personal expenditures.

But when the news got to Nixon's New York headquarters,

Parkinson's wife suddenly took ill, forcing him to resign and return to California.

When Reagan hired Spencer and Roberts in June of 1965 and Joseph Shell pulled out of the contest William Penn Patrick then made sounds of entering the primary in Shell's place against Reagan and Christopher. His entry was a minor political event. He was new to the party. But he was an unbending conservative who shared nearly everything Reagan was—and still is—propounding, and his unexpected position as a feature of resistance to the Reagan team had all the significance in the world to those with eyes to see. Because as early as mid-1965, anyone trying to retain and or fortify the strong statewide conservative lines forged just one year before found himself up against the Elventh Commandment.

As a conservative millionaire with money and effort to contribute to a conservative victory, Patrick faced an organization that was already starting to deviate from Reagan's announced position—two years before this fact would be recognized by Republicans generally. Anyone who dared bring up the subject of previous left-wing affiliations was guilty of promoting "disunity."

Then came the 1966 primary elections. More and more of the old guard caught the message, quietly passed to the rear during the "phase out" of conservative leaders, and along with Patrick and 40 or 50 thousand others, began to represent an unorganized minority voice. Later that year, they thought they could salvage something during the state central committee elections.

Patrick and the conservatives became involved in a struggle to elect Dr. Bernard Tully and here, greater than ever before, met as their opposition, Parkinson, Weinberger and the party unity set around Reagan. Then came the legislative reversals going into 1967. Patrick was becoming stronger in his opposition to events, which, by now, had been shaping up for over a year and a half, and he was joined by Senator John Schmitz from the legislature.

Beneath the surface, a groundswell of Republican bitterness formed over the appointments which brought minority resentment out into more open discussion from county to county. But rather than create hostility with their own friends who were now working with the liberals on faith, thousands of irate

and discouraged party workers were not ready to identify as organized opposition and preferred to restrict their sentiments to private conversation. Others were waiting for the second year before drawing any premature conclusions. So throughout the whole first year, Patrick and Schmitz were almost the only strongly outspoken voices—Schmitz within the legislature and Patrick on television appearances and at Republican gatherings. More outward in his remarks than the average conservative to begin with, Patrick made no points before the Republican volunteer organizations during this time, even though the drive was already on to destroy their influence. Finally, going into 1968, the Caspar Weinberger appointment broke the dyke. If Reagan were trying to keep the conservatives aligned, this was probably the most ill-advised move he would have made. Illustrative of spontaneous grass roots reaction to the Weinberger appointment was the following letter from the 1966 state chairman of the California Young Republicans and a onetime member of Reagan's 1966 statewide campaign committee.

February 13, 1968

Honorable John G. Schmitz
State Capitol
Sacramento, California

Dear Senator Schmitz:

I wish to congratulate you most wholeheartedly for your forthright and courageous statements regarding Governor Reagan's outrageous appointment of Casper Weinberger as the State of California Financial Director.

It is saddening indeed to my family, my friends and myself to observe now that years of precinct work, meetings, conventions and financial hardship which went into the effort to resurrect the Republican Party in California appear to be in vain. The Weinberger appointment is but another testimony to the fact that the Reagan Administration has given us so far only a less corrupt and better run welfare state in California than his predecessor. Thus, essentially Governor Reagan has betrayed the mandate given to him by the people.

In your letter to your electorate dated February 2, 1968 discussing the Weinberger appointment, you stated: "It is

hard to give up a dream." No, it is not! Especially if it becomes a nightmare!

With warm regards, I am

Sincerely yours,
Mike Djordjevich

The struggle in California now, while still in the incubating stage, centers about the problem of salvaging what was once the main wedge in the Republican Party as the "phase-out" of active conservatism nation-wide follows Reagan into the 1968 presidential run.

A man who sees the "error of his ways" (especially a lifelong liberal Democrat) and wants to change parties should be welcomed with open arms and given every chance. He should be given a seat in the back row and allowed to work his way forward in ways which establish his alignment beyond all reasonable doubt, not taken at face value and boosted overnight to the head of the party. Would the Israelis turn Ben Gurion's job over to an Arab who said he had converted to Zionism two years before?

In politics, performance is all there is. Has modern government made campaign oratory any less susceptible to expedient afterthought, or more so? Is today's politician any less prone to believe in his own propaganda? Reagan had words; he had no "credentials." No one knows this better than the Democrats, to whom Reagan's thundering appearance comes not as proof of Republican shrewdness but of a yawning vulnerability beyond their wildest assumptions; of blundering over-enthusiasm and almost childlike idolatry. Reagan's ostrich-like step as a *serious* presidential contender after one short year in public office will do more for the Democrats than question the value of Republican leadership. From this, they have little to lose. Could Reagan possibly deliver the kind of miracle the Republicans are asking for this year? Should any mundane entity be *expected* to? Had Reagan the power to make actions line up with words, we would be on our way back to constitutional government and Reagan would be facing a nationwide roar of liberal opposition. Instead, it's happy times, incense and orange flower water everywhere. You couldn't have greater forewarning of a worse predicament.

Faced with the warning signs of a dilemma which almost compels reserve, one stands with mixed fear and compassion at the sight of the "Reagan conservative groundswell" reach-

ing out for more space on a sagging political bow with nothing below but a year of assumptions and rationalizations. In the South, you will see signs which read: "A Vote for Wallace Is A Vote for Johnson." Wallace, in other words, is going to split the Republican ticket and elect Johnson, et al. And you hear a lot of talk from worried liberals about a Wallace-Johnson "deal."

Although he will probably do more damage to the Democrats than the Republicans, even Wallace could not split the GOP had not Reagan first split the conservatives in the finest post-1964 Goldwaterian tradition. If present patterns continue, the more appropriate sign will read: "A Vote for Reagan Is A Vote For Johnsonism." Unless Reagan does some fast reorganizing before convention time.

Credibility

"Ronald Reagan," remarked a legislator one day, "is an actor. And the trouble is, you never know when a matinee idol is *not* acting." So much of his ideology, his advisors, methods and even his statements have shifted gears since 1965, the question of identification becomes less simple than downright problematic. "REAGAN: DON'T GIVE CONTROL TO MODERATES," ran the Oakland *Tribune* headline on November 11, 1964. Unwinding from the Goldwater defeat a few days before, Reagan had a father's advice for the Los Angeles Young Republicans. "Actor Ronald Reagan," ran the article, "says relinquishing control of the Republican Party to the so-called moderates wouldn't make any sense at all."

"The principal job now is to prove to the several million Republicans who didn't join us November 3 that our conversation is akin to their own thinking."

Four months later, Reagan was giving his ideology a new wrinkle:

"The Hollywood star, who was Barry Goldwater's California campaign chairman, told newsmen he disliked being called a conservative. 'By using labels and hyphens, we've been suckered by the Democrats . . . if anything, I'm an ex-Democrat-Republican.'" (San Francisco *Examiner*, March 28, 1965)

And finally, proceeding into the first days of his new office

as Governor, an Oakland *Tribune* article announced: "MODERATES PUT IN TOP STATE JOBS," adding

"Governor-elect Ronald Reagan is steering a straight middle-of-the-road path for his new Republican administration in Sacramento" (Oakland *Tribune*, November 27, 1966).

And on a special CBS television broadcast called "What About Reagan?" (December 14, 1967), this remark from Harry Ashmore, chairman of the Advisory Committee of the California Democratic Party:

"... one of the really remarkable things I had seen in politics was the way in which Ronald Reagan managed to change his image almost completely between the time he announced for the office of governor and the time he came into the home stretch in the election, a period of some two or three months.

"I would say he came into the election carrying the image of Barry Goldwater. He emerged at the end of that campaign bearing the image of Nelson Rockefeller.

"And he did this apparently without losing the votes and perhaps even the fervor of his right-wing supporters who were his original backers, the ones who put him in the race."

Which is precisely the problem. Reagan supports the closed union shop but thinks dues-paying members should have the secret ballot. The Delano Grape strikers in California (AFL-CIO) won moral support from Reagan and he did nothing to oppose their left-oriented leader Chavez. But he claims he does not believe in union-regimented farm labor. It took four letters and the threat of a lawsuit to get his name off the letterhead of the United World Federalists, but he still believes in some form of world government. We must learn to co-exist with the Communists, he told the Omaha Young Republicans in June of 1967, but from a position of strength, not weakness. Reagan's espoused doctrine is conservatism, but organized conservatism is denied any leverage in his administration and is treated as a threat to "party unity." He rebels at the waste in socialized medicine schemes, but not against socialized medicine per se.

What is this artful dodgery supposed to mean? It's like stepping into a bath without water; shifting into reverse and getting a forward gear; climbing on board a Boeing 707 that

never takes off; swallowing apple pie to the taste of sauerkraut. Keep going and you run into the happy house.

You can make book on one thing: it is not conservatism, nor even "Fabian conservatism."

On the resignation on February 1, 1968 of Gordon Smith, Reagan named Caspar Weinberger as his new state finance director, the state's highest-salaried appointive post. The promotion of Weinberger, an ultra-liberal, Kuchel-Rockefeller Republican, to a position that should go to a conservative, leaves no doubt as to which way Reagan is going.

Starting with his 1968 "State of the State" message to the legislature, Reagan's speeches were a tape recording of the previous year. "We are going to squeeze, and cut and trim," he said. So state spending went up \$379 million more, adding 7.1% of the previous budget for another record among the states of \$5,699,536,034. This included increases of: 11.3% for the University of California; 21.2% for the state colleges; 22.6% for Medi-Cal; and 11.4% for welfare.

Once again, Sen. John Schmitz rose to represent the Republican opposition. In his *Sacramento Report* for February 9, 1968, Schmitz showed that from the 1958-59 budget to the 1968-69 budget just proposed by Reagan, total state expenditures rose from \$2.1 billion to \$5.7 billion. In the eight years of Democratic Governor Pat Brown (Reagan's predecessor), the increase was \$2.4 billion. "In the first two years of Ronald Reagan," said Schmitz, "if his current budget is adopted the increase will be \$1.1 billion. At that rate, in eight years, Reagan's new spending would almost double Brown's."

The average annual spending under Brown was 10.1%. Under Reagan, the average so far is 11.4%. "This certainly does not change the fact that 'Pat' Brown was the biggest spender in California history up to this time. But these figures show that so far, on the average, his successor (Reagan) is spending more. "The excuse of the 'Brown deficit' is no longer available. . . . These facts may seem almost incredible to the many who still believe in the promises made during the 1966 campaign . . ."

Reagan assailed Schmitz' findings as inaccurate, then on February 15, summoned Schmitz downstairs to his office for the annual attempt to talk Schmitz into voting for the new budget increases. It was a round-robin of 12 months before. For 45 minutes, Reagan went over the need for party unity and the reasons why new spending would be needed again this year. However, he was not going to raise taxes, he had told

the press. But dangling between them like a pink elephant both were trying to pretend wasn't there was the Democrats' compromise withholding tax bill Reagan was almost sure to sign. Like a script from 1967, Schmitz reminded Reagan of his campaign promises and of the meetings clear back into 1965 when Reagan had received stern warning from his conservative "elders" not to allow entrenched liberals to gain a foothold in his administration.

The next day, Schmitz answered Reagan's charges of inaccuracy in the following release to the press, as the *Sacramento Bee* broke the news of a "Schmitz-Reagan feud:"

"I regret more than I can say the necessity of entering into public controversy with the Governor I supported so strongly throughout the primary and general election campaign of 1966. But the soaring cost of state government and the punitive taxation which results is too important an issue to bury in the name of party unity.

"The budget totals were supplied to me by the legislative analyst, Alan Post. To compare them and obtain an average annual increase is mere grade-school arithmetic."

Applied Reaganism seems to add up to an apprentice course for novices who want to strike the well-worn Christlike "all things to all people" pose without really going anywhere. And to stop where we are, places us just where the Democrats left off: 9/10ths of the way to socialism. For Reagan, the combination works beautifully; it gets him the votes without having to deliver.

Offstage, Ronald Reagan is congenial and possessed of great personal magnetism. He is a *good citizen*. But when people ask "What is Ronald Reagan," you are almost compelled to reply, "Reagan is after power by the shortest method possible, next to which his speeches are almost pure deception." If the 1967 legislative year and the campaign that preceded it do not offer substantiating proof, his tie-in with the mercenaries of the Syndicate leaves little to the imagination. Which, of course, makes tatters of his conservative outer-garments. In practice, he is still very much a liberal.

Because Reagan must do the expedient thing in the search for power, he is committed to the liberal path, a move any conservative could have made over the years—and thousands have. But whether his position will improve or decline as a result remains to be seen.

The liberals do not appreciate Reagan now, but will go along as long as the concessions hold up. If he loses the conservatives too, as he is almost certain to do in time, he can become one of the swiftest political suicides in U.S. history. What Reagan must guard against most of all is loss of credibility. Integrity is almost the whole pitch on Reagan now; he is billed as the "candidate of integrity." And perhaps, within tight Reagan circles—despite the homosexual incident—it is true. At the same time, honesty by itself does not produce better government.

Some of the unkind clichés now heard in California—and especially in and around the state legislature—may be a bit too brutal. Such as the frequent, circumspect remarks about his passion for jellybeans, or the cynic's favorite nickname: "Ronnie Wonderful;" or the less polite "J. G. Reagan." Translation: Judas Goat. "J. G. Reagan is now running Sacramento," comes the voice of non-Syndicate conservatism. Beyond the bounds of dignified dissent, perhaps. In some cases, nothing more than the expected flare of partisanship, to be sure. But from other Republicans—mainly Goldwater conservatives—there has been a serious falling off.

Should Americans once get it into their heads that they can't believe what he says, he will become a calculated risk in politics. "Like it or not," said CBS announcer Harry Reasoner (CBS Special "What About Reagan?" December 17, 1967) "Reagan's every utterance will be examined from now on," adding that "A feeling that a candidate has a credibility gap can be as damaging as unpopular views on foreign policy."

Reagan can't get away with the old double-play forever. He will find it less easy as time goes on to leave disillusioning statements hanging in the air. Like the time he appeared on NBC's "Meet the Press" (January 9, 1966) and in reply to suggestions that he was right-wing politically, said:

"My views haven't changed an awful lot since I was a Democrat."

NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT

*Lyndon Johnson (Grotesqum Powermadus Obnoxi) is Through
(He Would Have You Believe)*

Even if Wallace weren't in the race to take his share this year, you would think the Republican ego were the Goodyear blimp with respect to LBJ. Or, is it more like LSD? "Johnson is finished," "LBJ has lost all his popularity," "LBJ looks tired and ill and will probably resign." (as he said he was going to on March 30, 1968), Or more far-fetched than any of them: "Johnson *wants* out." You might as well expect Castro to join a monastery.

The Republicans have it all figured out. Without Wallace, LBJ is a worn-out stag on the way to the glue factory; a pariah; Hiroshima, *before*. Not really; there's just a bull market on glib nonsense this year. For one thing, it is fairly well established by now: Wallace is taking his greatest toll from the Democrats, not the Republicans. Such was the surprise outcome of his successful 110,000 registration drive in California, for instance. He may be the only one who can *prevent* a Johnson victory this year.

But even if Wallace were to withdraw and take a job as Chairman of the Highway Beautification program in Alabama this year (his words), Johnson would be anything but through. Johnson is *President*. He can pull anything out of the bag between July and November. He can win the war in Vietnam (what Paul Harvey once called the "18-hour war"), bring the boys home (some of them), and float back to Washington as the victorious bulwark of freedom against Communist aggres-

sion. He can accept a truce long enough to become the champion of peace. He can accelerate war all over the globe, declare a national emergency, and say we've got to have him for four more years to execute our national defense. Should civil riots break out all over the nation (as they probably will) by election time, he can declare martial law in U.S. cities and be canonized as the protector of community safety and property. He can do an about-face on the whole civil rights issue and take the side of the white 90% majority against the "ungrateful" 10% colored minority. To Johnson, political power is the Holy Grail. He can do anything, and probably will, to take the next step *upward*—to Caesar, if possible.

Social security checks will reach some 24 million people this year. As of June 1967, reports were that the Johnson administration expected to spend upwards of \$58 billion more on social welfare and rehabilitation programs by mid-1968, thus adding more millions who look to Washington for sustenance. If all Johnson does is concentrate on this block of votes, with the three-way split shaping up in the months to come, he can go back to Washington on a simple plurality.

Johnson is a fastidious poll-watcher. He consults statistics constantly and knows where the bodies are buried. He can win the election with or without Wallace. But he can also lose.

So where does this leave the Republicans? Either the Republicans offer a wholesale departure from existing policies or they won't make a dent in the public consciousness. And they aren't doing it. Instead, out of stark fear of offending the liberals, they're on another "me-too" kick while blowing idle smoke rings in the air about "change."

It's going to be a "Syndicate"-style campaign all the way, meaning: coalitions with the liberals; a retreat on all major platform issues that might destroy "respectability;" and a purge of the Party's conservative wing because its members will not sacrifice ideology to give the Syndicate absolute control of the GOP structure. To put it straight, 27 million Republicans who voted for reforms in 1964 have no candidate this year.

If Reagan *had* the drive, the will and the determination to offer America an alternative, it will go by the boards in this year's warmed-over attempt by the Republicans around him to bear alms and incense to the existing power structure, as they did in California. And it won't be enough for a liberation-hungry American public. Wallace challenges the GOP

because he openly shuns the power structure while the GOP shuns the rank and file voter. His withdrawal would neither hand them a victory, nor will his candidacy produce one for LBJ. Poor merchandise can't be blamed on competitors.

"Party unity" is the weathervane of another sell-out. The logical "out" would be to shift gears and make some fast adjustments. Or, you can join us in Mono County after 1968 with the rocks and parakeets (or was it muskrats?). (Actually, there are about 500 good conservatives living out there). The conservative groundswell? It has shifted from a semi-intellectual force within the GOP to a non-intellectual conservative *direction* (self-interest) on the part of labor and the low-income groups (mostly Democrats fleeing LBJ's civil rights program) behind Wallace. Rather than diminishing, it has probably doubled in force, because the 27-million vote margin that went for Goldwater in 1964 is still there, looking for a home.

This year, a union of conservative and labor sentiment raises the chance of an upset over anything even remotely possible four years ago. But not at the top of the GOP ticket. Other realistic alternatives exist, both within and outside the Republican Party, for change-conscious Americans of all callings. All carry big-gain potential depending on how well they are utilized, and how fast.

(1)

They can fall in behind Wallace and work the precincts for him as they did for Barry Goldwater in 1964. In specific areas Wallace has the only proven conservative position in the race this year and the only stand on the all-important civil rights issue which is known to reflect the true majority interests. If Reagan does not want the field corps which had the power to nominate Goldwater and deliver 27 million votes thereafter, they should stop mooning, change direction, and shift *as a body* without hesitation. And they should not wait for explanations. There is no time. A tremendous forward motion exists in American affairs now and they will either assist or oppose it by their actions. This, of course, would isolate Reagan with the liberals, and make Wallace the major candidate in those states where he is registered. And he would probably come up with a victory. Moreover, it can be held without equivocation: unless there is a complete overhaul in the GOP a Wallace *loss* will net more for fundamental American freedoms this year than a Reagan victory.

(2)

This means third parties in some of the states. The model for all third party efforts and the only successful growing third party in America today, is the Conservative Party of the State of New York. Organized by professionals in 1962, the Conservative Party of New York is efficiently managed, and operates on a tight budget. In six years, it has grown to where it now controls close to a million votes and can command leverage in both major parties.

(3)

They can work for Richard Nixon where at least they know what they are getting.

(4)

GOP conservatives have strength at the local level. In California, they can *win any major primary campaign* for the right candidate. They should strengthen what they have, increase their position in the county and state central committees, and concentrate on electing good candidates to lesser offices, such as Congress and the state legislatures. Those who hold good positions within the party should hang on to them. Otherwise, the liberals are merely getting rid of their opposition without lifting a finger. There will be plenty of people without hard-earned strategic posts to pour into the third party drive.

(5)

The conservatives can send an un-instructed "wait and see" delegation to the Republican Convention in Miami. After what has occurred, the polls (as of February 12, 1968) showed that 70% of Republicans in California would support an un-instructed delegation over the favorite son candidacy if it appeared on the June primary ballot.

In the selection of delegates to the 1968 Miami Convention, Reagan has followed the 1966 campaign, and later appointment, formula. California's delegates are liberals to conservatives in a ratio of 4 to 1—(23 of the 86 are conservatives.) The latter include this year's *outgoing* presidents of the Republican volunteer organizations. All are under written oath to do what Reagan tells them until released by him. As of January 28, 1968, other states were shaping up in much the same way. Oklahoma's state Senator Richard Stansberry told reporters that the draft-Reagan movement in that

state was carefully avoiding what he called the "ultras"—the John Birch Society, the AFL-CIO and the right-to-work movement. Of Oklahoma's 22 delegates, 12 to 15 are expected to be Reagan backers. They should cover the usual moderate-to-left range with any active conservatives lumped into the "far-right" category and excluded. Which is not surprising. Handling most of the liaison work for Reagan in the field is Tom Reed, his former northern California campaign chairman and first appointments secretary.

And many lifelong Democrats are pouring into the campaign, such as Indiana millionaire Walter J. Dilbeck, Jr. Dilbeck, who voted Democrat all his life and actively opposed conservative Republican Barry Goldwater in 1964, set up a Reagan-for-President headquarters in Washington early in the year. John Despol, a national representative of the United Steelworkers International in Los Angeles, and a lifelong Democrat, is among the first 36 members of the organizing committee to select Reagan's "favorite son" delegation to the Miami convention. (All 36 will probably continue on as delegates themselves).

Despol supported Reagan's 1966 Democratic opponent, Gov. Edmund G. Brown, in all of his campaigns for governor and attorney general. He was on the California delegation to all the Democratic National Conventions from 1948 to 1960. These were the campaigns that nominated Harry Truman, Adlai Stevenson (twice), and John F. Kennedy.

Before the state CIO merged with the AFL in 1958, Despol was the CIO's secretary-treasurer in California—its top paid officer. After the merger, he served one term as general vice president of the California Labor Federation, AFL-CIO. Despol was asked by one of Reagan's nucleus members to join the organizing committee. He knew Reagan when he was a Democrat (*San Jose Mercury*, January 13, 1968).

Despol's appointment does not serve notice of a broad labor rank and file movement toward Reagan. But it may reveal a shift among the labor bosses. And the difference should be born firmly in mind by conservatives in either major political party now trying to draw an accurate picture of Reagan's place in the 1968 elections.

In mid-February of 1968, the Reagan ensemble "re-hired" Spencer and Roberts from 1966 to conduct his presidential campaign. Which means that what occurred two years ago is almost certain to be duplicated on a national scale. And there may not be room enough in Mono County to take all

refugees. *This* purge may take in the entire conservative wing of the Republican Party. Already, Reagan is taking favors from the liberals—including the Democrats—to whom he will have to pony-up after the polls close, just as he did last year.

The retention of Clifton White as a national campaign consultant no doubt represents an attempt by Reagan's backers—the Perino's-For-Lunch-Bunch in Los Angeles that started this merrygoround—to help resurrect the spirit of 1964 and herd the conservatives in behind Reagan. If that is their thinking, Reagan's Cook's tour through American government begins to make the Pied Piper look like a missionary at a cannibal's convention. It's 100% pure deception.

The strategy may pay off or it may backfire. For one thing, Reagan's first year in California is going to become national news before long. They can't keep it down forever. Plus the fact that the United States is probably twice as conservative as it was four years ago, if not more so, even though the pressure groups have a tighter grip on the political machinery. Votes are votes. If Reagan keeps going the way he is, his campaign may *have* to be made up mostly of Democrats to produce a victory.

It's the Eisenhower years all over again. Reagan is putting the conservatives back to sleep. Either he will be used to sell the nation on four more years of "Johnsonism" under the Republican label by using the conservative vote to elect a liberal like Nelson Rockefeller, or he will try for the presidency where the liberals will throw his green years all over him like tobasco sauce and run away with the ballgame. If he couldn't hack it in Sacramento, does he think life is going to be easier in Washington where the pressure is 1,000 times as severe? Do the conservatives?

The Rockefeller-Reagan idea takes the best odds. Why? Because (a) Reagan does not have the experience for the top job, (b) there are enough rifts between Reagan and Nixon all over the country to suggest Rockefeller as the only other logical alternative, and (c) after delivering the vote, Reagan could blithely disappear into the vice-presidential seat, leaving California with problems it never had under Pat Brown. Everyone would be happy. The liberals would ride back into Washington without a break and the conservatives would point to Vice President Reagan as a victory for their side—"The greatest gains we've made so far," they would say.

Washington's pressure anarchy is more than willing to make its peace with rising American resentment by putting a conservative face on its operation. What's the difference, as long as the power does not change hands?

If the Republican Party cannot come up with something better than a repeat of the Eisenhower years, it has nothing. Reform government made no gains under Dwight Eisenhower, but socialism most assuredly did. He was surrounded by liberal machinery from the time his name was put up for nomination, and had he *been* the crusader for reform which the conservatives think they see in Ronald Reagan, he didn't stand a Chinaman's chance in Washington. Ronald Reagan is making his national debut in almost the same way.

Or worse. Listen to the pros this year and learn of an even more bizarre theory now making the rounds. Could be, they say, that Reagan is being set up to take the Democrats' albatross this year (meaning their unpopularity); to take a dive and pull the Republican Party in after him. Even the wise ones make mistakes, but they recognize the symptoms of a fix.

Chart the horoscope: the Democrats' public ratings couldn't be lower; they are divided into factions at the top level and have lost their coalition of labor and the low-income groups which were their main repository of strength. The public is fed up over civil rights pressure, foreign no-win wars, and inflationary economy which wipes away their earnings. With the United States closer to a many-staged domestic crisis than it has been since 1929, the Democrats need a breather or a meal ticket back into power, one or the other. The Republicans take a victory and cannot bail the nation out of impending turmoil brought on by eight years of liberal usury and mal-administration. They sink beneath a tidal wave of public resentment by 1969 and take the blame in history for producing what may be America's most violent and destructive period. By 1970, the Democrats, having passed their problems to the GOP, commence their resurrection with a whole slate of new policies, riding back into power like never before. With Reagan as the anchor-man, the Republicans meet themselves coming down as they step up to claim victory in 1968, their destruction is that fast.

You've heard that barb about how the Democrats are running the Republican Party by proxy. Could Reagan be an "unknowing" part of Democratic long-range strategy? The inconsistencies are what make it possible. For one: Reagan's inexperience and lack of political schmaltz. Possessed of great

talent, he is nevertheless as green as the grass on the state house grounds. But the less he shows, the greater the red carpet treatment and big-time publicity all over the nation. Doesn't that strike you as odd? Could a buck private have driven the Germans out of Italy or the Japanese out of the South Pacific? Even with CBS on his side?

Second, the Republican Party is heading for an instant replay—granted, with variations—of its Reconstruction role of 1865. One hundred years ago, the same general set of circumstances brought on America's darkest hour under two Republican administrations—an eleven-year nightmare of vice, "black power," and political tyranny which nearly destroyed (what was then) one-third of the American enterprise.

It was all staged under the plea of "civil rights" and Ulysses S. Grant was *also* inexperienced in politics. This year, every Republican running is a hopeless emotional sop in the civil rights field, like Charles Sumner, author of the drastic Civil Rights Bill of 1866. Lots of good intentions, (so were Sumner's) but none of them understands America's race problem or even anything about the Negroes, over whom the whole argument is waged. And race relations is America's biggest problem today. For eight years, the Democrats have simply been reviving buried history.

But for the Republicans to take up where the Democrats leave off would be like receiving a gift-wrapped time bomb from your nearest neighbor, whether that bomb is the gold and silver shortage, impending race war, or foreign no-win "peace actions."

If the Democrats can't bag a victory this year, they have to find a scapegoat for their hated policies. This, plus Reagan's tender years in government and the peculiar timing, make thinkable what would otherwise make good Batman script. And if you can believe CBS and NBC are about to hand favorable coverage to a conservative for president, there are going to be a lot of Brooklyn Bridge sales this year. They've been cozying up to Reagan since the days of his gubernatorial primary.

Reagan should let the liberals take their own albatross this year and swim upstream against the Niagara that is obviously trying to wash him 3,000 miles away. That looks too much like Nelson what's-his-name at the headgate. Besides, California *still* needs a good governor. He has three whole years to find out how to win at marbles with Jesse Unruh. Should Reagan go to Washington, California may have Jesse Unruh as

Governor in 1970. And Unruh is a Bobby Kennedy fan. Finch? Rumors indicate he would rather be a U.S. Senator.

In California, Reagan can learn *how* to be a governor, deliver on some of his promises, and try to rebuild the conservative wing he has just thrown out with the dirty dishwasher. He can become one of the few in high office who ever matched actions with words. And at worst estimates, he would be better off going down with a good cause in California than as master of the liberal ship Washington during the nation's most anti-liberal period—which is just around the corner. Even his old re-runs wouldn't look the same any more. As of now, some of them are pretty good!

Most of all, Americans cannot afford that kind of a gamble. The stakes are too high; 1968 is going to be a bad year, and after that comes 1969. They should let Reagan figure out what he is going to be and whose gods he is going to serve over the next two years—in California—not Washington.

Or, should Reagan decide to stay with the liberals, maybe he can get through by painting "soul brother" on the side of the capitol building.

APPENDIX

Ronald Reagan: SYNDICATE OR NON-SYNDICATE?

Clifton White is consultant to the Reagan "Favorite Son" delegation on the 1968 GOP National Convention. To probably 85% of registered Republicans, the name means nothing. But to a minority that has either followed or faced White's convention tactics over the years, the appointment turns mystery into revelation as to the possible future course of the GOP should Reagan win or lose.

White is not just another Mo Padidleheimer in a nutty-looking bow tie. He has a system, and the system has its consequences. The system is a combination of political techniques inherited from big Eastern professionals over a 20-year period and molded into a well-oiled machine by White's close-knit crew in survival-of-the-fittest contests with other equally-skilled political artisans in early days with the New York Young Republicans. Owing to the special tools of its trade, White's ensemble has gained among its opposition the slightly-sketchy title of *Syndicate*. Those in or around White's immediate range of interest, however, like to refer to themselves as "responsible conservatives." Regardless of your ideological calling or what manner of cliché you may decide to hang on the operation, it is time you discovered where the weather is coming from. For White's "old friends" from the Young Republicans are considerably older now; they have a national GOP confederation; their interests take in the whole of the senior party; and the identity of the next GOP presidential candidate will be decided on the floor of the national convention, where it has become White's assigned task to concentrate 20 years of accumulated skills to come up with a Reagan victory.

Clif White was spawned under the Dewey machine in New York. He began his career in politics in 1946 by losing a primary race for Congress in his own Ithaca, New York district. After his defeat, he set out to discover why he lost and will probably crown that search this year by bagging the chairmanship of the National Republican Committee. He was

teaching political science at Cornell University at the time, and was faculty advisor to the college Young Republican Club. He then joined the Ithaca Young Republican Club and later became its president. Late in 1946, White became active in the New York State Young Republican Association and was elected president of the Association through his own clique with William Rusher (publisher of *National Review Magazine*) as Chairman of the Board. Under control of White's organization, the New York YR Association passed a resolution asking Thomas E. Dewey to run for a third term as Governor of New York, and figured heavily in the subsequent draft-Dewey drive that year.

In order to maintain its power, the White clique had to win *all* convention fights. Consequently, it developed an advanced technique for convention tactics which proved so successful that the clique engineered the victories of all the New York Young Republican conventions from 1950 to 1958 and all the National Young Republican Federation conventions from 1951 to 1959, even though White officially retired from Young Republican politics in 1957.

In 1950, the long-term goals of White, Rusher, Charles McWhorter, and the other members of the organization required the development of efficient political machinery which, hopefully, would give them power in New York's senior GOP and eventually, control within the Republican National Committee. White's immediate goal was to help nominate Dwight Eisenhower as the GOP presidential candidate in 1952. His machine went to work to develop a strong organization within the New York Young Republican Association which could control the convention of the National Young Republican Federation by 1951. Through control of this convention, they would use the Young Republicans as a base for national publicity to demonstrate that Eisenhower enjoyed greater popularity with the Republican Party than Robert Taft. The plan came off as scheduled. White was thereafter given credit for the convention floor tactics that shot down Taft in favor of the Dewey-Eisenhower machine, and which sent Dwight Eisenhower on to win the presidency.

These convention techniques are as old as politics and are employed in both parties by most senior and junior members to one degree or another. White simply exercised them more successfully and ruthlessly. And they earned White's syndicate the expected hostility of the losers plus occasional accusations of corruption and unethical practice. At the 1952 conven-

tion, for instance, with William Rusher in firm control of the credentials committee, the New York Young Republican Association accepted the validity of several contested delegations from the Bronx which had been hastily-formed to help elect a candidate named Bachenheimer chairman of the first judicial district. In protest, the regular Bronx Young Republican Club walked out of the convention and withdrew from the state association with this statement:

"... a number of clubs represented at the convention do not have qualified membership . . . and in view of the deliberate refusal of the present Young Republican administration to correct this situation; and in fact its support of this system in order to maintain its Tammany-like control of this Association, we are left no alternative other than to withdraw from this Association." (Copy of the Bronx Young Republican Statement, May 24, 1952).

During the 1960 presidential campaign of Richard Nixon, White performed background chores as a technician in the shadow of Robert Finch and was never invited to join Finch's inner-circle of campaign strategists. The next year, White pulled some of his "old friends" from the Young Republicans together from all over the country to launch the National Draft Goldwater Committee. In Theodore White's analysis (*The Making of The President 1964*, New York, Athenum, 1965), Clif White had restricted himself to Young Republican politics since 1948 and wanted to exercise his technical talents at the presidential level. With a national organization formed in over 10 laborious years with the National Young Republican Federation, White set out to seize and hold the National Republican Party as he had seized and held the Young Republicans years before. By his analysis, to control the Party, you had to select and control the presidential nominee. The conservative tempo of the GOP had been growing since 1955 with Barry Goldwater as its moral nucleus and, from the standing reception given Goldwater's withdrawal speech ("Conservatives, let's grow!") at the 1960 Republican convention in Chicago, it was obvious that Goldwater would be the Party's choice four years down the line, should Nixon lose. Over the next three years, White's network built up such a stampede of nationwide demand for Goldwater that he found himself—against his will—literally suctioned into declaring his candidacy.

White won the nomination for Goldwater in one of the

smoothest campaigns ever conducted. But Goldwater had been watching White for three years. He not only distrusted White's motives, but was not the kind of man you could push around. Furthermore, he did not like being used as a pawn in a grab for party power which had more mercenary than idealistic overtones. So the day after the victorious nomination over Scranton, Goldwater deprived White of any further policy-making influence over the campaign and refused him the chairmanship of the Republican National Committee, which to White were like separate halves of the Hope Diamond.

Syndicate members who had been with White since 1961 and before were incensed at Goldwater. In their suite at San Francisco's Fairmont Hotel, there were tears and bitterness with intermittent suggestions from some of the more militant ones to dump Goldwater in favor of another candidate (op. cit. Theodore White, *The Making of The President 1964*, p. 206). Relegated to a minor role for the duration of the campaign, White's entourage concentrated on fortifying their base for future use. For them, the election was over, even with five months still to go.

The new vehicle became the nationwide Citizens For Goldwater-Miller Committee, which Goldwater turned over to White as a kind of burnt offering. Through this committee, White and Company went right on, building and extending their ties and contacts within the still-swelling conservative movement. And many of them found lucrative employment.

Citizens For Goldwater-Miller wound up with a surplus of \$300,000 in its treasury. Thousands of loyal contributors to that drive have yet to see an accounting of its transactions and expenditures. It is well-known, however, that White rewarded some of his faithfuls directly out of the fund. One of them, Kansas' Tom Van Sickle, was handed \$5000 to promote his own candidacy for President of the Young Republican National Federation in 1965 at Miami (California Young Republican *Wire*, August, 1965). More was delivered into the hands of California's Rus Walton, a White sympathizer, to administer on behalf of the United Republicans of California (UROC), of which he was then Executive Director. In California, Co-Chairman of Citizens For Goldwater-Miller was Ronald Reagan.

From early 1965 forward, conservatives began to line up more openly on both sides of White's political see-saw: conservative mercenaries vs conservative idealists; Machiavel-

lians vs moralists; Syndicate vs Non-Syndicate, while the division went unrecognized to the vast majority of Party membership. In the more typical maneuver—whether involving a campaign for public office or the take-over of a Republican volunteer group—a Syndicate operation seemed to produce one or all of these three major by-products: 1) a coalition with the liberal wing of the Party to produce strength which, after victory, always requires the traditional payoff (witness the 1967 national convention of Republican women in Washington, D.C.); 2) a backdown on major conservative platform proposals to maintain respectability (witness the 1965 and 1967 Young Republican National conventions); and 3) a purge of ideologically-aligned conservatives because they cannot be controlled (witness the removal of nearly all active conservatives from the patronage structure in 1966 who had brought Reagan into politics two years before).

The first apparent victim accepted by the Non-Syndicate as the focus of a Syndicate-engineered purge in 1964 was Republican National Chairman Dean Burch. Burch was voted out within months of his installation by Barry Goldwater to clear the decks for a more “management-oriented” Ray Bliss. Goldwater had the votes to keep Burch in office but failed to use them, for reasons guessed-at by Republicans as anything from lack of nerve to loss of heart.

At the 1965 convention of the National Young Republican Federation, the Syndicate pulled everything in the book to jockey Kansas’ Tom Van Sickle into position as incoming chairman. Stepping down: another Syndicate man, Buz Lukens. The Miami convention was described in the *Washington Post* as a marionette show. Before Lukens sat a panel of multi-colored lights with thick cords leading away and up to a special suite of rooms in the Deauville Hotel. There, high above the auditorium, sat a consortium of senior members from Clifton White’s organization—once Young Republicans themselves—directing the actions of Syndicate members on the convention floor like a giant, invisible brain. “Pulling the strings,” said the *Post*,

“... are middle-aged Republicans who want to manipulate the Young Republican organization for their own political ends—among them is a graying municipal court judge from Dubuque, Iowa named Edward Failor. He is agent for Clifton White, a New York public relations man.” (*Washington Post*, July 18, 1965)

Apparently, each light was supposed to flash signals to Lukens for his next move, possibly calculated from a television-viewing screen located in Failor's hotel room. A red light might order Lukens to "stop debate;" a yellow light could signal him to "recognize our man on the floor," etc. Lights cords, bribes, pressure tactics—the whole schmear—were known to everyone in the hall in what turned Roberts Rules of Order into little more than an underworld code for a sophisticated bank job. How were you going to challenge a system that had ruled the National YR Federation since 1948? Through a succession of deals, the Syndicate produced near-unanimity in the voting. This Syndicate-controlled convention wound up endorsing the principles of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the progressive income tax! Non-Syndicate conservative YR's wandered away from the auditorium depressed by one of the most blatant abuses of democratic processes they had ever witnessed, their thoughts about the next convention dominated by a sense of futility. Others were more optimistic. "From the point of view of the conservatives," wrote one William F. Buckley,

"... the good guys are what is called in the trade the Syndicate. The Syndicate has been running things in YR circles for a dozen years." (San Francisco *Examiner*, June 22, 1965).

This was the time Van Sickle was awarded \$5000 by White out of the \$300,000 kitty remaining in the Citizens For Goldwater-Miller treasury. Lukens is now a U.S. congressman from Ohio.

In the presidential race of the California Young Republicans in February, 1966, challenger Bob Sprinkle of Los Angeles ran openly as a Syndicate candidate against conservative Mike Djordjevich of Daly City. Sprinkle's main support came from the liberal-left counties of San Francisco and Santa Barbara. When Djordjevich still managed to come up with the victory, National Young Republican Chairman Tom Van Sickle tried to revoke the charter of the California chapter and turn it over to Sprinkle. Sprinkle and his boys even go-go'd up to Fresno—270 miles North of Los Angeles—to receive the charter.

Meanwhile, Leland Kaiser—then State GOP Finance Chairman, and a respected conservative—intervened on behalf of Djordjevich while Djordjevich calmly laid plans for legal action and public exposure of Syndicate methods and

influence in California. Finally, at an all-night session in Los Angeles' International Hotel the following April involving Djordjevich, Van Sickle, J. Kerwitz (who flew out with Van Sickle from Kansas), and Dr. Gaylord Parkinson (Chairman of the Republican State Central Committee) Van Sickle backed down, admitting that the charges against the California conservatives were "drummed up." He flew out of Los Angeles without waiting for the sun to rise. But on the way out, he did manage time to explain the details in a hurried telephone call to onetime Los Angeles congressman John H. Rousselot.

For Chairman of the United Federation of Republican Women in May, 1967, conservative Mrs. Phyllis Schlafly was railroaded out to make room for a moderate-to-liberal, Mrs. Gladys O'Donnell of Long Beach, California. Busloads of "rump" delegations were shipped into the Washington, D.C. convention from the neighboring states of New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania to stack the hall which were promptly given floor approval to vote by a tightly-controlled credentials committee. Permission to check the voting machines was denied by this packed convention which also refused to submit to an official delegate count. Consequently, supporters of Mrs. Schlafly were never really sure whether she won, lost, or tied. The convention was described in various accounts as a "larcenous an operation as any labor convention ever witnessed." *Success Magazine's* Oakley Bramble called it

... an incident ... for a takeover of the Republican Party by a group of skillful and hardnosed conservative professionals ...

You may deplore the tactics, as this writer does. They were crude, they were rough, and they are not defensible, because the end does not justify the means. (*Success Magazine*, June 5, 1967).

A lawsuit is now pending in California, initiated by Young Republicans from 21 counties against the Syndicate tactics of outgoing president, Fresno's John Hicks, during the April, 1967 State convention of the California Young Republican Association. Grounds for the court action are unethical and illegal practices in violation of the state Young Republican constitution.

In order to hand the president's chair to Syndicate Steve Lewis of San Mateo County, the suit alleges that Hicks and his crew arbitrarily disfranchised five conservative California

counties. One more was split by decision of the Syndicate-dominated credentials committee, and a seventh, Los Angeles County, was allowed to vote only after the first five counties had been eliminated and their rump delegations seated. So the large Los Angeles vote made no difference. In protest, 21 counties walked out of the convention, taking a majority of the state's membership with them. The lawsuit maintains that at this convention, Hicks even allowed registered Democrats to vote as delegates. Hicks was later named by Ronald Reagan to his 1968 Favorite Son Delegation.

As an object lesson in the fate that can befall a thriving conservative entity once under Syndicate control, the California Young Republican Association offers possibly the best illustration. The California YR chapter was given partial credit for the Goldwater victory over Nelson Rockefeller in the now-historic California primary fight of 1964. Its members were the first to extend official endorsement to Goldwater that year and in Los Angeles County alone, sent over 2000 active workers into the precincts to help win the primary battle.

After just one year of Syndicate rule, the CYR is as dead as the horse-drawn carriage. In something resembling re-entry, membership has fallen out of the sky from 15,000 to 5,000. For the upcoming and crucial US Senate primary contest between conservative Dr. Max Rafferty (State Superintendent of Public Instruction) and ultra-liberal Senator Thomas H. Kuchel—who is about as popular as the neighborhood child-molester—the Syndicate-dominated CYR has neither endorsed Dr. Rafferty nor assisted in his campaign drive. Once in Syndicate hands, the California Young Republicans a) rewarded liberals with key appointments; b) conducted systematic purges of conservatives; c) made alliances with the regular (eg: liberal) party machine; d) changed the organizations' by-laws to strengthen its own control; and e) disregarded those provisions of the by-laws and Roberts Rules of Order which hampered or interfered with their drive for absolute control.

By itself, the Syndicate probably could not elect one of its own to second shovel on a chain gang. It relies for its initial base of power on the everlasting allegiance of the conservatives, then acquires strength by entering into various coalitions with the liberal wing of the Party. By this and other methods, it has become the swing vote in the Republican Party nationally. For example, the states of New York,

Pennsylvania, and Michigan are considered hardcore liberal. The conservative areas are made up of Southern California and the Deep South. "The balance of power," wrote the *Washington Post's* Bill Broder on May 1, 1967, "rests with a swing vote of self-described 'responsible conservatives,' drawing support from many states, but centered in Texas, Tennessee, Illinois, and Ohio."

In 1965, several of White's inner-circle put together a nationwide consulting service called Public Affairs, Inc. Heading up the regional office out of Topeka, Kansas would be Tom Van Sickle (Reagan campaign films for the 1968 Oregon primary were sent out from Topeka, Kansas. In charge there is J. Kerwitz, who came out in 1966 with Tom Van Sickle to argue over the California YR charter); the Northern California branch was taken by Rus Walton; William McFadden set up another branch in Minneapolis; in Washington, DC, the job went to Herbert Warburton, one of White's associates from the NYRF days of 1951. (*Kansas City Star*, September 9, 1965). Other firms joined the federation later on. Among Walton's clients, the *Star* list the United Republicans of California (UROC). Through UROC, White's public relations team and expected to play a major role in the gubernatorial campaign of Ronald Reagan should he seek the nomination. That was in *September of 1965*. Walton was later expelled as Executive Director of UROC on grounds of Syndicate affiliation and for trying to neutralize UROC's conservative position in state affairs. Which leads one to ponder how far back the Syndicate may have had its arm in the Reagan campaign. For if, in 1961, Clif White could see three years into the future to Barry Goldwater, why not with Reagan in 1964? Reagan was with White and dozens of Syndicate men in Citizens For Goldwater-Miller in 1964 and, as with Goldwater, it was a speech that set the whole thing off. As a result of "The Speech," Californians were beginning to chant for Reagan for governor two weeks before Goldwater went down to defeat.

By various estimates—all of which require further substantiation—the Syndicate is said to dominate or exert considerable influence over, the National Young Republican Federation, the United Federation of Republican Women, Young Republican chapters in at least 20 states, the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), the American Conservative Union (ACU), the Conservative Book Club, and the careers of at least two dozen U.S. congressmen and senators. Generally

accepted by the Non-Syndicate to be the Syndicate's national organ and philosophical bible: *National Review Magazine*. Considering publisher William Rusher's longstanding association with Clif White, this estimate is probably not far off. In its September 6, 1966 issue, NR went to no uncertain lengths to emphasize its absolute authority concerning Clifton Whites political commitments. *Human Events Magazine*, out of Washington, to whom NR was addressing its remarks, is considered free of Syndicate control, and, hence, a more objective spokesman for Republican affairs. At the same time, certain correspondents with Syndicate bias not infrequently use the columns of *Human Events* to promote the White-Rusher line.

Most Syndicate people started out as ideological conservatives, not political mercenaries. Most of them still think they are. But the means they employ do not deliver the goals they seek, and probably a majority working on the periphery are unaware of the conflict of interest to which they have become parties. Most of them have probably lost sight of the reason they entered politics to begin with, which was to affirm their social system and protect their heritage, not raid the Republican Party as the nation passed relentlessly into totalitarian hands. It would be both extraneous and premature to list the principle cast of Syndicate characters here. A full-length book is now underway which will try to pull the whole subject together by mid-1969. For the time being, just try and call to mind several random self-named conservatives whose actions and statements have left you dumbfounded for years. They probably belong. In states and organizations under Syndicate control, conservatism functions at an all-time low.

Clifton White will be wheeling and dealing at the Miami Convention. As to whether Reagan was the Syndicate's choice for President before he even got ready to run for governor, the fact is, he probably was. But it's your guess, and really doesn't matter. More important, the emergence of White is like a Whale suddenly surfacing out of your drawn bath water. It explains where the Reagan campaign is heading and, particularly, the Republican Party. It may even explain Reagan's reverses throughout 1966 and 1967. For, apparently, Reagan is willing to make the kind of trade Goldwater rejected in 1964 through which—due to Syndicate involvement—the GOP now threatens to become a closed party. And if past is prelude, a Republican Party under Clifton White's control will be tough to challenge—if at all.

Ronald Reagan: over the top or over the hill?

From California comes the surprise report of the year America has been waiting to learn: what is Ronald Reagan really like in politics? Taken from news columns, daily reports, state documents and over 70 personal interviews, here is the "minority report" on a considerably changed Ronald Reagan after his first 12-month encounter with American government. After a conservative start, Reagan has followed the familiar trail into the GOP's liberal wing to build his power base. The result so far? A conservative face on the Democrats' old program.

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With a national election shaping up, what are the implications? Will Reagan be used to sell the nation on four more years of "Johnsonism" under the Republican label? Will he "gather in" the conservative vote once more to hand to a GOP liberal in 1968—such as Nelson Rockefeller?

Don't go to the polls without reading this book!